[ 11 ] Ibid., I. li, I. lv, I. cxxi.
[ 12 ] Ibid. I. cxxiv, note.
[ 13 ] For example, Kaye cites from Blewitt, a critic of Mandeville, this passage: "nothing can make a Man honest or virtuous but a Regard to some religious or moral Principles" and characterizes it as "precisely the rigorist position from which Mandeville was arguing when he asserted that our so-called virtues were really vices, because not based only on this regard to principle." (Ibid. II. 411. The italics in both cases are mine). The passage from Blewitt is not, of itself, manifestly rigoristic, while the position attributed to Mandeville is rigorism at its most extreme.
As further evidence of the prevalence of rigorism, Kaye cites from Thomas Fuller the following passage: "corrupt nature (which without thy restraining grace will have a Vent.)" Ibid. I. cxxi, note. But in Calvinist theology "restraining grace," which was not a "purifying" grace, operated to make some men who were not purged of sin lead a serviceable social life. (See John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, Bk. II, Ch. III, () 3, pp. I. 315-316 of the "Seventh American Edition," Philadelphia, n.d.) As I understand it, the role of "restraining grace" in Calvinist doctrine is similar to that of "honnêteté" in Jansenist doctrine, referred to infra. The rascals whom Mandeville finds useful to society are not to be identified either with those endowed with the "restraining grace" of the Calvinists or with the "honnêtes hommes" of the Jansenists.
For other instances of disregard by Kaye of the variations in substance and degree of the rigorism of genuine rigorists, see ibid. II. 403-406, II. 415-416.
[ 14 ] See especially F. B. Kaye, "The Influence of Bernard Mandeville," Studies in Philology, XIX (1922), 90-102.