Randolph, at Washington's request, had made a rough draft of a memorial, intended to meet all objections to the treaty. This had been sent to Mount Vernon, and in reference to it the president said:—
“The memorial seems well designed to answer the end proposed; and by the time it is revised and new-dressed, you will probably (either in the resolutions, which are or will be handed to me, or in the newspaper publications, which you promised to be attentive to) have seen all the objections against the treaty which have any real force in them, and which may be fit subjects for representation in the memorial, or in the instructions, or both.
“But how much longer the presentation of the memorial can be delayed without exciting unpleasant sensations here, or involving serious evils elsewhere, you, who are at the scene of information and action, can decide better than I. In a matter, however, so interesting and pregnant with consequences as this treaty, there ought to be no precipitation; but, on the contrary, every step should be explored before it is taken, and every word weighed before it is uttered or delivered in writing.”
Washington arrived at Philadelphia on the eleventh of August. His return was hastened by a mysterious letter from Colonel Pickering, the secretary of war, dated the thirty-first of July. “On the subject of the treaty,” he said, “I confess I feel extreme solicitude, and for a special reason, which can be communicated to you only in person. I entreat, therefore, that you will return with all convenient speed to the seat of government. In the meantime, for the reason above referred to, I pray you to decide on no important political measure, in whatever form it may be presented to you. Mr. Wolcott and I (Mr. Bradford concurring) waited on Mr. Randolph, and urged his writing to request your return. He wrote in our presence, but we concluded a letter from one of us also expedient.”
On the day after his arrival, the president called a cabinet meeting. Mr. Pickering had already explained the mysterious hints in his letter, by handing to Washington some papers which had excited suspicions concerning Secretary Randolph's conduct. When the cabinet had convened, the president submitted the question, “What shall be done with the treaty?” Randolph not only insisted upon the repeal of the provision order already alluded to, as a preliminary to ratification, but took the ground that the treaty ought not to be ratified at all, pending the war with Great Britain and France. The other members of the cabinet were in favor of immediate ratification, with a strong memorial against the provision order. In this opinion Washington coincided, and on the eighteenth the ratification was signed by the president. Randolph was directed to complete the memorial which he had commenced, and also instructions for further negotiations.
Washington's feelings had been deeply moved by the papers which Pickering placed in his hands. The chief of these was a despatch of M. Fauchet, the French minister, to his government, late in the autumn of 1794, and which had been intercepted. In that despatch, Fauchet gave a sketch of the rise of parties in the United States, in substantial accordance with Jefferson's views, and then he commented freely upon the Whiskey Insurrection in western Pennsylvania, then drawing to a close. Echoing the sentiments of the democratic leaders, Fauchet, professing to have his information from Randolph, declared that the insurrection grew out of political hostility to Hamilton. It was Hamilton's intention, he said, in enforcing the excise, “to mislead the president into unpopular courses, and to introduce absolute power under pretext of giving energy to the government.”
In his further comments, the minister, in deprecation of the conduct of professed republicans, and the general co-operation with the president in putting down the insurrection, said: “Of the governors whose duty it was to appear at the head of the requisitions, the governor of Pennsylvania alone [Mifflin] enjoyed the name of republican. His opinions of the secretary of the treasury, and of his systems, were known to be unfavorable. The secretary of this state [Dallas] possessed great influence in the popular society of Philadelphia, which in its turn influenced those of other states; of course he merited attention. It appears that these men, with others unknown to me, were balancing to decide on their party. Two or three days before the proclamation was published, and of course before the cabinet had resolved on its measures, Mr. Randolph came to me with an air of great eagerness, and made to me the overtures of which I have given an account in my No. 6.[83]
Thus, with some thousands of dollars, the republic could have decided on civil war or on peace! Thus the consciences of the pretended patriots of America already have their prices! What will be the old age of this government, if it is thus already decrepit?”
After speaking of Hamilton's financial schemes as the instrument of making “of a whole nation a stock-jobbing, speculating, and selfish people,” and asserting that “riches alone here fix consideration, and, as no one likes to be despised, they are universally sought after,” he makes some exceptions among the leading republicans by name, and continues:—
“As soon as it was decided that the French republic purchased no men to do their duty, there were to be seen individuals, about whose conduct the government could at least form uneasy conjectures, giving themselves up with scandalous ostentation to its views, and ever seconding its declarations. The popular societies [democratic] soon emitted resolutions stamped with the same spirit, which, although they may not have been prompted by love of order, might nevertheless have been omitted, or uttered with less solemnity. Then were seen, coming from the very men whom we have been accustomed to regard as having little friendship for the treasurer, harangues without end, in order to give a new direction to the public mind.”