Real estate loans, 7.4%;
Collateral loans, 30%, of which we assign to stock exchange collateral, 22½%, and to other collateral, 7½%;
All other loans, 36.4%, of which we assign to "Commercial paper" 18.2%;
Total stocks and bonds, 26%.
Adding the percentages for stock exchange collateral loans and for stocks and bonds owned, we get 48½% of all extensions of bank-credit for these three classes of institutions in the form of credits extended to the security market. If everything else except the real estate loans should be counted as "commercial loans" the stock exchange credit would still exceed the commercial credit. If my estimate of 18.2% of bank-credit based on commercial paper is high enough,[529] the banks and trust companies have extended over two and a half times as much credit, at a given time, to the security market as they have to commerce. This on the face of the record. But there is, as above indicated, a further item which does not get into the record, namely, overcertifications and "morning loans." Every day in the great speculative centres, and very especially in Wall Street, enormous advances are made to brokers, which are canceled during the day, but which, during their short life, are a real addition to bank-credit. To attempt to estimate this with any accuracy is hopeless, but the total on any ordinary day is enormous, and most of it is extended in connection with stock market transactions.
A final comparison,[530] which will conclude this perhaps too wearisome analysis of these figures, will consider the loans alone, neglecting the securities owned:
Of total loans:
Real estate loans, 9.3%;
Collateral loans, 40.8%, of which we assign to stock exchange collateral, 30.6%, and to other collateral, 10.2%;
All other loans, 49.6%, of which we assign to "Commercial paper," 24.8%.