Hor. This is making the First Cause of things not an intelligent being.
Cleo. Why so? Can you not conceive an intelligent, and even a most wise being, that is not only exempt from, but likewise incapable of entertaining any malice or cruelty?
Hor. Such a being could not commit, or order things that are malicious and cruel.
Cleo. Neither does God. But this will carry us into a dispute about the origin of evil; and from thence we must inevitably fall on free-will and predestination, which, as I have told you before, is an inexplicable mystery I will never meddle with. But I never said nor thought any thing irreverent to the Deity: on the contrary, the idea I have of the Supreme Being, is as transcendently great, as my capacity is able to form one, of what is incomprehensible; and I could as soon believe, that he could cease to exist, as that he should be the author of any real evil. But I should be glad to hear the method, after which you think society might have been much better introduced: Pray, acquaint me with that milder way you spoke of.
Hor. You have thoroughly convinced me, that the natural love which it is pretended we have for our species, is not greater than what many other animals have for theirs: but if nature had actually given us an affection for one another, as sincere and conspicuous as that which parents are seen to have for their children, whilst they are helpless, men would have joined together by choice; and nothing could have hindered them from associating, whether their numbers had been great or small, and themselves either ignorant or knowing.
Cleo. O mentes hominum cæcas! O Pectora cæca!
Hor. You may exclaim as much as you please; I am persuaded that this would have united men in firmer bonds of friendship, than any common danger from wild beasts could have tied them with: but what fault can you find with it, and what mischief could have befallen us from mutual affection?
Cleo. It would have been inconsistent with the scheme, the plan after which, it is evident, Providence has been pleased to order and dispose of things in the universe. If such an affection had been planted in man by instinct, there never could have been any fatal quarrels among them, nor mortal hatreds; men could never have been cruel to one another: in short, there could have been no wars of any duration; and no considerable numbers of our species could ever have been killed by one another’s malice.
Hor. You would make a rare state-physician, in prescribing war, cruelty and malice, for the welfare and maintenance of civil society.
Cleo. Pray, do not misrepresent me: I have done no such thing: but if you believe the world is governed by Providence at all, you must believe likewise, that the Deity makes use of means to bring about, perform, and execute his will and pleasure: As for example, to have war kindled, there must be first misunderstandings and quarrels between the subjects of different nations, and dissentions among the respective princes, rulers, or governors of them: it is evident, that the mind of man is the general mint where the means of this sort must be coined; from whence I conclude, that if Providence had ordered matters after that mild way, which you think would have been the best, very little of human blood could have been spilt, if any at all.