XXII. The vanity (says the famous Magdalen Scudery, in the fourth volume of her Cyrus) which is derived only from our progenitors, is not well founded; but for all this, this illustrious chimera, which so sooths and flatters the hearts of all mankind, is so universally established throughout the world, that it cannot fail to obtain veneration and regard. It is certain, that in many things common usage hurries us on against reason, but in others, reason dictates to us, that we should conform to the common practice, and this is the predicament with respect to the subject we are treating of, that we find ourselves in at present.
XXIII. It is however true, that I have my doubts, whether this common estimation of nobility has arose of itself, or whether it is derived from an adjunct quality that is annexed to it, which is power. Noblemen are generally rich, and it may be doubted, whether the adoration that is paid to this idol called nobility, was introduced by the respect people bore to the image or figure, or the gold of which it was made. What we see is, that the nobles who fall off in riches, proceed with the same pace that they decrease in these, to lose the estimation in which they were held; and although there will always remain to them some respect, who can determine, whether this proceeds from the occult influence of their generous race, or from a common habit we are in of holding them in esteem? It may also happen, that a noble reduced from opulence to poverty, may be venerated as the relic of an idol, which heretofore had been worshiped.
XXIV. It is therefore necessary, to seek for some more solid ground than any we have hitherto gone over, whereon to build the estimation which should be enjoyed by the nobility, and such, no doubt, is to be found in reason, abstracted from the support of authority. It is a fixed maxim in ethics, that to every kind of excellence some honour is due; the general consent then of mankind, the regard shewn them by princes, and the privileges allowed them by the laws; having placed the nobility in a degree of superiority above that of other people; I say these considerations, ought to make us look upon nobility as a kind of excellence, to which, in consequence of its being such, we owe respect and honour.
XXV. And here it will be proper to remark, that this debt is not barred or cancelled by any uncertainty that may arise concerning the origin of those who are accepted as nobles. The reason is, because their being generally acknowledged and received as such, is sufficient to place them in that degree of superiority; for we cannot require more examination of their descent, in order to respect them, than the laws require which favour them. He would be a very extraordinary man, who could arrive at giving physical proof of who is his father; but his not being able to do this, does not absolve any one from the indispensable obligation of reverencing the man as such, who is generally esteemed and reputed to be his father.
XXVI. This debt of veneration to the nobility, should be understood in all cases, with a reservation of what is due, and properly appertains to virtue, which, according to the constant doctrine of Aristotle, and St. Thomas, is much more worthy of honour than nobility; therefore, even with that civil and extrinsic honour, which in their ethics those two great masters speak of, we ought more to reverence a virtuous Plebeian, than a Nobleman without virtue. Our cardinal Aguirre, when he is explaining philosophy, in the third chapter of his fourth book of ethics, says, that a vicious nobleman is unworthy of all honour and respect; to which sentiment I subscribe, because it is conformable to a maxim of the angelic doctor, who (22 quæst. 145. art. I.) having said, that honour properly and principally was only due to virtue, admits, that other qualities and excellences inferior to her, such as nobility, riches, and power, are only honourable in proportion as they conduce to, and assist the operations of virtue: Alia vero, quæ sunt infra virtutem, honorantur in quantum coadjuvant ad opera virtutis, sicut nobilitas, potentia, & divitiæ. If the nobility then do not assist virtue, but rather foment vanity and nourish pride, by lending their suffrages to vices which obstruct virtue, they render themselves totally unworthy of the least respect.
SECT. VI.
XXVII. But how shall we reconcile what we have just now said against the nobility, with what we said but a little before in their favour? Easily, by saying this prerogative is not laudable, but honourable. The arguments we have just urged impugn its laudabillty, those we are about to use are affirmative of its honour. This is a distinction pointed out by Aristotle, between virtue and all the other excellences which illustrate the human race. Virtue, he says, is laudable; riches, nobility, and power, deserve no praise, but have a pretension to be honoured. So that there is nothing in nobility which a man should boast or be vain of; but there is something in it, which those who are inferior to them in rank should reverence and respect. This distinction will reconcile all difficulties, and assure to the nobility esteem, without fomenting their vanity.
SECT. VII.
XXVIII. The subject of this discourse, especially that part of it which is contained in the second, third, and fourth paragraphs, leads me opportunely to banish an error which is exceedingly vulgarized. The world is so filled with the caprice of the occult influence of the blood, that many people are led away with a notion, that children by the force of it, not only inherit from thence those passions which depend on the temperament, but also a propensity for the religion of their ancestors. They don’t even stop here, for the lower sort extend this influence to the milk with which children are nourished in their infancy, giving credit to this ridiculous maxim, from here and there an uncertain or fabulous experiment or instance, such for example, as a person when he came to the state of manhood having turned Jew, which he imbibed a disposition to do, by having sucked a Jew nurse.
XXIX. There is no error more void of all probability than this. If we speak of the true religion, not only the assent which the understanding gives to its dogmas, but also the pious affection which precedes this assent, are both supernatural; consequently, according to sound theology, neither the blood nor the aliment, nor any other natural cause, can have connexion, either with the assent or pious affection. This is all the work of the divine grace, as a substitute for which, there is not the most remote disposition to be found in the whole sphere of nature, and you can only admit negative natural ones, which concur merely to remove impediments, such as a good understanding, and a good native turn of mind. But these good dispositions, in those who possess them, do not depend upon their fathers having professed the true religion; for if this was the case, all the catholics would have good understandings, and would be naturally good-disposed people.