Supposing then, that heaven may still continue to bless his majesty's arms, and that the event of this just war may put it in our power to retain some of our conquests at the making of a peace; let us consider,
[1. The security of a dominion, a justifiable and prudent ground upon which to demand cessions from an enemy.]
Whether we are to confine ourselves to those possessions only that were "the objects for which we began the war[22]." This the remarker seems to think right, when the question relates to "Canada, properly so called; it having never been mentioned as one of those objects, in any of our memorials or declarations, or in any national or public act whatsoever." But the gentleman himself will probably agree, that if the cession of Canada would be a real advantage to us; we may demand it under his second head, as an "indemnification for the charges incurred" in recovering our just rights; otherwise, according to his own principles, the demand of Guadaloupe can have no foundation.—That "our claims before the war were large enough for possession and for security too[23]," though it seems a clear point with the ingenious remarker, is, I own, not so with me. I am rather of the contrary opinion, and shall presently give my reasons.
But first let me observe, that we did not make those claims because they were large enough for security, but because we could rightfully claim no more. Advantages gained in the course of this war may increase the extent of our rights. Our claims before the war contained some security; but that is no reason why we should neglect acquiring more, when the demand of more is become reasonable. It may be reasonable in the case of America, to ask for the security recommended by the author of the Letter[24], though it would be preposterous to do it in many other cases. His proposed demand is founded on the little value of Canada to the French; the right we have to ask, and the power we may have to insist on an indemnification for our expences; the difficulty the French themselves will be under of restraining their restless subjects in America from encroaching on our limits and disturbing our trade; and the difficulty on our parts of preventing encroachments, that may possibly exist many years without coming to our knowledge.
But the remarker "does not see why the arguments, employed concerning a security for a peaceable behaviour in Canada, would not be equally cogent for calling for the same security in Europe[25]." On a little farther reflection, he must I think be sensible, that the circumstances of the two cases are widely different.—Here we are separated by the best and clearest of boundaries, the ocean, and we have people in or near every part of our territory. Any attempt to encroach upon us, by building a fort even in the obscurest corner of these islands, must therefore be known and prevented immediately. The aggressors also must be known, and the nation they belong to would be accountable for their aggression. In America it is quite otherwise. A vast wilderness, thinly or scarce at all peopled, conceals with ease the march of troops and workmen. Important passes may be seized within our limits, and forts built in a month, at a small expence, that may cost us an age, and a million, to remove. Dear experience has taught this. But what is still worse, the wide extended forests between our settlements and theirs, are inhabited by barbarous tribes of savages, that delight in war, and take pride in murder; subjects properly neither of the French nor English, but strongly attached to the former by the art and indefatigable industry of priests, similarity of superstitions, and frequent family alliances. These are easily, and have been continually, instigated to fall upon and massacre our planters, even in times of full peace between the two crowns; to the certain diminution of our people and the contraction of our settlements[26]. And though it is known they are supplied by the French, and carry their prisoners to them, we can, by complaining, obtain no redress; as the governors of Canada have a ready excuse, that the Indians are an independent people, over whom they have no power, and for whose actions they are therefore not accountable. Surely circumstances so widely different may reasonably authorise different demands of security in America, from such as are usual or necessary in Europe.
The remarker however thinks, that our real dependance for keeping "France or any other nation true to her engagements, must not be in demanding securities which no nation whilst independent can give; but on our own strength and our own vigilance[27]." No nation that has carried on a war with disadvantage, and is unable to continue it, can be said, under such circumstances, to be independent; and while either side thinks itself in a condition to demand an indemnification, there is no man in his senses, but will, cæteris paribus, prefer an indemnification, that is a cheaper and more effectual security than any other he can think of. Nations in this situation demand and cede countries by almost every treaty of peace that is made. The French part of the island of St. Christophers was added to Great Britain in circumstances altogether similar to those in which a few months may probably place the country of Canada. Farther security has always been deemed a motive with a conqueror to be less moderate; and even the vanquished insist upon security as a reason for demanding what they acknowledge they could not otherwise properly ask. The security of the frontier of France on the side of the Netherlands was always considered in the negotiation, that began at Gertrudenburgh, and ended with that war. For the same reason they demanded and had Cape Breton. But a war, concluded to the advantage of France, has always added something to the power, either of France, or the house of Bourbon. Even that of 1733, which she commenced with declarations of her having no ambitious views, and which finished by a treaty, at which the ministers of France repeatedly declared, that she desired nothing for herself, in effect gained for her Lorrain, an indemnification ten times the value of all her North American possessions. In short, security and quiet of princes and states have ever been deemed sufficient reasons, when supported by power, for disposing of rights; and such disposition has never been looked on as want of moderation. It has always been the foundation of the most general treaties. The security of Germany was the argument for yielding considerable possessions there to the Swedes: and the security of Europe divided the Spanish monarchy by the partition-treaty, made between powers who had no other right to dispose of any part of it. There can be no cession that is not supposed at least, to increase the power of the party to whom it is made. It is enough that he has a right to ask it, and that he does it not merely to serve the purposes of a dangerous ambition.
Canada, in the hands of Britain, will endanger the kingdom of France as little as any other cession; and from its situation and circumstances cannot be hurtful to any other state. Rather, if peace be an advantage, this cession may be such to all Europe. The present war teaches us, that disputes arising in America may be an occasion of embroiling nations; who have no concerns there. If the French remain in Canada and Louisiana, fix the boundaries as you will between us and them, we must border on each other for more than fifteen hundred miles. The people that inhabit the frontiers are generally the refuse of both nations, often of the worst morals and the least discretion; remote from the eye, the prudence, and the restraint of government. Injuries are therefore frequently, in some part or other of so long a frontier, committed on both sides, resentment provoked, the colonies first engaged, and then the mother countries. And two great nations can scarce be at war in Europe, but some other prince or state thinks it a convenient opportunity to revive some ancient claim, seize some advantage, obtain some territory, or enlarge some power at the expence of a neighbour. The flames of war, once kindled, often spread far and wide, and the mischief is infinite. Happy it proved to both nations, that the Dutch were prevailed on finally to cede the New Netherlands (now the province of New York) to us at the peace of 1674; a peace that has ever since continued between us, but must have been frequently disturbed, if they had retained the possession of that country, bordering several hundred miles on our colonies of Pensylvania westward, Connecticut and the Massachusetts eastward. Nor is it to be wondered at, that people of different language, religion, and manners, should in those remote parts engage in frequent quarrels; when we find, that even the people of our own colonies have frequently been so exasperated against each other, in their disputes about boundaries, as to proceed to open violence and bloodshed.
[2. Erecting forts in the back settlements, almost in no instance a sufficient security against the Indians and the French; but the possession of Canada implies every security, and ought to be had, while in our power.]
But the remarker thinks we shall be sufficiently secure in America, if we "raise English forts at such passes as may at once make us respectable to the French and to the Indian nations[28]." The security desirable in America may be considered as of three kinds. 1. A security of possession, that the French shall not drive us out of the country. 2. A security of our planters from the inroads of savages, and the murders committed by them. 3. A security that the British nation shall not be obliged, on every new war, to repeat the immense expence occasioned by this, to defend its possessions in America. Forts, in the most important passes, may, I acknowledge, be of use to obtain the first kind of security: but as those situations are far advanced beyond the inhabitants, the expence of maintaining and supplying the garrisons will be very great even in time of full peace, and immense on every interruption of it; as it is easy for skulking-parties of the enemy, in such long roads through the woods, to intercept and cut off our convoys, unless guarded continually by great bodies of men.—The second kind of security will not be obtained by such forts, unless they were connected by a wall like that of China, from one end of our settlements to the other. If the Indians, when at war, marched like the Europeans, with great armies, heavy cannon, baggage, and carriages; the passes through which alone such armies could penetrate our country, or receive their supplies, being secured, all might be sufficiently secure; but the case is widely different. They go to war, as they call it, in small parties; from fifty men down to five. Their hunting life has made them acquainted with the whole country, and scarce any part of it is impracticable to such a party. They can travel through the woods even by night, and know how to conceal their tracks. They pass easily between your forts undiscovered; and privately approach the settlements of your frontier inhabitants. They need no convoys of provisions to follow them; for whether they are shifting from place to place in the woods, or lying in wait for an opportunity to strike a blow, every thicket and every stream furnishes so small a number with sufficient subsistence. When they have surprised separately, and murdered and scalped a dozen families, they are gone with inconceivable expedition through unknown ways; and it is very rare that pursuers have any chance of coming up with them[29]. In short, long experience has taught our planters, that they cannot rely upon forts as a security against Indians: the inhabitants of Hackney might as well rely upon the tower of London, to secure them against highwaymen and housebreakers.—As to the third kind of security, that we shall not, in a few years, have all we have now done, to do over again in America, and be obliged to employ the same number of troops, and ships, at the same immense expence, to defend our possessions there, while we are in proportion weakened here: such forts I think, cannot prevent this. During a peace, it is not to be doubted the French, who are adroit at fortifying, will likewise erect forts in the most advantageous places of the country we leave them; which will make it more difficult than ever to be reduced in case of another war. We know by the experience of this war, how extremely difficult it is to march an army through the American woods, with its necessary cannon and stores, sufficient to reduce a very slight fort. The accounts at the treasury will tell you, what amazing sums we have necessarily spent in the expeditions against two very trifling forts, Duquesne, and Crown Point. While the French retain their influence over the Indians, they can easily keep our long extended frontier in continual alarm, by a very few of those people; and with a small number of regulars and militia, in such a country, we find they can keep an army of ours in full employ for several years. We therefore shall not need to be told by our colonies, that if we leave Canada, however circumscribed, to the French, "we have done nothing[30];" we shall soon be made sensible ourselves of this truth, and to our cost.
I would not be understood to deny, that even if we subdue and retain Canada, some few forts may be of use to secure the goods of the traders, and protect the commerce, in case of any sudden misunderstanding with any tribe of Indians: but these forts will be best under the care of the colonies interested in the Indian trade, and garrisoned by their provincial forces, and at their own expence. Their own interest will then induce the American governments to take care of such forts in proportion to their importance, and see that the officers keep their corps full, and mind their duty. But any troops of ours placed there, and accountable here, would, in such remote and obscure places, and at so great a distance from the eye and inspection of superiors, soon become of little consequence, even though the French were left in possession of Canada. If the four independent companies, maintained by the crown in New York more than forty years, at a great expence, consisted, for most part of the time, of faggots chiefly; if their officers enjoyed their places as sinecures, and were only, as a writer[31] of that country styles them, a kind of military monks; if this was the state of troops posted in a populous country, where the imposition could not be so well concealed; what may we expect will be the case of those, that shall be posted two, three, or four hundred miles from the inhabitants, in such obscure and remote places as Crown Point, Oswego, Duquesne, or Niagara? they would scarce be even faggots; they would dwindle to mere names upon paper, and appear no where but upon the muster-rolls.