Mr. Monroe's imprudence, and his zeal in the cause of France, now placed him in an unpleasant dilemma. He received from Mr. Jay the assurance that he would soon send him, in cipher, the principal heads of the treaty. But that would not be sufficient to appease the offended French government, and Mr. Monroe immediately sent a confidential person to Mr. Jay for a complete copy of the document. “'Tis necessary to observe,” he said, “that as nothing will satisfy this government but a copy of the instrument itself, and which, as our ally, it thinks itself entitled to, so it will be useless for me to make to it any communication short of that. I mention this that you may know precisely the state of my engagements here, and how I deem it my duty to act under them, in relation to this object.”
Mr. Jay, as in duty bound, civilly declined to send a copy of the treaty; and in his reply to Mr. Monroe's letter, took the occasion to give that gentleman his views on national independence and the duties of ministers.
“You must be sensible,” he said, “that the United States, as a free and independent nation, have an unquestionable right to make any pacific arrangements with other powers which mutual convenience may dictate, provided those arrangements do not interdict or oppugn their prior engagements with other states.
“Whether this adjustment was consistent with our treaty with France? struck me as being the only question which would demand or receive the consideration of that republic; and I thought it due to the friendship subsisting between the two countries, that the French government should have, without delay, the most perfect satisfaction on that head.” He then referred to his former communications, and gave him the following exact and literal extract from the treaty:—
“Nothing in this treaty contained, shall, however, be construed or operate contrary to former and existing public treaties with other sovereigns or states.”
After speaking of his former intention to communicate to Mr. Monroe some of the most interesting particulars of the treaty, “but in the most perfect confidence,” Mr. Jay continued:—
“As that instrument has not yet been ratified, nor received the ultimate forms necessary to give it validity; as further questions respecting parts of it may yet arise, and give occasion to further discussions and negotiations, so that, if finally concluded at all, it may then be different from what it now is, the impropriety of making it public at present is palpable and obvious; such a proceeding would be inconvenient and unprecedented. It does not belong to ministers who negotiate treaties to publish them, even when perfected, much less treaties not yet completed, and remaining open to alteration or rejection. Such acts belong exclusively to the governments who form them.
“I can not but flatter myself, that the French government is too enlightened and reasonable to expect that any consideration ought to induce me to overleap the bounds of my authority, or to be negligent of the respect which is due to the United States. That respect, and my obligations to observe it, will not permit me to give, without the permission of their government, a copy of the instrument in question to any person, or for any purpose; and by no means for the purpose of being submitted to the consideration and judgment of the councils of a foreign nation, however friendly.”[104]
Soon after this, John Trumbull, Mr. Jay's secretary of legation, was about to pass through Paris, and he was authorized to make to Mr. Monroe a confidential communication concerning the provisions of the treaty. But the incensed minister refused to receive this or any communication in a form that he could not instantly lay before the French government. He afterward attempted to obtain a copy of the treaty from Thomas Pinckney, who passed through Paris on his way to Spain, but that gentleman would not betray Jay's confidence, and Monroe and the French government were compelled to wait until the authorized publication of the treaty the following summer.
Mr. Monroe felt himself aggrieved by what he deemed the want of confidence in him by the president and his cabinet, who had appointed him. He felt that the administration had injured him; and that the honor and credit of the United States were compromised by their refusal to redeem his promises of aid to the French republic, their “ally and friend.” His first and natural impulse was to resign his post, but alleged patriotic, as well as personal considerations, induced him to remain. He held the most intimate private relations with the members of the Committee of Public Safety and other officers of the French government, and appears to have enjoyed their confidence while he remained there. But, whether from his undue attachment to the French republic, his opposition to Jay's treaty, or his mistaken notions of American interests, Mr. Monroe appears to have done little, after his correspondence with Mr. Jay, to allay ill feeling toward his country on the part of the French government. He had been specially instructed, when sent envoy to France, to explain the views and conduct of the government of the United States in forming the treaty with England; and for this purpose ample documents were furnished him. But it appears from his own letters (published in his defence after his return, in 1796),[105] that he omitted to use them. Uninstructed in the truths which should have been given them, the French government utterly misinterpreted the actions and misconceived the views of the United States; and when informed that the house of representatives would execute the treaty made by Jay, they became very bitter in their resentment, and exhibited their animosity by allowing a French privateer to capture an American merchant-vessel.