But truth usually comes along behind any simple, clear policy and overcomes the obliquity, the conventional mentality, the spirit of opportunism, and the lie-barking of the yesterdays.
There is no country in the world in which foreign policy, though carefully carved out and approved by the nation, is not subject to internal attack based on ignorance or bad faith. Therefore it was no surprise to me to find that even when I had calmed the internal political situation and had established for us the main points of the general policy of Italy within and without, there were those who began an offensive of criticism.
One of them was Count Sforza, who in October, 1922, was in Paris as Italian ambassador.
This man, loquacious and irresponsible as a minister in the past governments, had been a nuisance to the country. He had linked his name with the Adriatic situation, humiliating for our nation. This former minister, an amateur in everything that concerned any perplexity of foreign policy, showed himself so vain that he could not sense the delicacy of his position in Paris. While in Italy events of historic character were maturing, homesickness for lost power made him a bad servant of his own country. He even went to the point of trying to create difficulties for the Fascist government in the French capital. Already political groups there were unfavorable to if not envious of, any new solidarity in Italy. Count Sforza at once began to criticise openly my declaration on foreign and internal policy, my political method and my concept of Fascist Italy. I sent him a telegram, and this is what I said:
“I must interpret as a not quite amiable and rather an awkward gesture, your decision to hand in your resignation before having officially known my orders as to foreign policy, which I will disclose in the Chamber of Parliament; orders that will not be merely a sum of sentiments and resentments, as you wrongly think. I bid you now formally to keep your place and not create difficulties for the Government. In this moment, the Government represents the highest expression of the national conscience. I am waiting for a telegraphic answer and I reserve my later decision as to you.
Mussolini.”
To this telegram Count Sforza made an elusive answer. So I called him to Rome and after some explanations which revealed our two minds to be in complete antithesis, I relieved him of office and dismissed him from his place. It was time that the central authority should no longer be debated by those who occupied inferior positions. Italian political life needs command and organization and discipline. Our representatives abroad were sometimes shown to have a cold, isolated, autonomous life, far removed from their primary duties toward their country.
This first strong gesture of mine was a clear signal; it undoubtedly served as an example and admonition for many others of our diplomatic representatives, who tried to withdraw themselves, with subjective attitudes, beyond the supreme authority of the state.
Having closed this breach in our diplomacy I dedicated all my energies to the solution of those political problems which would determine our future. I found facing me a situation already distorted and prejudiced by the crass errors of preceding governments. I found a series of peace treaties which, though in some respects full of defects, nevertheless constituted as a whole an unavoidable state of fact squarely to be met.
Still palpitating and open in Italy was the wound of the Rapallo treaty with Jugoslavia. I wanted to medicate that and heal it. On the delicate ground of treaties I explained my position and suggestions in a speech about foreign policy delivered in the chamber, November 16th, 1922. I said then, as I always say, that “treaties, whether bad or good, must be carried out. A respectable nation can have no other programme. But treaties are neither eternal nor irreparable. They are chapters of history, not epilogues of history.” Speaking of foreign policy in relation to the different groups of powers, I summarized my thoughts with this definition: “We cannot allow ourselves either a plan of insane altruism or one of complete subservience to the plans of the other peoples. Ours is then a policy of autonomy. It shall be firm and severe.”