The Philosophical Theory of the State

by Bernard Bosanquet

2. We will begin (1) by pointing out the analogy between the groups or systems of which our intelligence is composed, and the groups or systems which make up the fabric of society, and we will then go on (2) to exhibit them as up to a certain point aspects of the same fact.

(1) We may note two degrees of connection between the members of a whole, which we may call “Association” and “Organisation.”

(i.) When two individuals are so connected that where you find the one you expect to find the {157} other, they may be called associates. And any kind of habitual grouping, from a gang of thieves to a scientific or philanthropic institution, may be called an Association. Owing probably to the verbal force which it borrows from the verb “to associate,” the term “association” implies the intentional coming together of units which have been separate, and which may become separate again. The word “Society,” on the other hand, has not this verbal force, and although an “association” may call itself “a society,” yet “Society” as such is not spoken of as an “Association.” When we speak of “Society” we do not emphasise the aspect of being put together out of elements which exist apart, and therefore we habitually apply the word to that natural grouping, which, at any rate, we do not normally think of as purposely put together and liable to be dissolved again. When the State is treated as an Association, a definite theory of its nature is implied, such as is involved in Herbert Spencer’s comparison between it and a joint stock company.

Now this same term “Association” is the most familiar expression for a connection between elements of mind, analogous to that between persons who are called associates. If two elements of mind are so connected that, where we find the one we expect to find the other, they are said to be “associated.” If the engine’s whistle makes me think the train is going to start, then it would be said that the idea “train starting” is associated in my mind with the idea “engine whistling.” They have before entered into the same mental group or whole, and so, where we find the one, {158} we expect to find the other, just as, where my friend X is, his comrade Y is probably not far off.

We may here note the analogy between these two modes of association—that of persons and that of mental elements. In both cases, according to the plain man’s view of the matter, we are dealing with wholly casual conjunctions of units naturally independent. The associates in either case need no better reason for now being together than that they had been together before. Their connection expresses nothing intimate or essential in their natures, and, if they fall apart again, they will not be seriously affected by the separation.

Now, of course, this idea of mere conjunction is not strictly true even of the connections between the most casual associates. Every association, whether of comrades or of ideas, is a connection between qualities, and therefore a general connection between the natures of the related terms. People are not really companions for no reason at all; and ideas are not really units or atoms which stick together by mere juxtaposition, so that when one is pulled up out of the Hades of oblivion it drags the other with it. Both the association of companions and the association of ideas are tendencies in which some general connection of qualities is at work, and expresses itself through the detail of the actual surroundings, so far as an opening is left to it. When the association is made explicit by both members being present together, there is an outlet or utterance of the nature of the associates which there is not when they are separated.

{159} But though all this is true, and can be detected in cases of association by careful analysis, it is, relatively speaking, the fact that commonplace association depends upon qualities which are so superficial that they may set up a tendency to connection between any units which are members of the same world. And, therefore, as compared with any more thorough-going kind of connection, such association may be set down as casual, and as determined by the mere chance of juxtaposition.

(ii.) Let us compare the kind of connection just described as association with that which we have agreed to call organisation.

Associates, [1] we saw, were together, as might roughly be said, simply because they found themselves together. That is to say, they were, after their association, what they were before it, and would not be seriously affected if they were to be separated. Connections of this kind are essentially between unit and unit. They fall short of the nature of a plan which determines a great range of elements, variously but with reference to an identical operation.

[1] An “Association,” it may be urged, generally has a definite purpose, and so far, as indeed we said above, the associates come together, and do not merely find themselves together. But this is only an apparent difficulty. In comparison with the whole compass of their nature, associates who come together for some limited purpose—Bimetallism, Philanthropy, a political cause—do merely find themselves together. They form, as the cynic will say, an extraordinary menagerie, and their association may break up without any apparent effect upon their nature. Obviously, however, there are some purposes which go deeper into men’s characters, and others which are shallower; and this merely illustrates our point that the most casual association is a universal connection of qualities in disguise.