A journal, of a young man of Massachusetts, late a surgeon on board an American privateer, who was captured at sea by the British in May, eighteen hundred and thirteen and was confined first, at Melville Island, Halifax, then at Chatham, in England, and last at Dartmoor prison

by Benjamin Waterhouse

As to that part of the report which mentions the guard-barracks being the repository for the arms of the guard off duty, and of its standing in the yard to which the hole in the wall would serve as a communication, and of its being a further cause of suspicion and alarm to Captain Shortland—to one acquainted with the situation of the prison, such an idea would be ridiculous; but to those who are not acquainted with it, it will be only necessary for us to mention, that if the prisoners had the intention of breaking out through this passage, and had actually got into the barrack-yard, the difficulties they would then have to encounter would be much greater than to break a passage through the market square, or the back part of the yard. As to the idea of their possessing themselves of the muskets standing in the racks in the guard-barracks (even if they knew of any being there) it is childish; for how easy would it have been for the commanding officer, on the shortest intimation of such an attempt, with one blast of his bugle, to have called all his guards to the spot before a hundredth part of the prisoners could have got into the yard, and by that means instantly put a stop to any further proceedings on their part.

We cannot conceive how Mr. King can possibly come forward and say, on these grounds, it appeared to him that Captain Shortland was justified in giving the order for sounding the alarm bell, when, if he found the prisoners were conducting themselves improperly, had he sent for the committee (as always had been his custom heretofore, when he had any charge against the prisoners for improper conduct) and told them that the prisoners were breaking the wall (which circumstance, as has been published before, was not known to one tenth of the prisoners) and requested them to have represented to those engaged in it, the consequences that must ensue if they persisted in such conduct, we have not a moment's hesitation in saying, they would have put a stop to any further proceedings of that kind.

That part which relates to the breaking of the iron chain which fastened No. 1 gate, and which follows next in the report, says there was no evidence to show whether it was done before or after the alarm bell rang. As this was a material point on which they grounded Shortland's justification, we have to regret that the evidence we had to lay before the commissioners, and which would, in our opinion, have sufficiently cleared up that point, was not examined.

On the ringing of the alarm bell, the rush towards the gates leading into the market square was so great (attracted as has been before stated by curiosity) that those in front were irresistibly pushed forward by those in the rear, and if the chain had not broke, the lock must have given way to the pressure, and by this opening, it is but natural to suppose, that a number must have been shoved into the square, in front of the soldiers, who were drawn up in a line across the square, with Shortland at their head.

If, as the report now goes on to state, there was no direct proof before them of a previous concert or preparation on the part of the prisoners, and no evidence of their intention or disposition to effect their escape on this occasion, excepting that which arose by inference from the whole of the detailed circumstances connected together, had Mr. King examined the evidence on the part of the prisoners, as minutely as it seems he examined those on the part of Shortland, he could not even have drawn the shadow of an inference of that being their intention.

Where the commissioners got their evidence for asserting that Captain Shortland, by quiet means and persuasion, endeavored to persuade the prisoners to retire into their respective yards, is unaccountable to us, as those who know Captain Shortland, know he is not a man of persuasion. It is correct that Dr. M'Grath used every exertion to persuade the prisoners to retire out of the square, which if Shortland had allowed sufficient time, would have been quietly done; but the crowd, by this time, had become so great, and the pressure from the rear so strong, that those in front could not retreat until time should be allowed for those in the rear to fall back, but the hasty, haughty, and overbearing temper of Shortland, could not allow him to use such conciliatory means. He orders (the report says) fifteen file of the guard fronting the open gate, to the charge; and after some little time the charge was so effectual, with but very little or no injury to the prisoners, as to drive them, for the most part, quite out of the square, with the exception of a small number who continued their resistance about No. 1 gate. Under these circumstances, continued the report, the firing commenced.

Here we beg leave to request an attentive perusal of the affidavits of some of the prisoners, taken by the committee, and which relate particularly to this part of the transaction. It is there positively stated, that on the soldiers coming to the charge, the prisoners ALL retreated into the yard, and pushed the gate to after them. If the commissioners had examined the evidence, this part of the report ought to have been differently expressed.

We cannot conceive how Mr. King finds it difficult to reconcile the testimony respecting Captain Shortland's giving the orders to fire; when he reports that SEVERAL of the Americans SWEAR POSITIVELY, that Captain Shortland gave that order—and many of the soldiers and the English witnesses heard the word given by some one, but could not swear it was by Captain Shortland; and some of them (among whom is the officer commanding the guard) THINK, if Captain Shortland had given such an order, they must have heard it, which they did not. Thus, then, stands the foundation for this part of the report. An English officer THINKS it is not so, and several Americans SWEAR it is so; and he finds it very difficult to reconcile their testimony.—The lightness with which they seem to have passed over this most important point of that day's transaction, cannot but be deeply regretted by those who feel for the unhappy sufferers, when they go on to state, "It may remain a matter of doubt whether the firing first began in the square by an ORDER, or whether it was a spontaneous act of the soldiers themselves; it seemed clear it was continued and renewed both there and elsewhere, without orders—and that on the platforms and several places about the prison it was certainly commenced without any authority." We must once more request the attention of the public to the affidavits already published; it is there sworn by one of the witnesses, that PREVIOUS to the alarm bell being rung, and while walking in the yard, a soldier called to him from the walls, and told him to go in, as they would soon be fired upon. How, then, can it be possible, that a soldier on the walls should know that they would soon be fired upon, if the order had not been previously given to that effect? And had the bugle-man been examined, he could have stated that, previous to the ringing of the alarm bell, he received orders to sound to fire; so that when the soldiers took their stations on the walls, they were charged and prepared for that purpose. With such information, we conceive the committee to stand fully justified in stating in their report, the belief of its being a pre-concerted plan, on the part of Shortland; and if the commissioners had possessed themselves with a knowledge of these circumstances, which they could and ought to have done, would they, then, reported Shortland as justifiable, even in a military point of view?

The next thing we have to notice in the report is, that very singular paragraph, which says, "from the fact of the crowd being so close, and the firing at first being attended with very little injury, it appears probable, that a large proportion of the muskets were, as stated by one or two of the witnesses, levelled over the heads of the prisoners, a circumstance, in some respects, to be lamented." Is it, then, to be lamented, that the soldiers did not level their pieces, on the first fire, directly into the crowd, which they have stated to be so great and so close that a soldier declared he could not come fairly down to a charge? or is it to be lamented, that one or two hundred were not killed at the first discharge, and a thousand or two wounded? If so, we think it much to be lamented, that the reporters were not there, and placed foremost in the crowd.

The circumstance of so few being hurt at the first discharge is not strange to those who are acquainted with the situation; and this occurrence alone corroborates the American evidence, and ought to have been sufficient proof to the commissioners, that the prisoners upon being charged upon, retreated through the gates, and shut them after them, before the firing commenced; and which circumstance, alone, should have shut the door of justification against Shortland for commencing a fire upon them, as they were in their own yards. As this was the actual situation of the prisoners on the first discharge, and the soldiers having to fire through the iron paling, and the prisoners retreating on a descending ground, of course brought the muskets, when down to a level, over the heads of the prisoners—it was owing to this fortunate circumstance that so few were injured on the first discharge of the musketry; and it seems the inhuman Shortland was aware of this circumstance, when he was distinctly heard to order his soldiers to fire low. This does not appear to correspond with that part of their report which says, "Captain Shortland was in the market square, exerting himself in giving orders to stop the firing."