The Treaties of Peace. The Great War has resulted in six treaties of peace up to the present: Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon, Neuilly, Sèvres, Rapallo. Not one of these treaties has wholly satisfied the victors; not one, even the Treaty of Rapallo, which was supposed to be a masterpiece of friendly and peaceful negotiation, has been accepted by the vanquished. As far as the Treaty of Versailles, the greatest of all, is concerned, even at this moment the important question of the indemnity which Germany ought to pay is still under discussion. It is a figure which makes us feel giddy and the last word has not yet been said. All the settlements, especially those made by diplomats, have an ironically provisional character.
The Germans, who have formed the “sacred union” of non-payment, announce that they will make counterproposals by the same representatives who will speak at London in a few weeks’ time. Our opinion is, that if the Germans can pay they ought, as far as it is possible, and the experts must ascertain the truth of this possibility. We must not forget, before allowing ourselves to pity the Germans—who had already fixed our indemnity at 500 milliards of gold, in the case of their victory—that it was the Germans who began the war, and that the first Irredentism was directed against Italy, on account of those minorities which had descended, without right, into the Upper Adige.
German Austria, Macedonia and Smyrna. The present Austrian Republic was the result of the Treaty of St. Germain. Can it continue to live, formed as it is at present? It is generally thought not. There remains the alternative of a Danube Confederation with its centre at Vienna and Budapest, but the “Little Entente” sees to it that there shall be no return, under any form, of the old régime. We think that, by the force of events, an economic Danube Confederation will be formed sooner or later, in which case the conditions of Austria, and especially of Vienna, would improve until she had arrived at the point of lessening the pro-German annexationist movement. From the standpoint of justice, and whenever there was a clear manifestation of the will of the people, Austria would have the right of separating herself from Germany. This possible eventuality cannot leave us indifferent, because of the boundaries of the Brenner, which is a question of life or death for the Paduan valley. A hungry and pauper Austria cannot organise a dangerous Irredentism against us; but as the result of union with Germany the question of the Upper Adige would certainly become more acute.
As for Hungary, she can certainly expect a revision of the treaty which mutilates her on every side. It must be added, however, that the chapter of Fiume is definitely closed in Hungarian history.
Centres of infection for another war exist all over the Balkan world. Let us quote Montenegro and Albania, for example. We are in favour of the independence of both these States, provided that they show themselves capable of enjoying it. Bulgaria has a right to Macedonia[[7]] and also to a port on the Ægean. And this is of capital importance for the economic expansion of Italy in Bulgaria. The Treaty of Sèvres crushed Turkey in order to exalt the Greece of Venizelos and Constantine, which gave the European war the sacrifice of 787 “euzoni.” We consider, as far as the Eastern Mediterranean is concerned, that Italy, on the whole, should follow a pro-Turkish policy.
[7]. Population: 1,181,000 Bulgarians, 499,000 Turks, and 228,000 Greeks.
The Treaty of Rapallo. Immediately after the signing of the Treaty of Rapallo, the Central Committee of the Fascio passed its judgment upon it, finding it “acceptable for the Eastern boundaries, inacceptable and deficient as regards Fiume, and insufficient and to be rejected as regards Zara and Dalmatia.” At three months’ distance this judgment does not seem to be contradicted by successive events. The Treaty of Rapallo is an unhappy compromise, against which pages of criticism were printed in the Popolo d’Italia, which it is now useless to repeat.
It must be explained why victorious Italy ever arrived at the point of signing the Peace of Rapallo. And the explanations do not need much mental exertion. Rapallo was the logical consequence of the line of foreign policy followed by us or imposed upon us before, during and after the war. It is explained by Wilson and his so-called experts and the absolute lack of Italian propaganda abroad and the dead-tiredness of the people. Rapallo is explained by the meeting of the oppressed nationalities held at Rome in April 1918, which meeting can be directly connected with the ill-fated story of Caporetto. Everything is paid for in this life. On 12th November 1920, we paid at Rapallo for the breakdown of 24th October 1917. Had there been no Caporetto, there would have been no Pact of Rome. In that congress the Yugoslavs threw dust in our eyes because in reality they did nothing towards breaking up the Dual Monarchy from within, of which they were the faithful slaves to the last, with traditional Croat loyalty. Not for nothing did the Hapsburg monarchy, upon its decease, try to present the Jugoslavs with its navy. But it was in the April of 1918 that the irreparable was committed, with the consent of all currents of Italian public opinion, including ours and the Nationalists—that is to say, our worst enemies were raised to the rank of effectual and powerful allies, and naturally, when the victory was obtained, there was no accepting of the rôle of vanquished, but they adopted that of co-operators with a relative share in the common booty. After the Pact of Rome it was no longer possible to place our knee on the chest of Yugoslavia—this is the truth. And so it happened that the Italian people—tired, impoverished and unnerved by two long years of useless negotiations, demoralised by the policy of the Government and the tremendous wave of after-war sabotage (against which only the Fascisti reacted powerfully)—accepted, or rather suffered, the Treaty of Rapallo, without manifestations of grief or joy. And, in order to finish it once and for all, many people would also have accepted the terrible line of Montemaggiore. All the parties of all the grades of Left and Right accepted the treaty as a lesser evil. We, too, submitted to it, considering it merely as a transitory and ephemeral act (has there ever been anything definite in the world, much less upon the moving sands of diplomacy?), and with the intention of gathering our forces to be ready for the revision which, sooner or later, would improve the treaty and not make it worse, would carry our boundaries to the Dinaric Alps, but never again allow the boundaries of Yugoslavia to reach the Isonzo.
The fate meted out to Dalmatia makes us very sad. But the fault does not lie wholly with the negotiators of the eleventh hour; the renunciation had already been made in Parliament, in the papers and in the universities themselves, where a professor printed a book, which was naturally translated at Zagabria, in which he proved, in his own way, that Dalmatia is not Italian. The Dalmatian tragedy lies in this ignorance, bad faith and want of understanding; faults which we hope to repair with our work by making Dalmatia known, loved and defended.
The treaty, once signed, could be annulled in one of two ways: by outside war or internal revolution. Both equally absurd. You do not make the people throng the squares in order to change a peace treaty after five years of bloodshed. Nobody is capable of working such prodigies. It was possible to cause a revolution in Italy in order to obtain intervention; but to cause a revolution in November 1920, in order to annul a peace treaty which, good or bad, had been accepted by ninety-nine per cent. of the Italian people, could not be considered. I do not mind much about coherence, but there are stenographic records which bear witness to the fact that I steadily refused to go against the treaty either by promoting outside war or internal revolution. I considered that it was also dangerous to get mixed up in an armed resistance to the treaty.