In the same letter, the chief complained of the tardiness in the recruiting-service. “We are now near the end of September,” he said, “and not a man recruited, nor a battalion-officer appointed, that has come to my knowledge. The consequence is, that the spirit and enthusiasm, which prevailed a month or two ago, and would have produced the best men in a short time, are evaporating fast, and a month or two hence may induce but a few, and those perhaps of the worst sort, to enlist. Instead, therefore, of having the augmented force in a state of preparation, and under a course of discipline, it is now to be raised, and possibly may not be in existence when the enemy is in the field. We shall have to meet veteran troops, inured to conquest, with militia or raw recruits.”
Washington also complained, at this time, of the remissness of the secretary of war in giving him full information. In a friendly but decisive tone he wrote to Mr. M'Henry on the subject. “Short letters,” he said, “taking no notice of suggestions or queries, are unsatisfactory and distressing. Considering the light in which I think my services have placed me, I should expect more attention from the secretary of war; but from Mr. M'Henry, as a friend and coadjutor, I certainly shall look for it.”
A month later, Washington wrote a friendly letter to Knox, urging him to accept the proffered appointment. The president had not, till then, made his final decision as to the relative position of Knox and Hamilton. The commander-in-chief again dwelt upon the cause of the selection. “If an amicable arrangement could have been settled between Generals Hamilton, Pinckney, and yourself, previous to the nomination, it would have been perfectly satisfactory to me; but driven as I was to make it myself, at the time and in the manner it was transmitted, I was governed by the best views and best evidence I could obtain of the public sentiment relative thereto. The senate acted upon it under an impression that it was to remain so, and in that light the matter is understood by the public; and it would be uncandid not to add that I have found no cause since to believe that I mistook that sentiment.
“We shall have,” he continued, “either no war or a severe contest with France. In either case, if you will allow me to express my opinion, this is the most eligible time for you to come forward. In the first case, to assist with your counsel and aid in making judicious provisions and arrangements to avert it; in the other case, to share in the glory of defending your country, and, by making all secondary considerations yield to that great and primary object, display a mind superior to embarrassing punctilios at so critical a moment as the present.
“After having expressed these sentiments, with the frankness of undisguised friendship, it is hardly necessary to add that, if you should finally decline the appointment of major-general, there is none to whom I would give a more decided preference as aid-de-camp, the offer of which is highly flattering, honorable, and grateful to my feelings, and for which I entertain a high sense. But, my dear General Knox—and here, again, I speak to you in the language of candor and friendship—examine well your mind upon this subject. Do not unite yourself to the suite of a man whom you may consider as the primary cause of what you call a degradation, with unpleasant sensations. This, while it was growing upon you, would, if I should come to the knowledge of it, make me unhappy; as my first wish would be, that my military family and the whole army should consider themselves as a band of brothers, willing and ready to die for each other.”
Before this letter reached Knox, he had heard of the decision of the president to place Hamilton in the position for which Washington had nominated him, and he had written to the secretary of war, declining the appointment, if compelled to serve under Hamilton and Pinckney, saying, “No officer can consent to his own degradation by serving in an inferior station.”
General Pinckney's course was more patriotic and generous. He arrived at New York, from France, at the middle of October. Washington had awaited this event with anxiety, for he was fearful that he might have a repetition of the difficulties with General Knox. But Pinckney cheerfully acquiesced in the arrangement, and accepted his commission. He expressed his pleasure at seeing the name of Hamilton at the head of the major-generals, and applauded the commander-in-chief for his sagacity and discernment in placing it there. He also expressed his regret that General Knox had declined his appointment, and that his feelings had been severely wounded by being outranked. He added, “If the authority which appointed me to the rank of second major in the army, will revise the arrangement, and place General Knox before me, I will neither quit the service nor be dissatisfied.”
At the request of the secretary of war, Washington repaired to Philadelphia as early in November as a due regard to health would allow, the yellow fever having prevailed in that city during the autumn. He was requested to meet there Generals Hamilton and Pinckney, to make arrangements respecting the provisional army about to be raised. M'Henry had prepared a series of thirteen questions for their consideration, and Washington propounded fourteen more, all bearing upon the construction and disposition of the army. For almost five weeks the three generals were closely engaged in the consideration of this subject, and thus the result of their deliberations was reduced to proper arrangement, in the form of two letters to the secretary of war, which were prepared by Hamilton and signed by Washington. While in Philadelphia on this occasion, the latter was present at the opening of Congress. This was his last visit to the seat of the federal government.
Washington returned to Mount Vernon about the twentieth of December, leaving the executive department of the provisional army in the hands of General Hamilton. He still adhered to the opinion that there would be no actual war with France, or at least that the people of the United States need not have any fear of a French invasion; yet he acted upon the wise principle of being prepared. On his way home, being detained, he wrote out some general suggestions for the guidance of the secretary of war in the disposition of the army.
Arriving at Mount Vernon, Washington was delighted with a letter from Lafayette, who spoke with much feeling of the pleasure he derived from conversations with his son about that pleasant home on the Potomac. The marquis then adverted to politics, and said it was his full persuasion that the French Directory seriously desired to be at peace with the United States. Under this conviction, he expressed a hope that Washington would use his “influence to prevent the breach from widening, and to insure a noble and enduring reconciliation.” In his reply to this portion of the letter, Washington said, “You have expressed a wish worthy of the benevolence of your heart.” He assured him that no man could deprecate a rupture between the two governments more than he. “You add,” he said, “that the executive Directory are disposed to an accommodation of all differences. If they are sincere in this declaration, let them evidence it by their actions; for words, unaccompanied therewith, will not be much regarded now. I would pledge myself that the government and people of the United States will meet them heart and hand, at a fair negotiation; having no wish more ardent than to live in peace with all the world, provided they are suffered to remain undisturbed in their just rights.... On the politics of Europe, I shall express no opinion, nor make any inquiry who is right or who is wrong. I wish well to all nations and to all men. My politics are plain and simple. I think every nation has a right to establish that form of government under which it conceives it may be most happy, provided it infracts no right, or is not dangerous to others; and that no governments ought to interfere with the internal concerns of another, except for the security of what is due to themselves.”