Cleo. That is true; and therefore the whole tenor and design of this commandment presupposes, and must imply what I say. But the prohibitions of stealing, adultery, and coveting any thing that belonged to their neighbours, are still more plainly intimating the same; and seem to be additions and amendments, to supply the defects of some known regulations and contracts that had been agreed upon before. If, in this view, we behold the three commandments last hinted at, we shall find them to be strong evidences, not only of that instinct of sovereignty within us, which at other times I have called a domineering spirit, and a principle of selfishness; but likewise of the difficulty there is to destroy, eradicate, and pull it out of the heart of man: for, from the eighth commandment it appears, that, though we debar ourselves from taking the things of our neighbour by force, yet there is danger that this instinct will prompt us to get them unknown to him in a clandestine manner, and deceive us with the insinuations of an oportet habere. From the foregoing precept, it is likewise manifest, that though we agree not to take away, and rob a man of the woman that is his own, it is yet to be feared, that if we like her, this innate principle that bids us gratify every appetite, will advise us to make use of her as if she was our own; though our neighbour is at the charge of maintaining her and all the children she brings forth. The last more especially is very ample in confirming my assertion. It strikes directly at the root of the evil, and lays open the real source of the mischiefs that are apprehended in the seventh and the eighth commandment: for without first actually trespassing against this, no man is in danger of breaking either of the former. This tenth commandment, moreover, insinuates very plainly, in the first place, that this instinct of ours is of great power, and a frailty hardly to be cured; in the second, that there is nothing which our neighbour can be possessed of, but, neglecting the consideration of justice and property, we may have a desire after it; for which reason it absolutely forbids us to covet any thing that is his: The Divine Wisdom, well knowing the strength of this selfish principle, which obliges us continually to assume every thing to ourselves; and that, when once a man heartily covets a thing, this instinct, this principle will over-rule and persuade him to leave no stone unturned to compass his desires.
Hor. According to your way of expounding the commandments, and making them tally so exactly with the frailties of our nature, it should follow from the ninth, that all men are born with a strong appetite to forswear themselves, which I never heard before.
Cleo. Nor I neither; and I confess that the rebuke there is in this smart turn of yours is very plausible; but the censure, how specious soever it may appear, is unjust, and you shall not find the consequence you hint at, if you will be pleased to distinguish between the natural appetites themselves, and the various crimes which they make us commit, rather than not be obeyed: For, though we are born with no immediate appetite to forswear ourselves, yet we are born with more than one, that, if never checked, may in time oblige us to forswear ourselves, or do worse, if it be possible, and they cannot be gratified without it; and the commandment you mention plainly implies, that by nature we are so unreasonably attached to our interest on all emergencies, that it is possible for a man to be swayed by it, not only to the visible detriment of others, as is manifest from the seventh and the eighth, but even though it should be against his own conscience: For nobody did ever knowingly bear false witness against his neighbour, but he did it for some end or other; this end, whatever it is, I call his interest. The law which forbids murder, had already demonstrated to us, how immensely we undervalue every thing, when it comes in competition with ourselves; for, though our greatest dread be destruction, and we know no other calamity equal to the dissolution of our being, yet such unequitable judges this instinct of sovereignty is able to make of us, that rather than not have our will, which we count our happiness, we choose to inflict this calamity on others, and bring total ruin on such as we think to be obstacles to the gratification of our appetites; and this men do, not only for hindrances that are present, or apprehended as to come, but likewise for former offences, and things that are past redress.
Hor. By what you said last, you mean revenge, I suppose.
Cleo. I do so; and the instinct of sovereignty which I assert to be in human nature, is in nothing so glaringly conspicuous as it is in this passion, which no mere man was ever born without, and which even the most civilized, as well as the most learned, are seldom able to conquer: For whoever pretends to revenge himself, must claim a right to a judicature within, and an authority to punish: Which, being destructive to the mutual peace of all multitudes, are for that reason the first things that in every civil society are snatched away out of every man’s hands, as dangerous tools, and vested in the governing part, the supreme power only.
Hor. This remark on revenge has convinced me more than any thing you have said yet, that there is some such thing as a principle of sovereignty in our nature; but I cannot conceive yet, why the vices of private, I mean particular persons, should be thought to belong to the whole species.
Cleo. Because every body is liable to fall into the vices that are peculiar to his species; and it is with them, as it is with distempers among creatures of different kinds: There are many ailments that horses are subject to, which are not incident to cows. There is no vice, but whoever commits it had within him before he was guilty of it, a tendency towards it, a latent cause that disposed him to it: Therefore, all lawgivers have two main points to consider at setting out: First, what things will procure happiness to the society under their care: Secondly, what passions and properties there are in man’s nature, that may either promote or obstruct this happiness. It is prudence to watch your fish ponds against the insults of hearns and bitterns; but the same precaution would be ridiculous against turkeys and peacocks, or any other creatures, that neither love fish, nor are able to catch them.
Hor. What frailty or defect is it in our nature, that the two first commandments have a regard to, or, as you call it, tally with?
Cleo. Our natural blindness and ignorance of the true Deity: For, though we all come into the world with an instinct toward religion that manifests itself before we come to maturity, yet the fear of an invisible cause, or invisible causes, which all men are born with, is not more universal, than the uncertainty which all untaught men fluctuate in, as to the nature and properties of that cause, or those causes: There can be no greater proof of this——
Hor. I want none; the history of all ages is a sufficient witness.