Washington and the American Republic, Vol. 3.

by Benson John Lossing

The Congress, on the twenty-eighth of September, unanimously resolved to send the constitution adopted by the convention, and the accompanying letters, to the legislatures of the several states, and to recommend them to call conventions within their respective jurisdictions to consider it. And it was agreed, that when nine of the thirteen states should ratify it, it should become the fundamental law of the republic.

And now commenced the first great and general conflict of political opinions since the establishment of the independence of the United States; and in each of the several commonwealths, men of the first rank in talent, social position, and sound moral and political integrity, became engaged in the discussion of the great question of national government. That conflict had commenced in the general convention, but the proceedings of that body were under the seal of secrecy. Yet the positions assumed by the delegates in the general discussion in their several states, revealed the fact that extreme diversity of opinion had prevailed in the convention, and that the constitution was composed of compromises marked with the scars of severe conflict.

Referring to these differences of opinion in the convention, Washington remarked to Catharine Macaulay Graham, in a letter written on the sixteenth of November, that “the various and opposite interests which were to be conciliated, the local prejudices which were to be subdued, the diversity of opinions and sentiments which were to be reconciled, and, in fine, the sacrifices which were necessary to be made on all sides for the general welfare, combined to make it a work of so intricate and difficult a nature, that I think it is much to be wondered at that anything could have been produced with such unanimity as the constitution proposed.... Whether it will be adopted by the people or not remains yet to be determined.”

To Lafayette he wrote in February following: “It appears to me little short of a miracle that the delegates from so many states, different from each other, as you know, in their manners, circumstances, and prejudices, should unite in forming a system of national government, so little liable to well-founded objections.” After alluding to its obvious defects, he continued:—

“With regard to the two great points, the pivots upon which the whole machine must move, my creed is simply: First, that the general government is not invested with more powers than are indispensably necessary to perform the functions of a good government; and, consequently, that no objection ought to be made against the quantity of power delegated to it. Secondly, that these powers, as the appointment of all rulers will for ever arise from, and at short stated intervals recur to, the free suffrage of the people, are so distributed among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, into which the general government is arranged, that it can never be in danger of degenerating into a monarchy, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, or any other despotic or oppressive form, so long as there shall remain any virtue in the body of the people.

“I would not be understood, my dear marquis, to speak of consequences which may be produced, in the revolution of ages, by corruption of morals, profligacy of manners, and listlessness in the preservation of the natural and inalienable rights of mankind, nor of the successful usurpations that may be established at such an unpropitious juncture upon the ruins of liberty, however providently guarded and secured, as these are contingencies against which no human prudence can effectually provide. It will at least be a recommendation to the proposed constitution, that it is provided with more checks and barriers against the introduction of tyranny, and those of a nature less liable to be surmounted, than any government hitherto instituted among mortals. We are not to expect perfection in this world; but mankind, in modern times, have apparently made some progress in the science of government. Should that which is now offered to the people of America be found an experiment less perfect than it can be made, a constitutional door is left open for its amelioration.”

Hamilton, with his usual marvellous sagacity, clearly perceived the shaping of the conflict to be fought, and at once assumed the panoply of a most acute contestant in its favor. “The new constitution,” he wrote immediately after the adjournment of the convention, “has in favor of its success these circumstances: A very great weight of influence of the persons who framed it, particularly in the universal popularity of General Washington. The good will of the commercial interest throughout the states, which will give all its efforts to the establishment of a government capable of regulating, protecting, and extending the commerce of the Union. The good will of most men of property in the several states, who wish a government of the Union able to protect them against domestic violence, and the depredations which the democratic spirit is apt to make on property; and who are, besides, anxious for the respectability of the nation. The hopes of the creditors of the United States that a general government, possessing the means of doing it, will pay the debt of the Union. A strong belief, in the people at large, of the insufficiency of the present confederation to preserve the existence of the Union, and of the necessity of the Union to their safety and prosperity; of course, a strong desire of change, and a predisposition to receive well the propositions of the convention.”

Very soon Hamilton, with other federalists, as the supporters of the constitution were called, found it necessary to put forth all his intellectual energies in defence of that instrument. Conventions were speedily called in the several states to consider it, and the friends and opponents of the constitution marshalled their respective antagonistic forces with great skill and zeal.

In Virgina, Patrick Henry, George Mason, and Richard Henry Lee, opposed the constitution with all their power and influence, chiefly because it would, in a degree, annul state rights, and base the sovereignty too absolutely upon the popular will. Mason led in the opposition, and Henry gave him the support of his eloquence. His arguments were those of all other opponents; and with the leaders in his own and other states, he raised the cry, which soon became general, that the new constitution had no bill of rights and no sufficient guaranties for personal liberty.

They cited the experience of the past to show, that of all national governments a democratic one was the most unstable, fluctuating, and short-lived; and that despotism, arising from a centralization of power in the national government on one hand, and anarchy, incident to the instability of democracy—“the levelling spirit of democracy” denounced by Gerry as “the worst of political evils”—on the other, were the Scylla and Charybdis between which the republic would, in the opinion of their opponents, be placed, with almost a certainty of being destroyed.