Our record in international affairs discloses a sleepless vigilance to build peace and make friends. More peace, more friends. We yield nothing of our autonomy, nor do we allow our power to be used as a pawn by others. We are idealists in the sense that we endeavor to make and keep peace by building and maintaining, brick by brick, stone by stone, a structure of peace founded on realities rather than on dreams and visionary plans. I have insisted upon being strong, but I have labored to be generous.
For an efficient foreign service, the world requires some housecleaning in its diplomatic machinery, which has grown stale, over-manned, and bureaucratic, and filled with feeble, petty conspiracies to gain place and promotion.
I then began, in the reorganization of our consulates, an elimination of foreign functionaries. That work was long and wide-spread, because it was necessary to rebuild our old consular organization. The renovation, complex as were its problems, was completed with unswerving insistence.
In the midst of this complex task of foreign policy and machinery, and while I was studying the solution of the Adriatic problem, there came the news that the Italian military mission in Albania had been treacherously ambushed on a road and massacred in its entirety by bandits from the border. In this tragic happening there were wiped out brave General Enrico Tellini, Surgeon-Major Luigi Corte, Artillery Lieutenant Mario Bonacini, and a soldier, Farneti. The Italian military mission was in Albania, together with other foreign missions, with a well-defined task, laid out by definite international agreements. The offense to Italy and to the Italian name hit the sensibilities of Italy squarely in the face. History furnishes other examples of such outrages and points to accepted standards. I made myself the interpreter of the righteous wrath of Italians everywhere. I at once sent an ultimatum to Greece.
I demanded an apology. I demanded payment of fifty million lire as indemnity.
Greece turned to us a deaf ear. Pretexts and excuses met my request. There was an attempt by Greece to find allies to aid her to slide away from my demands. I would not play that base game. Without hesitation I sent units of our naval squadron to the Greek island of Corfu. There the Italian marines landed. At the same time I sent a note to the powers. The League of Nations declared itself incompetent to judge and solve the incident. I continued the occupation of Corfu, declaring clearly that Italy would withdraw from the League if we could not obtain there a satisfactory attitude. This was not a mere matter of insult by words; it concerned the lives of Italian officers and soldiers. It was impossible to believe that I could allow this tragic page to be turned over with nothing more than some bureaucratic gesture.
There has been so much misrepresentation and nonsense as to this outrage and the settlement of our demands that I may do well to state the simple facts, which any school child can understand and digest.
The case, when brought for judgment to the Conference of the Ambassadors, received, as was to be expected, a verdict favorable to the Italian position.
Greece gave me all the satisfaction that I had asked. The indemnity was paid. I offered ten millions of this indemnity to the Greek refugees. Thereafter, having obtained full satisfaction, I recalled the squadron from Corfu. The book was closed.
But that month was indeed one of tragic happenings. The new Fascist style of foreign policy had satisfied the sensibility of all the Italians, but I admit that it had hurt the feelings of many foreign elements which saw in my foreign policy something out of the ordinary, disturbing to many and preventing plans opposed to the rights of Italy. I allowed nothing to deflect me. I made important declarations to the senate, both as to the Greek incident and on the question of Fiume. I said then that the most painful inheritance of our foreign policy was Fiume, but that nevertheless I was treating with Jugoslavia to solve, with the slightest possible damage, the very grave Adriatic situation inherited as a consequence of the Treaty of Rapallo.