Washington and the American Republic, Vol. 3.

by Benson John Lossing

Washington gave a decided negative to the request of the house. It appears to have been unexpected. The opposition were not prepared for such boldness and firmness on the part of the executive, and it “appeared to break,” says Marshall, “the last cord of that attachment which had theretofore bound some of the active leaders of the opposition to the person of the president.” Amid all the excitements of party contests, there was real affection and respect for Washington on the part of those who were politically opposed to him; but this act, so much like defiance of the popular will as expressed by the house of representatives, in the eyes of the unreflecting, seemed, for the moment, to extinguish every lingering spark of affection in the bosom of his old friends, now his political enemies.

After a week's delay, the president's message was taken up in committee of the whole, with two resolutions offered by Blount, of North Carolina, declaratory of the sense of the house respecting its own power on the subject of treaties. These embodied doctrines contrary to those expressed in the message. The first, after disclaiming any pretensions on the part of the house to “any agency in making treaties,” asserted, that “when a treaty stipulated regulations on any of the subjects submitted by the constitution to the power of Congress, it must depend for its execution, as to such stipulations, on a law to be passed by Congress,” and that the house had a right to deliberate on the expediency or inexpediency of such law, and pass or reject it as they might determine. The second resolution asserted, that in applications to the president for information, the house was not bound to specify for what purpose such information was wanted.

These resolutions took a rather less untenable position than had been maintained in argument, and were quite inexplicit on an essential part of the question. After a brief debate, in which Madison was chief speaker in favor of the resolutions, they were adopted by a vote of fifty-seven to thirty-five.

While this exciting subject was before Congress, the treaties with the Indians, with the dey of Algiers, and with Spain respecting the navigation of the Mississippi, had been ratified by the president and senate, and communicated to the house of representatives. It was moved to refer them to the committee of the whole house; but, for several days in succession, the motion was voted down. It was finally carried; and on the thirteenth of April, the moment the committee of the whole was organized by the chairman taking his seat, Mr. Sedgwick, of Massachusetts, arose and moved “that provision ought to be made by law for carrying into effect, with good faith, the treaties lately concluded with the dey and regency of Algiers, the king of Great Britain, the king of Spain, and certain Indian tribes northwest of the Ohio.” The opposition were completely surprised by this unexpected movement, and an angry altercation ensued. They complained loudly of the manner in which an attempt was made to force action upon the four treaties together, and resented what they deemed the ungenerous sharp practice of their opponents, because it was in contravention of the solemn vote of the house lately recorded upon their journals, declaratory of their right to exercise a free discretion over the subject. It was contended, on the other hand, that, as the four treaties formed part of one system, if one was rejected, it might be expedient to reject the others also. After a warm debate, it was agreed to dispose of the other treaties before taking up that with Great Britain. In accordance with this determination, the action of the house on the other treaties was such as not to contradict the claim set up by Blount's resolutions, and they were disposed of without any difficulty.

The treaty with Great Britain was taken up on the fifteenth of April. Its friends, in and out of Congress, supposing that on a subject which had so long agitated the community, the mind of every member was settled, and that an attempt to make converts by either party through debates would be futile, urged an immediate decision of the matter. They felt confident that the majority would not dare to meet the country on such an issue as the withholding of means for the execution of the treaty; but that majority, though knowing they had the power to break the treaty, were unwilling to do so without first embracing an opportunity for giving satisfactory reasons for their action. They therefore called for discussion. “The expectation,” says Marshall, “might not unreasonably be entertained, that the passions belonging to the subject would be so inflamed by debate as to produce the expression of a public sentiment favorable to their wishes; and if in this they should be disappointed, it would be certainly unwise, either as a party or as a branch of the legislature, to plunge the nation into embarrassments in which it was not disposed to entangle itself, and from which the manner of extricating it could not be distinctly perceived.”

The friends of the treaty did not shrink from discussion; and the debate, which lasted a fortnight, was opened by Madison with a speech, elaborate in its details and carefully prepared. He maintained that there was the grossest want of reciprocity exhibited in that part of the treaty that related to the settlement of disputes growing out of the compact of 1783. The British, he asserted, got all they asked—the debts due their merchants with damages in the shape of interest. We got nothing, he said, for the valuable negroes carried away, and we received nothing for damages accruing from the long detention of the western posts. And they, he said, were received with conditions respecting the Indian trade which made them almost useless to us, as to influence over the savage tribes, in which alone their greatest value consisted; and he considered the agreement to pay the American claims for spoliations as no offset for the loss of the negroes.

The same want of reciprocity, he said, prevailed in the portion of the treaty respecting neutral rights and the law of nations. By it we yielded the favorite principle, long ago enunciated, that “free ships make free goods,” and had actually added naval stores and even provisions to the list of contraband articles. He severely animadverted upon the provisions which conceded to British subjects the right to hold lands within the territory of the United States; the stipulation concerning the navigation of the Mississippi; and the permission to open all American ports to British shipping, while our own vessels were excluded from the colonial harbors.

The latter measure, allowing Great Britain to retain her colonial monopoly and preserve intact her colonial system, he denounced as “a phenomenon which had filled him with more surprise than he knew how to express.” And more vehement than all, because it interfered with his favorite scheme of commercial coercion, was Madison's denunciations of the provisions which prevented the Americans from retaliating upon the British, in the event of their making commercial restrictions to our disadvantage by further discriminations. He concluded with scouting the idea that war would ensue if the treaty should be rejected, because the hostilities England were then waging with France were quite as much as she was able to manage at that time.

Madison's speech alarmed the country, especially the sensitive mercantile classes, for whose losses, by spoliations, the treaty made provision, and those who were dependant upon trade, because they feared its influence in causing the inexecution of the treaty, and consequent war with Great Britain, by which their interests would be seriously effected. Other classes were also alarmed; indeed, all who loved peace and deprecated quarrels, much less physical contests, with other nations, trembled for the fate of the treaty. The country was violently agitated. Public meetings were held in all parts of the United States, and the strength of parties was once more fully tried. Petitions were sent in to Congress from all the great marts of business in the country in favor of ratification; while counter meetings were held and counter petitions were sent in from various places. Insurance against captures on the high seas could no longer be obtained for vessels or goods; and a sudden blow was given to commerce, which threatened financial ruin.

To add to the confusion, Bond, the British chargé des affaires, had intimated, that if the house of representatives, refused the necessary appropriation to carry the treaty into effect, the western posts would not be given up at the stipulated time, now near at hand. He also took that occasion to insist upon an explanatory article concerning a clause in Wayne's treaty with the Indians, by which they had agreed to allow no trader to reside among them, unless licensed by the authorities of the United States; for it seemed to be in contradiction with the provisions of the treaty under consideration, a mutual free-trade with the Indian tribes being guarantied thereby. This menace and this demand created much irritation; yet it did not in the least affect the tide of popular sentiment in favor of the treaty which was continually rising. This fact was clearly discerned by both parties, and the friends of the treaty protracted the debate, in order that, before the vote should be taken, public opinion might be so expressed, as to have an omnipotent effect in its favor.