Major Beckwith first approached Hamilton, the secretary of the treasury. After acknowledging the courtesy of the United States government in offering to comply with the wishes of Lord Dorchester, he observed that the prospect of a war between Great Britain and Spain would prevent or defer his lordship's departure for England.

“He next proceeded to observe,” says Hamilton in his written report of the interview which he laid before the president, “that Lord Dorchester had been informed of a negotiation commenced on the other side of the water, through the agency of Mr. Morris; mentioning, as the subscriber understood principally by way of proof of Lord Dorchester's knowledge of the transaction, that Mr. Morris had not produced any regular credentials, but merely a letter from the president directed to himself; that some delays had intervened, partly on account of Mr. Morris's absence on a trip to Holland, as was understood, and that it was not improbable these delays and some other circumstances may have impressed Mr. Morris with an idea of backwardness on the part of the British ministry. That his lordship, however, had directed him to say that an inference of this sort would not, in his opinion, be well founded, as he had reason to believe that the cabinet of Great Britain entertained a disposition, not only toward a friendly intercourse, but toward an alliance with the United States.”

“Major Beckwith then proceeded to speak of the particular cause of the expected rupture between Spain and Great Britain, observing it was one in which all commercial nations must be supposed to favor the views of Great Britain. That it was therefore presumed, should a war take place, that the United States would find it to their interest to take part with Great Britain rather than with Spain.”

Major Beckwith then, in the name of Lord Dorchester, disclaimed any influence, under the sanction of British authorities, over the western tribes, unfavorable to the interests of the citizens of the United States; and concluded by producing a letter signed by Dorchester, which contained sentiments similar to those expressed by the bearer, with an assurance that “his lordship knew too well the consequences of such a step, to have taken it without a previous knowledge of the intentions of the cabinet.”

Washington's impression of this semi-official overture from Great Britain is expressed in the following record in his diary on the eighth of July: “The aspect of this business, in the moment of its communication to me, appeared simply and no other than this: 'We did not incline to give any satisfactory answer to Mr. Morris, who was officially commissioned to ascertain our intentions with respect to the evacuation of the western posts within the territory of the United States, and other matters, until by this unauthenticated mode we can discover whether you will enter into an alliance with us, and make common cause against Spain. In that case we will enter into a commercial treaty with you, and promise perhaps to fulfil what we already stand engaged to perform.'”

The president referred the matter to his cabinet, with a request that they would give it their serious consideration. They did so; and on the fourteenth it was agreed to treat Beckwith's communications very civilly—to intimate, delicately, that they carried no marks official or authentic; nor, in speaking of alliance, did they convey any definite meaning by which the precise object of the British cabinet could be discovered. “In a word,” says Washington in his diary, “that the secretary of the treasury was to extract as much as he could from Major Beckwith, and to report to me, without committing, by any assurances whatever, the government of the United States, leaving it entirely free to pursue, unreproached, such a line of conduct in the dispute as her interest and honor shall dictate.”

It was evident that the British government were willing that their relations with the United States should remain unchanged, until they should perceive what course European affairs were likely to take. For about nine months Morris remained in London, endeavoring to accomplish the objects of his mission; but, at the end of that time, the views of the British government, on all the main topics of discussion, were as much hidden in a cloud of uncertainty as when he first presented Washington's letter to the duke of Leeds, as his credentials. The powers given to Mr. Morris were withdrawn; because, to further press the subject of a commercial treaty, or the exchange of ministers, or the evacuation of the western posts, on the part of the United States, would be useless and dishonorable; and it was resolved to pause in action until the government had become strong enough to speak in decisive tones, and prepare to maintain words with works.

Finding the French government, then embarrassed by its own internal difficulties, disinclined to take part in the quarrel with Great Britain, Spain, unable alone to cope with her foe, yielded every point in the controversy, and the dispute was settled.

FOOTNOTES:

[28] In his diary under date of March the sixteenth, 1790, Washington recorded: “Exercised on horseback, between ten and twelve o'clock; previous to this, I was visited (having given permission) by Mr. Warner Mifflin, one of the people called Quakers, active in pursuit of the measures laid before Congress for emancipating the slaves. After much general conversation, and an endeavor to remove the prejudices which, he said, had been entertained of the motives by which the attending deputations from their society were actuated, he used arguments to show the immorality, injustice, and impolicy of keeping these people in a state of slavery; with declarations, however, that he did not wish for more than a gradual abolition, or to see any infraction of the constitution to effect it. To these I replied, that as it was a matter which might come before me for official decision, I was not inclined to express any sentiments on the merits of the question before this should happen.”