Essays, or discourses, vol. 1 (of 4)

by Benito Jerónimo Feijoo

A declamation on behalf of Pompey.

LIV. Whoever tells you, sir, that from an apprehension of Cæsar, you should destroy Pompey, would persuade you to fear men more than the gods. I will suppose Cæsar to be so unjust, as to be capable of thanking you for putting Pompey to death, and of being irritated against you for not doing it. This same act of flattery to Cæsar, is so palpable an offence against heaven, that he who advises you to it, cannot possibly entertain a doubt of its being such; for if he should tell you, that by such a conduct you would conform to the will of the gods, who have declared themselves favourable to Cæsar, he would advance a sophistry unworthy to be heard in so august and solemn an assembly; for what delirium is it to imagine, that we may continue to oppress those, who groan under the weight of adverse fortune, upon a pretence, of co-operating with the Supreme Providence? According to this mode of reasoning, it would be right to give a sick man poison instead of medicine, instead of binding up the sores of the wounded, to cut and stab him afresh, and instead of succouring the poor, to take from him the little he has. The gods are able to make people unhappy, for this is a prerogative annexed to their sovereign power, which they sometimes exert, by way of exercising the patience and constancy of those they afflict, and with a view of affording to others an opportunity of manifesting their clemency, and of administering to the misfortunes of the distressed. Thus he who lends a compassionate hand to assist those whom the gods have thought fit to make unhappy, does not counteract their dispensations, but rather shews a compliance with, and an obedience to, the immutable principles of their laws.

LV. To insinuate to you, in order to make Pompey a delinquent, that by seeking an asylum here, he sought the ruin of your kingdom, amounts to the same thing, as saying he meditates burning the temple, who from the fury of his enemies, takes refuge at the altars of it. Pompey does not pretend to compel, but only intreats you; neither, in his intreaty, does he point out the bounds to which you should extend your protection to him; nor although he should point them out, could any consequences be deduced from thence to your disadvantage; for that cannot take away from you, neither now, nor at any time after he shall have put himself into your hands, the right of deliberating upon, and after a just estimation of your power, your obligation, and your risk, of determining to act by him, as the urgency of your affairs may make it necessary. Furthermore, if you reflect, you will find that he has a right to demand your protection, although it may be dangerous for you to afford it him. You owe to him the sceptre you now sway, which he restored to your father; nor is the probable hazard of the same crown, which was certainly restored to you, an adequate recompence to the man who restored it.

LVI. Having hitherto endeavoured to shew, that it would be just and right to protect Pompey; my next argument shall be to prove, that it would be convenient and advantageous also; although I am very well aware, that in the eyes of an ordinary politician, this will appear an extravagant paradox.

LVII. I shall begin with asking, what opinion ought we to entertain of Cæsar, to think that he would look with benign eyes, and a grateful heart, on a horrible act of perfidy, although it was committed to disincumber him of that enemy, who has already disputed, and may perhaps contend again with him for the empire? It seems to me, sir, that this is the light in which it is laboured to represent Cæsar to you; but if he truly is not such a sort of man, the treachery which Theodotus proposes to you, will be very useless; but I will add, that although he is that sort of man, you will not avoid, but rather augment the danger of losing your crown, by being guilty of it. If Cæsar is blinded by the passion of ambition to such an extreme degree, that it would excite him, for the sake of gratifying it, to trample every sort of duty and obligation under foot; this vile piece of service, will not exempt or protect you from his despoiling you of your kingdom; his ambition, if this is his only idol, will prompt him to extend his dominion by all possible ways and means, whether just or unjust; and the opulent kingdom of Egypt, is not so contemptible an acquisition, that an ambitious man will forbear to seize it, for the sake of rewarding a perfidious one with its possession.

LVII. The worst is, that by following the advice of Theodotus, you will furnish Cæsar with a specious pretence for usurping your kingdom; and therefore I say, that so far from avoiding the danger of losing it, by adopting his plan, you would increase the risk. That Cæsar is very sagacious and penetrating, is well known to all the world; and although he might be glad to hear that Pompey was put to death; after the deed was executed, he would affect to lament it. He, in appearance at least, would detest the treachery of receiving Pompey into Egypt, under a promise of security upon the royal word, for the purpose of taking away his life. From this equivocal or critical state of Cæsar’s mind, there might be but a short transition to his taking the resolution of depriving you of your crown, and perhaps your life also. He might do it for the sake of gratifying his ambition, and endeavouring to persuade the world, that he was actuated by no other motive than that of punishing the treacherous murderer of Pompey; and although he might foresee, the Romans would never believe that this was his motive; he well knows they would applaud the action, as they idolized Pompey while living, and will adore his memory when dead. Other nations, who on account of their being less penetrating, may not see into the artful policy of Cæsar, will only contemplate in your ruin, a punishment correspondent to your crime, and will admire the heroic justice of Cæsar, who chastised the wicked act, although the commission of it was never so convenient to him. Consider, sir, whether Cæsar will lose so fine an opportunity of flattering the Roman people, of recommending himself to the world for a just man, and of adding to the Imperial crown he is fabricating, the precious gem of this kingdom.

LIX. We know that Cæsar, in all his actions and designs, has proposed to himself Alexander of Macedon as the only example he would wish to imitate. We are informed, that having in a temple of Spain, seen a statue of that hero, it raised in his imagination a contemplation of his glory, and caused him to shed tears of envy. Attend now, sir, to what I am about to say to you. Immediately after Darius was defeated by Alexander in the battle of Arbela, that unhappy king, who was become a fugitive from the conqueror, was treacherously murdered by Bessus the governor of Bactria, who thought by putting him to death, that he should gain the favour of Alexander. But what followed? Why, that Alexander caused him to be arrested, and torn to pieces by his own immediate order as some tell us, or as others say, delivered him to Oxathres the brother of Darius, to be dealt with as he thought proper. Consider, sir, how great an affinity there is between the battles of Arbela and Pharsalia, between the fortunes of Pompey and Darius, and between the genius and tempers of Cæsar and Alexander. How much is it to be dreaded, that if you act by Pompey, as Bessus did by Darius, that Cæsar will do by you, as Alexander did by Bessus? He will find himself precisely in the same circumstances of Alexander, and will, without doubt, be strangely flattered with the idea of imitating him, and especially in an action, which he knows was applauded by all the world. We find ourselves also in the city of Alexandria, which was founded by, and took its name from, Alexander; and even this circumstance, may contribute to augment your danger, because, if ever he should think fit to visit this city, it would revive in his imagination the idea of its founder.

LX. I very well know, that although Cæsar should be the man we have hitherto supposed him, still the protection of Pompey is not free from danger. The Roman legions, in search of this illustrious fugitive, will naturally present themselves to our imagination, destroying with warlike fury, the country that harbours him. But if, in whatever course we pursue, we must unavoidably encounter rocks and quicksands, what does human prudence dictate in such a case? that we should do what’s right and just, and leave the event to the disposal of the gods. It is beyond a doubt, that the power of Cæsar is great; but his fortune is no less dependant on heaven than ours, and the ray of Jupiter pays no more respect to the proud palace, than to the humble cabin. Thus those to whom heaven is most propitious, are likely to be most successful.

LXI. Nor need we depend solely for our security on the special providence of the gods, as we have resources in the ordinary course of human events, and in the common influence of second causes. Cæsar is yet at a great distance, and as he will have much to settle both in Italy and Greece, in order to secure the fruits of his late victory, it will be probably some time before he will find himself at leisure to visit Egypt. During that interval, we may be employed in modeling and disciplining our troops; they are not few in number, and we may add new recruits to them; and to make the Egyptian troops equal to the best in the world, nothing more is necessary, than that they should be properly trained, and be commanded by a good general; because when we had such a one in the person of our famous Sesostris, they conquered and triumphed over the principal regions of Asia, as the ruins of the columns that prince erected, and which time has thrown down, testify. Nobody disputes Pompey’s being, if not the greatest soldier in the world, at least equal to the greatest. His victories have acquired him the epithet of great, which is a title Cæsar never attained. We have then in him, the general we want; nor ought his reputation to be lessened by the victory Cæsar lately obtained over him; for besides his commanding a motley army, collected from, and composed of various nations, he was but little or ill obeyed in that war; and this is an evil, for which we have a remedy in our own power, by committing the whole military government to the discretion and direction of Pompey. If he finds himself not in a condition or situation to attack with a prospect of victory, he will stand on the defensive, and preserve his troops, which is the conduct he wished to have pursued in Greece. We may also hope for many advantages from time; as in the interval of our recess, succours may arrive to Pompey from all the world; for the whole Roman empire, except the troops immediately in his pay, are enemies to Cæsar; and although we should not be able to assemble an army, capable of resisting Cæsar, his success will not be quite certain. The whole Roman republic which commands the world, groans with affliction, under the intolerable sensation, occasioned by the suppression of their liberty; and it would be very extraordinary, if among the millions of people of which it is composed, there should not be found some one desperate enough, to sacrifice his own life, for the sake of redeeming his country. Every man who arrives at despising, or setting no value on his own life, may have that of Cæsar in his power; for one concealed poignard, or one disguised dose of poison administered at his table, would be more dangerous and fatal to him, than fifty thousand lances in the open field. The instances of Romans, who have offered themselves voluntary victims to the idol of fame, or the good of their country, are numerous; and perhaps Cæsar at this time, has some one near his person, waiting for an opportunity to repeat the same sacrifice.

LXII. There remains to us also another crutch of hope whereon to rest, that is, the unwholesomeness of our climate. The air of Ægypt, which is very unsalutary to the natives, is much more so to strangers. The soldiers of Cæsar were born under, and have served in climates, which were very different from ours. How natural then is it to suppose, that by being detained some time in this country, the visitation of an epidemical disorder may either demolish or incapacitate them!