XVIII. If any colony should at their own charge erect a fortress, to secure their port against the fleets of a foreign enemy, get your governor to betray that fortress into your hands. Never think of paying what it cost the country, for that would look, at least, like some regard for justice; but turn it into a citadel, to awe the inhabitants and curb their commerce. If they should have lodged in such fortress the very arms they bought and used to aid you in your conquests, seize them all; it will provoke like ingratitude added to robbery. One admirable effect of these operations will be, to discourage every other colony from erecting such defences, and so their and your enemies may more easily invade them, to the great disgrace of your government, and of course the furtherance of your project.
XIX. Send armies into their country, under pretence of protecting the inhabitants; but, instead of garrisoning the forts on their frontiers with those troops, to prevent incursions, demolish those forts, and order the troops into the heart of the country, that the savages may be encouraged to attack the frontiers[138], and that the troops may be protected by the inhabitants: this will seem to proceed from your ill-will or your ignorance, and contribute farther to produce and strengthen an opinion among them, that you are no longer fit to govern them[139].
XX. Lastly, invest the general of your army in the provinces with great and unconstitutional powers, and free him from the controul of even your own civil governors. Let him have troops enow under his command, with all the fortresses in his possession, and who knows but (like some provincial generals in the Roman empire, and encouraged by the universal discontent you have produced) he may take it into his head to set up for himself? If he should, and you have carefully practised these few excellent rules of mine, take my word for it, all the provinces will immediately join him—and you will that day (if you have not done it sooner) get rid of the trouble of governing them, and all the plagues attending their commerce and connection from thenceforth and for ever.
FOOTNOTES:
[136] These rules first appeared in a London newspaper about the beginning of the year 1774, and have several times since been introduced into our public prints.—The minister alluded to is supposed to be the Earl of Hillsborough.
"The causes and motions of seditions (says Lord Bacon) are, innovation in religion, taxes, alteration of laws and customs, breaking of privileges, general oppression, advancement of unworthy persons, strangers, dearths, disbanded soldiers, factions grown desperate, and whatsoever in offending people joineth and knitteth them in a common cause." B. V.
[137] One of the American writers affirms, "That there has not been a single instance in which they have complained, without being rebuked, or in which they have been complained against, without being punished."—A fundamental mistake in the minister occasioned this. Every individual in New England (the peccant country) was held a coward or a knave, and the disorders, which spread abroad there, were treated as the result of the too great lenity of Britain! By the aid of this short and benevolent rule, judgment was ever wisely predetermined, to the shutting out redress on the one hand, and inforcing every rigour of punishment on the other. B. V.
[138] I am not versed in Indian affairs, but I find, that in April, 1773, the assembled chiefs of the western nations told one of our Indian agents, "that they remembered their father, the king of Great Britain's message, delivered to them last fall, of demolishing Fort Pittsburg (on the Ohio) and removing the soldiers with their sharp-edged weapons out of the country:—this gave them great pleasure, as it was a strong proof of his paternal kindness towards them." (See Considerations on the Agreement with Mr. T. Walpole for Lands upon the Ohio, p. 9). This is general history: I attempt no application of facts, personally invidious. B. V.
[139] As the reader may be inclined to divide his belief between the wisdom of ministry and the candor and veracity of Dr. Franklin, I shall inform him that two contrary objections may be made to the truth of this representation. The first is, that the conduct of Great Britain is made too absurd for possibility, and the second, that it is not made absurd enough for fact. If we consider that this piece does not include the measures subsequent to 1773, the latter difficulty is easily set aside. The former I can only solve by the many instances in history, where the infatuation of individuals has brought the heaviest calamities upon nations. B. V.