* I saw one of these hand-bills among the Proclamations, &c., in the Massachusetts Historical Society. It was an address to the soldiers who were about embarking for America, and was printed in London. The writer, in speaking of the course of the provincials, emphasizes, by italics, printed in a single conspicuous line, the expression, "Before God and man they are right!" On the back of this address is the following endorsement, which was evidently printed in this country, the type and ink being greatly inferior to the other. It alludes to the two camps: the one on Prospect Hill, under Putnam; the other on Bunker Hill, under Howe.
Prospect Hill.
I. Seven dollars a month.
II. Fresh provisions, and in plenty.
III. Health.
IV. Freedom, ease, affluence, and a good farm.
Bunker Hill.
I. Three-pence a day.
II. Rotten salt pork.
III. The scurvy.
IV. Slavery, beggary, and want.
** One of these, in August, was quite successful. In the neighborhood of New London, a small British fleet obtained eighteen hundred sheep and more than one hundred head of oxen. Frothingham (page 236) quotes a letter from Gage to Lord Dartmouth, in which this important fact is announced. This letter was published, and in the anti-ministerial London Chronicle the following impromptu appeared:
"In days of yore the British troops
Have taken warlike kings in battle;
But now, alas I their valor droops,
For Gage takes naught but—harmless cattle.
"Britons, with grief your bosoms strike!
Your faded laurels loudly weep!
Behold your heroes, Quixotte like,
Driving a timid flock of—sheep!"
Council of War.—Situation of the Army.—Washington's Complaints.—Gage recalled.—His Life and Character.
ceived with the open arms of hospitality every where, except a few Tories who ventured to leave the city. These were treated with bitter scorn, and there were many martyrs for opinion's sake. This measure was a great relief to Gage; and the capture, about that time, of an American vessel laden with fresh provisions, made food quite plentiful in the city for a while.
The inactive and purely defensive policy pursued by both armies became exceedingly onerous to Washington, and he resolved, if expedient, to endeavor to put an end to it. Congress, too, became impatient, and requested Washington to attack the enemy if he perceived any chance for success. The commander-in-chief, accordingly, called a council of war on the 11th of September. In view of the rapid approach of the time when the term of 1775 enlistment of many of the troops would expire, and also of the general unfavorable condition of the army, Washington desired to make an immediate and simultaneous attack upon the city and the camp of the enemy on Bunker Hill. But his officers dissented; and the decision of the Council was "that it is not expedient to make the attempt at present." Ten days afterward, Washington wrote a long letter to the President of Congress, in which, after making a statement which implied a charge of neglect on the part of that body, he drew a graphic picture of the condition of the army. "But my situation," he said, "is inexpressibly distressing, to see the winter fast approaching upon a naked army, the time of their service within a few weeks of expiring, and no provisions yet made for such important events. Added to these, the military chest is totally exhausted; the paymaster has not a single dollar in hand; the commissary general assures me that he has strained his credit for the subsistence of the army to the utmost; the quarter-master general is in precisely the same situation; and the greater part of the troops are in a state not far from mutiny, upon a deduction from their stated allowance. I know not to whom I am to impute this failure; but I am of opinion that, if the evil is not immediately remedied, and more punctuality observed in future, the army must absolutely break up." Thus we perceive, that within three months after his appointment to the chief command, Washington had cause to complain of the tardy movements of the general Congress. Throughout the war, that body often pressed like a dead weight upon the movements of the army, embarrassing it by special instructions, and neglecting to give its co-operation when most needed. It was only during the time when Washington was invested with the powers of a military dictator, that his most brilliant military achievements were accomplished.
It was in September that the expedition to Quebec, under Arnold, by the way of the Kennebec, was planned. This important measure, and the progress and result of the expedition, have already been noticed on pages 190 to 194 inclusive.
