The fat cazique had often warned Narvaez not to touch the women, or anything which Cortes had left behind in the shape of gold or cotton stuffs, as he would certainly be greatly incensed, hasten from Mexico, and not only cut off Narvaez, but also him, for suffering his property to be touched.
All the complaints this cazique might make respecting the depredations committed by Narvaez's troops in Sempoalla were equally fruitless. And it was of no avail for him to repeat that Malinche and his men had never taken the smallest thing from them, and had proved themselves altogether kind-hearted teules; Narvaez and Salvatierra, whose conduct in general was the most heartless, merely mocked at the cazique, the latter often repeating to Narvaez and the other officers, "Only just imagine in what fear these caziques stand of that paltry little fellow Cortes!"
May the good reader learn from this how wrong it is to speak evil of honest folks; for I am ready to swear that this very Salvatierra behaved in the most pitiable and cowardly manner when the battle was fought between Narvaez and us, and yet his build and bones were powerful enough to have defended himself right well; however, he was a mere braggadocio, and I believe he was a native of Burgos.
We must now, however, return to Cortes, and acquaint the reader that Narvaez despatched his secretary, Alonso Meta, who subsequently settled in Puebla, with three other great personages, to Mexico, commanding us and our general, by virtue of the copies of his appointment by Velasquez, to submit to him.[75]
Cortes, who received daily intelligence of what was going on in Narvaez's head-quarters and at Vera Cruz, was duly informed by Sandoval how Narvaez had thrown Vazquez de Aillon into chains, and sent him to Spain or Cuba, and that, owing to such violent proceedings, five of his principal officers had come over to him, who feared, since so little respect had been paid to the person of a royal auditor, they, as Aillon's relatives, might expect worse treatment. From them Sandoval learnt everything that was passing in Narvaez's head-quarters, and that it was his intention to march shortly in person to Mexico to take us all prisoners. Cortes, on receiving this intelligence, assembled his officers and all those whom he was accustomed to consult in matters of great moment, and were men entirely devoted to him. In this council it was determined we should anticipate Narvaez, and immediately march out against him. Pedro de Alvarado was to remain in Mexico, with all those who were not over-anxious to make this campaign, to guard the person of Motecusuma; and we likewise took care to leave all those behind who, as partisans of Velasquez, were not altogether to be trusted.
Cortes had fortunately ordered a quantity of maise from Tlascalla previous to the arrival of Narvaez, for the harvest had altogether failed about Mexico, owing to a continued drought: we, indeed, required a great quantity of provisions for the numbers of Naborias[76] and Tlascallan troops we had with us. This and other necessaries of life, consisting in fowls, fruits, &c., arrived at the time appointed, and were given in charge of Alvarado. We likewise took the precaution of fortifying our quarters,—we mounted four pieces of heavy cannon on the most commanding point, and left Alvarado a few falconets and all the powder we could spare, with ten crossbow-men, fourteen musketeers, and seven horse soldiers; the latter were, indeed, more than he required, as the cavalry was of little use in the courtyards attached to our quarters. The number of soldiers we left behind in Mexico was altogether eighty-three.
Motecusuma easily conjectured what our designs were against Narvaez; yet, though Cortes daily called upon him, he was equally upon his guard as Cortes was in not throwing out any hints of his (Motecusuma's) sending Narvaez gold and provisions. It was only at the very last that the monarch made some inquiries respecting our intended movements, which will be found in the chapter following.
CHAPTER CXV.
How the powerful Motecusuma inquires of Cortes whether it was really his intention to march out against Narvaez, though the latter's troops were double the number of ours.