“The doctrine has been avowed, that the treaty, though formally ratified by the executive power of both nations, though published as a law for our own by the president's proclamation, is still a mere proposition submitted to this assembly, no way distinguishable, in point of authority or obligation, from a motion for leave to bring in a bill, or any other original act of ordinary legislation. This doctrine, so novel in our country, yet so dear to many precisely for the reason, that in the contention for power, victory is always dear, is obviously repugnant to the very terms, as well as the fair interpretation of our own resolution (Mr. Blount's). We declare, that the treaty-making power is exclusively vested in the president and senate, and not in the house. Need I say that we fly in the face of that resolution, when we pretend that the acts of that power are not valid until we have concurred in them. It would be nonsense, or worse, to use the language of the most glaring contradiction, and to claim a share in a power which we at the same time disclaim, as exclusively vested in other departments. What can be more strange than to say, that the compacts of the president and senate with foreign nations are treaties without our agency, and yet, that those compacts want all power and obligation until they are sanctioned by our concurrence. It is not my design, in this place, if at all, to go into a discussion of this part of the subject. I will, at least for the present, take it for granted that this monstrous opinion stands in little need of remark, and, if it does, lies almost out of the reach of refutation.”
After discussing the subject of bad faith on the part of the United States, in refusing to execute the treaty, with a clear and comprehensive view of the obligations of nations, Mr. Ames continued:—
“I shall be asked, why a treaty so good in some articles, and so harmless in others, has met with such unrelenting opposition? and how the clamors against it, from New Hampshire to Georgia, can be accounted for? The apprehensions so extensively diffused on its first publication, will be vouched as proof that the treaty is bad, and that the people held it in abhorrence.
“I am not embarrassed to find an answer to this insinuation. Certainly a foresight of its pernicious operation could not have created all the fears that were felt or effected: the alarm spread faster than the publication of the treaty; there were more critics than readers. Besides, as the subject was examined, those fears have subsided. The movements of passion are quicker than those of the understanding: we are to search for the causes of first impressions, not in the articles of this obnoxious and misrepresented instrument, but in the state of the public feeling.
“The fervor of the Revolutionary war had not entirely cooled, nor its controversies ceased, before the sensibility of our citizens was quickened with a tenfold vivacity, by a new and extraordinary subject of irritation. One of the two great nations of Europe underwent a change which has attracted all our wonder, and interested all our sympathy. Whatever they did, the zeal of many went with them, and often went to excess. These impression met with much to inflame, and nothing to restrain them. In our newspapers, in our feasts, and some of our elections, enthusiasm was admitted a merit, a test of patriotism; and that made it contagious. In the opinion of party, we could not love or hate enough. I dare say, in spite of all the obloquy it may provoke, we were extravagant in both. It is my right to avow, that passions so impetuous, enthusiasm so wild, could not subsist without disturbing the sober exercise of reason, without putting at risk the peace and precious interests of our country. They were hazarded. It will not exhaust the little breath I have left, to say how much, nor by whom, or by what means they were rescued from the sacrifice. Shall I be called upon to offer my proofs? They are here. They are everywhere. No one has forgotten the proceedings of 1794. No one has forgotten the capture of our vessels, and the imminent danger of war. The nation thirsted, not only for reparation, but vengeance. Suffering such wrongs, and agitated by such resentments, was it in the power of any words of compact, or could any parchment, with its seals, prevail at once to tranquillize the people? It was impossible. Treaties in England are seldom popular, and least of all, when the stipulations of amity succeed to the bitterness of hatred. Even the best treaty, though nothing be refused, will choke resentment, but not satisfy it. Every treaty is as sure to disappoint extravagant expectations, as to disarm extravagant passions; of the latter, hatred is one that takes no bribes; they who are animated by a spirit of revenge, will not be quieted by the possibility of profit.
“Why do they complain that the West Indies are not laid open? Why do they lament that any restriction is stipulated on the commerce of the East Indies? Why do they pretend, that if they reject this, and insist upon more, more will be accomplished? Let us be explicit—more would not satisfy. If all was granted, would not a treaty of amity with Great Britain still be obnoxious? Have we not this instant heard it urged against our envoy, that he was not ardent enough in his hatred of Great Britain? A treaty of amity is condemned because it was not made by a foe, and in the spirit of one. The same gentleman, at the same instant, repeats a very prevailing objection, that no treaty should be made with the enemy of France. 'No treaty,' exclaim others, 'should be made with a monarch or a despot; there will be no naval security while those sea-robbers prevail on the ocean; their den must be destroyed; that nation must be extirpated.'
“I like this, sir, because it is sincerity. With feelings such as these we do not pant for treaties. Such passions seek nothing, and will be content with nothing, but the destruction of their object. If a treaty left King George his island it would not answer, not if he stipulated to pay rent for it. It has been said, the world ought to rejoice if Great Britain was sunk in the sea; if, where there are now men, and wealth, and laws, and liberty, there were no more than a sandbank, for the sea-monsters to fatten on—a space for the storms of the ocean to mingle in conflict.
“I object nothing to the good sense or humanity of all this. I yield the point that this is a proof that the age of reason is in progress. Let it be philanthropy, let it be patriotism, if you will; but it is no indication that any treaty would be approved. The difficulty is not to overcome the objections to the terms; it is to restrain the repugnance to any stipulations of amity with the party.
“Having alluded to the rival of Great Britain, I am not unwilling to explain myself. I effect no concealment, and I have practised none. While those two great nations agitate all Europe with their quarrels, they will both equally endeavor to create an influence in America; each will exert all its arts to range its strength on its own side. How is this to be effected? Our government is a democratical republic; it will not be disposed to pursue a system of politics, in submission to either France or England, in opposition to the general wishes of the citizens; and if Congress should adopt such measures, they would not be pursued long, nor with much success. From the nature of our government, popularity is the instrument of foreign influence. Without it, all is labor and disappointment. With that auxiliary, foreign intrigue finds agents, not only volunteers, but competitors for employment, and anything like reluctance is understood to be a crime. Has Britain this means of influence? Certainly not. If her gold could buy adherents, their becoming such would deprive them of all political power and importance. They would not wield popularity as a weapon, but would fall under it. Britain has no influence, and, for reasons just given, can have none. She has enough; and God forbid she ever should have more. France, possessed of popular enthusiasm, of party attachments, has had, and still has, too much influence on our politics. Any foreign influence is too much, and ought to be destroyed. I detest the man, and disdain the spirit, that can bend to a mean subserviency to the views of any nation. It is enough to be American; that character comprehends our duties, and ought to engross our attachments.
“But I would not be misunderstood. I would not break the alliance with France. I would not have the connection between the two countries even a cold one. It should be cordial and sincere; but I would banish that influence, which, by acting on the passions of the citizens, may acquire a power over the government.”