The Fable of the Bees; Or, Private Vices, Public Benefits

by Bernard Mandeville

Hor. But why will you prevaricate with me after this manner? You know yourself, and all the world knows and sees, that there is such a minister; and it is easily proved, that there always have been such ministers: and in the situation we are, I do not believe a king could do without. When there are a great many disaffected people in the kingdom, and parliament-men are to be chosen, elections must be looked after with great care, and a thousand things are to be done, that are necessary to disappoint the sinister ends of malecontents, and keep out the Pretender; things of which the management often requires great penetration, and uncommon talents, as well as secrecy and dispatch.

Cleo. How sincerely soever you may seem to speak in defence of these things, Horatio, I am sure, from your principles, that you are not in earnest. I am not to judge of the exigency of our affairs: But as I would not pry into the conduct, or scan the actions of princes, and their ministers, so I pretend to justify or defend no wisdom but that of the constitution itself.

Hor. I do not desire you should: Only tell me, whether you do not think, that a man, who has and can carry this vast burden upon his shoulders, and all Europe’s business in his breast, must be a person of a prodigious genius, as well as general knowledge, and other great abilities.

Cleo. That a man, invested with so much real power, and an authority so extensive, as such ministers generally have, must make a great figure, and be considerable above all other subjects, is most certain: But it is my opinion, that there are always fifty men in the kingdom, that, if employed, would be fit for this post, and, after a little practice, shine in it, to one who is equally qualified to be a Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain. A prime minster has a vast, an unspeakable advantage barely by being so, and by every body’s knowing him to be, and treating him as such: A man who in every office, and every branch of it throughout the administration, has the power, as well as the liberty, to ask and see whom and what he pleases, has more knowledge within his reach, and can speak of every thing with greater exactness than any other man, that is much better versed in affairs, and has ten times greater capacity. It is hardly possible, than an active man, of tolerable education, that is not destitute of a spirit nor of vanity, should fail of appearing to be wise, vigilant, and expert, who has the opportunity whenever he thinks fit, to make use of all the cunning and experience, as well as diligence and labour of every officer in the civil administration; and if he has but money enough, and will employ men to keep up a strict correspondence in every part of the kingdom, he can remain ignorant of nothing; and there is hardly any affair or transaction, civil or military, foreign or domestic, which he will not be able greatly to influence, when he has a mind either to promote or obstruct it.

Hor. There seems to be a great deal in what you say, I must confess; but I begin to suspect, that what often inclines me to be of your opinion, is your dexterity in placing things in the light you would have seen them in, and the great skill you have in depreciating what is valuable, and detracting from merit.

Cleo. I protest that I speak from my heart.

Hor. When I reflect on what I have beheld with my own eyes, and what I still see every day of the transactions between statesmen and politicians, I am very well assured you are in the wrong: When I consider all the stratagems, and the force as well as finesse that are made use of to supplant and undo prime ministers, the wit and cunning, industry and address, that are employed to misrepresent all their actions, the calumnies and false reports that are spread of them, the ballads and lampoons that are published, the set speeches and studied invectives that are made against them; when I consider, I say, and reflect on these things, and every thing else that is said and done, either to ridicule or to render them odious, I am convinced, that to defeat so much art and strength, and disappoint so much malice and envy as prime ministers are generally attacked with, require extraordinary talents: No man of only common prudence and fortitude could maintain himself in that post for a twelvemonth, much less for many years together, though he understood the world very well, and had all the virtue, faithfulness, and integrity in it; therefore, there must be some fallacy in your assertion.

Cleo. Either I have been deficient in explaining myself or else I have had the misfortune to be misunderstood. When I insinuated that men might be prime ministers without extraordinary endowments, I spoke only in regard to the business itself, that province, which, if there was no such minister, the king and council would have the trouble of managing.

Hor. To direct and manage the whole machine of government, he must be a consummate statesman in the first place.

Cleo. You have too sublime a notion of that post. To be a consummate statesman, is the highest qualification human nature is capable of possessing. To deserve that name, a man must be well versed in ancient and modern history, and thoroughly acquainted with all the courts of Europe, that he may know not only the public interest in every nation, but likewise the private views, as well as inclinations, virtues, and vices of princes and ministers: Of every country in Christendom, and the borders of it, he ought to know the product and geography, the principal cities and fortresses; and of these their trade and manufactures, their situation, natural advantages, strength, and number of inhabitants; he must have read men as well as books, and perfectly well understand human nature, and the use of the passions: He must, moreover, be a great master in concealing the sentiments of his heart, have an entire command over his features, and be well skilled in all the wiles and stratagems to draw out secrets from others. A man, of whom all this, or the greatest part of it, may not be said with truth, and that he has had great experience in public affairs, cannot be called a consummate statesman; but he may be fit to be a prime minister, though he had not a hundredth part of those qualifications. As the king’s favour creates prime ministers, and makes their station the post of the greatest power as well as profit, so the same favour is the only bottom which those that are in it have to stand upon: The consequence is, that the most ambitious men in all monarchies are ever contending for this post as the highest prize, of which the enjoyment is easy, and all the difficulty in obtaining and preserving it. We see accordingly, that the accomplishments I spoke of to make a statesman are neglected, and others aimed at and studied, that are more useful and more easily acquired. The capacities you observe in prime ministers are of another nature, and consist in being finished courtiers, and thoroughly understanding the art of pleasing and cajoling with address. To procure a prince what he wants, when it is known, and to be diligent in entertaining him with the pleasures he calls for, are ordinary services: Asking is no better than complaining; therefore, being forced to ask, is to have cause of complaint, and to see a prince submit to the slavery of it, argues great rusticity in his courtiers; a polite minister penetrates into his master’s wishes, and furnishes him with what he delights in, without giving him the trouble to name it. Every common flatterer can praise and extol promiscuously every thing that is said or done, and find wisdom and prudence in the most indifferent actions; but it belongs to the skilful courtier to set fine glosses upon manifest imperfections, and make every failing, every frailty of his prince, have the real appearance of the virtues that are the nearest, or, to speak more justly, the least opposite to them. By the observance of these necessary duties, it is that the favour of princes may be long preserved, as well as obtained. Whoever can make himself agreeable at a court, will seldom fail of being thought necessary; and when a favourite has once established himself in the good opinion of his master, it is easy for him to make his own family engross the king’s ear, and keep every body from him but his own creatures: Nor is it more difficult, in length of time, to turn out of the administration every body that was not of his own bringing in, and constantly be tripping up the heels of those who attempt to raise themselves by any other interest or assistance. A prime minister has by his place great advantages over all that oppose him; one of them is, that nobody, without exception, ever filled that post but who had many enemies, whether he was a plunderer or a patriot: Which being well known, many things that are laid to a prime minister’s charge are not credited among the impartial and more discreet part of mankind, even when they are true. As to the defeating and disappointing all the envy and malice they are generally attacked with, if the favourite was to do all that himself, it would certainly, as you say, require extraordinary talents and a great capacity, as well as continual vigilance and application; but this is the province of their creatures, a task divided into a great number of parts; and every body that has the least dependence upon, or has any thing to hope from the minister, makes it his business and his study, as it is his interest, on the one hand, to cry up their patron, magnify his virtues and abilities, and justify his conduct; on the other, to exclaim against his adversaries, blacken their reputation, and play at them every engine, and the same stratagems that are made use of to supplant the minister.