From Newton to Einstein: Changing Conceptions of the Universe

by Benjamin Harrow

… In the treatment of Maxwell’s equations of the electromagnetic field, several investigators realized the importance of deducing the form of the equations when applied to a system moving with a uniform velocity. One object of such an investigation would be to determine such a set of transformation formulæ as would leave the mathematical form of the equations unaltered. The necessary relations between the new space-coordinates, those applying to the moving system, and the original set were of course obvious; and elementary methods led to the deduction of a new variable which should replace the time coordinate. This step was taken by Lorentz and also, I believe, by Larmor and by Voigt. The mathematical deductions and applications in the hands of these men were extremely beautiful, and are probably well known to you all.

Lorentz’ paper on this subject appeared in the Proceedings of the Amsterdam Academy in 1904. In the following year there was published in the Annalen der Physik a paper by Einstein, written without any knowledge of the work of Lorentz, in which he arrived at the same transformation equations as did the latter, but with an entirely different and fundamentally new interpretation. Einstein called attention in his paper to the lack of definiteness in the concepts of time and space, as ordinarily stated and used. He analyzed clearly the definitions and postulates which were necessary before one could speak with exactness of a length or of an interval of time. He disposed forever of the propriety of speaking of the “true” length of a rod or of the “true” duration of time, showing, in fact, that the numerical values which we attach to lengths or intervals of time depend upon the definitions and postulates which we adopt. The words “absolute” space or time intervals are devoid of meaning. As an illustration of what is meant Einstein discussed two possible ways of measuring the length of a rod when it is moving in the direction of its own length with a uniform velocity, that is, after having adopted a scale of length, two ways of assigning a number to the length of the rod concerned. One method is to imagine the observer moving with the rod, applying along its length the measuring scale, and reading off the positions of the ends of the rod. Another method would be to have two observers at rest on the body with reference to which the rod has the uniform velocity, so stationed along the line of motion of the rod that as the rod moves past them they can note simultaneously on a stationary measuring scale the positions of the two ends of the rod. Einstein showed that, accepting two postulates which need no defense at this time, the two methods of measurements would lead to different numerical values, and, further, that the divergence of the two results would increase as the velocity of the rod was increased. In assigning a number, therefore, to the length of a moving rod, one must make a choice of the method to be used in measuring it. Obviously the preferable method is to agree that the observer shall move with the rod, carrying his measuring instrument with him. This disposes of the problem of measuring space relations. The observed fact that, if we measure the length of the rod on different days, or when the rod is lying in different positions, we always obtain the same value offers no information concerning the “real” length of the rod. It may have changed, or it may not. It must always be remembered that measurement of the length of a rod is simply a process of comparison between it and an arbitrary standard, e.g., a meter-rod or yard-stick. In regard to the problem of assigning numbers to intervals of time, it must be borne in mind that, strictly speaking, we do not “measure” such intervals, i.e., that we do not select a unit interval of time and find how many times it is contained in the interval in question. (Similarly, we do not “measure” the pitch of a sound or the temperature of a room.) Our practical instruments for assigning numbers to time-intervals depend in the main upon our agreeing to believe that a pendulum swings in a perfectly uniform manner, each vibration taking the same time as the next one. Of course we cannot prove that this is true, it is, strictly speaking, a definition of what we mean by equal intervals of time; and it is not a particularly good definition at that. Its limitations are sufficiently obvious. The best way to proceed is to consider the concept of uniform velocity, and then, using the idea of some entity having such a uniform velocity, to define equal intervals of time as such intervals as are required for the entity to traverse equal lengths. These last we have already defined. What is required in addition is to adopt some moving entity as giving our definition of uniform velocity. Considering our known universe it is self-evident that we should choose in our definition of uniform velocity the velocity of light, since this selection could be made by an observer anywhere in our universe. Having agreed then to illustrate by the words “uniform velocity” that of light, our definition of equal intervals of time is complete. This implies, of course, that there is no uncertainty on our part as to the fact that the velocity of light always has the same value at any one point in the universe to any observer, quite regardless of the source of light. In other words, the postulate that this is true underlies our definition. Following this method Einstein developed a system of measuring both space and time intervals. As a matter of fact his system is identically that which we use in daily life with reference to events here on the earth. He further showed that if a man were to measure the length of a rod, for instance, on the earth and then were able to carry the rod and his measuring apparatus to Mars, the sun, or to Arcturus he would obtain the same numerical value for the length in all places and at all times. This doesn’t mean that any statement is implied as to whether the length of the rod has remained unchanged or not; such words do not have any meaning—remember that we can not speak of true length. It is thus clear that an observer living on the earth would have a definite system of units in terms of which to express space and time intervals, i.e., he would have a definite system of space coordinates (x, y, z) and a definite time coordinate (t); and similarly an observer living on Mars would have his system of coordinates (x′, y′, z′, t′). Provided that one observer has a definite uniform velocity with reference to the other, it is a comparatively simple matter to deduce the mathematical relations between the two sets of coordinates. When Einstein did this, he arrived at the same transformation formulæ as those used by Lorentz in his development of Maxwell’s equations. The latter had shown that, using these formulæ, the form of the laws for all electromagnetic phenomena maintained the same form; so Einstein’s method proves that using his system of measurement an observer, anywhere in the universe, would as the result of his own investigation of electromagnetic phenomena arrive at the same mathematical statement of them as any other observer, provided only that the relative-velocity of the two observers was uniform.

Einstein discussed many other most important questions at this time; but it is not necessary to refer to them in connection with the present subject. So far as this is concerned, the next important step to note is that taken in the famous address of Minkowski, in 1908, on the subject of “Space and Time.” It would be difficult to overstate the importance of the concepts advanced by Minkowski. They marked the beginning of a new period in the philosophy of physics. I shall not attempt to explain his ideas in detail, but shall confine myself to a few general statements. His point of view and his line of development of the theme are absolutely different from those of Lorentz or of Einstein; but in the end he makes use of the same transformation formulæ. His great contribution consists in giving us a new geometrical picture of their meaning. It is scarcely fair to call Minkowski’s development a picture; for to us a picture can never have more than three dimensions, our senses limit us; while his picture calls for perception of four dimensions. It is this fact that renders any even semi-popular discussion of Minkowski’s work so impossible. We can all see that for us to describe any event a knowledge of four coordinates is necessary, three for the space specification and one for the time. A complete picture could be given then by a point in four dimensions. All four coordinates are necessary: we never observe an event except at a certain time, and we never observe an instant of time except with reference to space. Discussing the laws of electromagnetic phenomena, Minkowski showed how in a space of four dimensions, by a suitable definition of axes, the mathematical transformation of Lorentz and Einstein could be described by a rotation of the set of axes. We are all accustomed to a rotation of our ordinary cartesian set of axes describing the position of a point. We ordinarily choose our axes at any location on the earth as follows: one vertical, one east and west, one north and south. So if we move from any one laboratory to another, we change our axes; they are always orthogonal, but in moving from place to place there is a rotation. Similarly, Minkowski showed that if we choose four orthogonal axes at any point on the earth, according to his method, to represent a space-time point using the method of measuring space and time intervals as outlined by Einstein; and, if an observer on Arcturus used a similar set of axes and the method of measurement which he naturally would, the set of axes of the latter could be obtained from those of the observer on the earth by a pure rotation (and naturally a transfer of the origin). This is a beautiful geometrical result. To complete my statement of the method, I must add that instead of using as his fourth axis one along which numerical values of time are laid off, Minkowski defined his fourth coordinate as the product of time and the imaginary constant, the square root of minus one. This introduction of imaginary quantities might be expected, possibly, to introduce difficulties; but, in reality, it is the very essence of the simplicity of the geometrical description just given of the rotation of the sets of axes. It thus appears that different observers situated at different points in the universe would each have their own set of axes, all different, yet all connected by the fact that any one can be rotated so as to coincide with any other. This means that there is no one direction in the four-dimensional space that corresponds to time for all observers. Just as with reference to the earth there is no direction which can be called vertical for all observers living on the earth. In the sense of an absolute meaning the words “up and down,” “before and after,” “sooner or later,” are entirely meaningless.

This concept of Minkowski’s may be made clearer, perhaps, by the following process of thought. If we take a section through our three-dimensional space, we have a plane, i.e., a two-dimensional space. Similarly, if a section is made through a four-dimensional space, one of three dimensions is obtained. Thus, for an observer on the earth a definite section of Minkowski’s four-dimensional space will give us our ordinary three-dimensional one; so that this section will, as it were, break up Minkowski’s space into our space and give us our ordinary time. Similarly, a different section would have to be used to the observer on Arcturus; but by a suitable selection he would get his own familiar three-dimensional space and his own time. Thus the space defined by Minkowski is completely isotropic in reference to measured lengths and times, there is absolutely no difference between any two directions in an absolute sense; for any particular observer, of course, a particular section will cause the space to fall apart so as to suit his habits of measurement; any section, however, taken at random will do the same thing for some observer somewhere. From another point of view, that of Lorentz and Einstein, it is obvious that, since this four-dimensional space is isotropic, the expression of the laws of electromagnetic phenomena take identical mathematical forms when expressed by any observer.

The question of course must be raised as to what can be said in regard to phenomena which so far as we know do not have an electromagnetic origin. In particular what can be done with respect to gravitational phenomena? Before, however, showing how this problem was attacked by Einstein; and the fact that the subject of my address is Einstein’s work on gravitation shows that ultimately I shall explain this, I must emphasize another feature of Minkowski’s geometry. To describe the space-time characteristics of any event a point, defined by its four coordinates, is sufficient; so, if one observes the life-history of any entity, e.g., a particle of matter, a light-wave, etc., he observes a sequence of points in the space-time continuum; that is, the life-history of any entity is described fully by a line in this space. Such a line was called by Minkowski a “world-line.” Further, from a different point of view, all of our observations of nature are in reality observations of coincidences, e.g., if one reads a thermometer, what he does is to note the coincidence of the end of the column of mercury with a certain scale division on the thermometer tube. In other words, thinking of the world-line of the end of the mercury column and the world-line of the scale division, what we have observed was the intersection or crossing of these lines. In a similar manner any observation may be analyzed; and remembering that light rays, a point on the retina of the eye, etc., all have their world-lines, it will be recognized that it is a perfectly accurate statement to say that every observation is the perception of the intersection of world-lines. Further, since all we know of a world-line is the result of observations, it is evident that we do not know a world-line as a continuous series of points, but simply as a series of discontinuous points, each point being where the particular world-line in question is crossed by another world-line.

It is clear, moreover, that for the description of a world-line we are not limited to the particular set of four orthogonal axes adopted by Minkowski. We can choose any set of four-dimensional axes we wish. It is further evident that the mathematical expression for the coincidence of two points is absolutely independent of our selection of reference axes. If we change our axes, we will change the coordinates of both points simultaneously, so that the question of axes ceases to be of interest. But our so-called laws of nature are nothing but descriptions in mathematical language of our observations; we observe only coincidences; a sequence of coincidences when put in mathematical terms takes a form which is independent of the selection of reference axes; therefore the mathematical expression of our laws of nature, of every character, must be such that their form does not change if we make a transformation of axes. This is a simple but far-reaching deduction.

There is a geometrical method of picturing the effect of a change of axes of reference, i.e., of a mathematical transformation. To a man in a railway coach the path of a drop of water does not appear vertical, i.e., it is not parallel to the edge of the window; still less so does it appear vertical to a man performing manœuvres in an airplane. This means that whereas with reference to axes fixed to the earth the path of the drop is vertical; with reference to other axes, the path is not. Or, stating the conclusion in general language, changing the axes of reference (or effecting a mathematical transformation) in general changes the shape of any line. If one imagines the line forming a part of the space, it is evident that if the space is deformed by compression or expansion the shape of the line is changed, and if sufficient care is taken it is clearly possible, by deforming the space, to make the line take any shape desired, or better stated, any shape specified by the previous change of axes. It is thus possible to picture a mathematical transformation as a deformation of space. Thus I can draw a line on a sheet of paper or of rubber and by bending and stretching the sheet, I can make the line assume a great variety of shapes; each of these new shapes is a picture of a suitable transformation.

Now, consider world-lines in our four-dimensional space. The complete record of all our knowledge is a series of sequences of intersections of such lines. By analogy I can draw in ordinary space a great number of intersecting lines on a sheet of rubber; I can then bend and deform the sheet to please myself; by so doing I do not introduce any new intersections nor do I alter in the least the sequence of intersections. So in the space of our world-lines, the space may be deformed in any imaginable manner without introducing any new intersections or changing the sequence of the existing intersections. It is this sequence which gives us the mathematical expression of our so-called experimental laws; a deformation of our space is equivalent mathematically to a transformation of axes, consequently we see why it is that the form of our laws must be the same when referred to any and all sets of axes, that is, must remain unaltered by any mathematical transformation.

Now, at last we come to gravitation. We can not imagine any world-line simpler than that of a particle of matter left to itself; we shall therefore call it a “straight” line. Our experience is that two particles of matter attract one another. Expressed in terms of world-lines, this means that, if the world-lines of two isolated particles come near each other, the lines, instead of being straight, will be deflected or bent in towards each other. The world-line of any one particle is therefore deformed; and we have just seen that a deformation is the equivalent of a mathematical transformation. In other words, for any one particle it is possible to replace the effect of a gravitational field at any instant by a mathematical transformation of axes. The statement that this is always possible for any particle at any instant is Einstein’s famous “Principle of Equivalence.”

Let us rest for a moment, while I call attention to a most interesting coincidence, not to be thought of as an intersection of world-lines. It is said that Newton’s thoughts were directed to the observation of gravitational phenomena by an apple falling on his head; from this striking event he passed by natural steps to a consideration of the universality of gravitation. Einstein in describing his mental process in the evolution of his law of gravitation says that his attention was called to a new point of view by discussing his experiences with a man whose fall from a high building he had just witnessed. The man fortunately suffered no serious injuries and assured Einstein that in the course of his fall he had not been conscious in the least of any pull downward on his body. In mathematical language, with reference to axes moving with the man the force of gravity had disappeared. This is a case where by the transfer of the axes from the earth itself to the man, the force of the gravitational field is annulled. The converse change of axes from the falling man to a point on the earth could be considered as introducing the force of gravity into the equations of motion. Another illustration of the introduction into our equations of a force by a means of a change of axes is furnished by the ordinary treatment of a body in uniform rotation about an axis. For instance, in the case of a so-called conical pendulum, that is, the motion of a bob suspended from a fixed point by string, which is so set in motion that the bob describes a horizontal circle and the string therefore describes a circular cone, if we transfer our axes from the earth and have them rotate around the vertical line through the fixed point with the same angular velocity as the bob, it is necessary to introduce into our equations of motion a fictitious “force” called the centrifugal force. No one ever thinks of this force other than as a mathematical quantity introduced into the equations for the sake of simplicity of treatment; no physical meaning is attached to it. Why should there be to any other so-called “force,” which like centrifugal force, is independent of the nature of the matter? Again, here on the earth our sensation of weight is interpreted mathematically by combining expressions for centrifugal force and gravity; we have no distinct sensation for either separately. Why then is there any difference in the essence of the two? Why not consider them both as brought into our equations by the agency of mathematical transformations? This is Einstein’s point of view.