Honourable Senators,—The speech that I have the honour of delivering before your illustrious Assembly may appear analytical, because in it I propose to touch on several questions and to speak decisively upon several problems, especially with regard to internal policy.[[13]] By this I do not delude myself to be able to convince those who are my opponents in malâ fide, nor to disperse completely the small opposition which nourishes itself on detail, and is the effect of personal temperament.
[13]. The speech on Internal Policy here referred to will follow this one on page [306].
You will not be surprised if I begin with foreign policy, even if it happens that this is the field in which serious and founded opposition does not exist, and it may be legitimately said that our policy is endorsed unanimously by the nation.
As I have already said on other occasions, the foreign policy of the present Government is inspired by the necessity for a progressive revaluation of our diplomatic and political position in Europe and in the world. It is a fact that, except for territorial acquisitions bounded by the Brenner and the Nevoso, frontiers wrested by long and bloody wars, Italy was excluded in the Peace of Versailles and other successive treaties from all other benefits of an economic and colonial nature. Solemn pacts signed during the war have lapsed and have not been replaced. The position of inferiority assigned to Italy has weighed and still weighs heavily on the economic life of our people. It is useless to dwell upon recriminations of the past. We must rather seek to regain the ground and time lost. There is no doubt that from October to to-day the situation has notably improved.
The other Powers, whether allied or not, know that Italy intends to follow an energetic and assiduous policy for the protection of her natural and vital interests, intends to be present wherever, directly or indirectly, they are at stake, because this is her right and her definite duty; but at the same time she is in favour of that line of conduct in general policy which tends to bring back as quickly as possible to a normal state the economic situation of our continent. Italy, who too is marching rapidly towards her readjustment, sees this re-birth continually disturbed by general outside factors. There is, therefore, a definite Italian interest in hastening the pacific solution of the European crisis.
The Position of Italy and Reparations. All such crises, since the Treaty of Versailles onwards, have been dominated by the one problem: Reparations. In the face of this problem the fundamental position of Italy is as follows:
1. Germany can and must pay a sum which now seems universally fixed and which is very far from the many hundreds of milliards talked of on the morrow of the Armistice;
2. Italy could not tolerate territorial changes which would lead to a political, economic or military hegemony in Europe;
3. Italy is prepared to bear her quota of sacrifice, if it is necessary to obtain what is called European reconstruction;
4. The Italian Government maintains to-day more than ever, above all after the last German Note, that the problem of reparations and that of Inter-Allied debts are intimately connected and are in a certain sense interdependent.