“If it were possible to do something which, without endangering the safety of Germany, would relieve Great Britain of this nightmare, it is my opinion that people over here would go very far to conciliate German aspirations.”
The striking fact that after a long interval, and in spite of the failure of the previous endeavours, a renewed attempt was made to arrive at a naval understanding, and that special pains were taken to ensure its success, may be due to various causes. For instance, the Morocco incident of 1911 had shown how easily a series of comparatively unimportant events might lead within reach of a dangerous catastrophe, unless the atmosphere of general distrust could be removed, and it was felt in Great Britain that this distrust was largely the result of the constant and regular increase of Germany’s armaments. Moreover, it was known that a new Navy Bill was then forthcoming in Germany which, in its turn, would be bound to cause fresh alarm, and growing expenditure in Great Britain, and that the Liberal Cabinet would prefer to gain its laurels by bringing about a more peaceful frame of mind. Finally, Mr. Winston Churchill had been appointed First Lord of the Admiralty in October, 1911, and as he was known to be by no means anti-German, his entering upon office may have given rise to the hope that, while he was administering the affairs of the Navy, it would be possible to settle certain purely technical matters affecting his department, which could then furnish the conditions preliminary to an understanding with Germany. Ballin, at any rate, had cherished the hope—as is borne out by the letter quoted above—that Mr. Churchill could be induced to pay a visit to Germany, and that an opportunity might then be found to bring the naval experts of both countries face to face with each other. Ballin had always eagerly desired that such a meeting should take place, because his long experience in settling difficult business questions had taught him that there was no greater barrier between people, and certainly none that hampered their intellectual rapprochement to a larger extent, than the fact of their never having come into personal contact with one another, and of never having had a chance to actually familiarize themselves with the mentality and the whole personality of the man representing the other side. It might also be assumed that, once the two really responsible persons—Churchill and Tirpitz—had met in conclave, the feeling of their mutual responsibility would be too strong to allow the negotiations to end in failure.
Unfortunately, such a meeting never took place; all that was achieved was a preliminary step, viz. the visit of Lord Haldane to Berlin.
Owing to the lack of documentary evidence it is not possible to say who first suggested this visit, but it is clear that the suggestion—whoever may have been its author—was eagerly taken up by Sir Ernest Cassel and Ballin, and that it also met with a warm welcome on the part of Herr v. Bethmann. In reply to a telegram which Ballin, with the approval—if not at the actual desire—of the Chancellor, sent to his friend in London, a message reached him on February 2nd, 1912, when he was in Berlin engaged on these very matters. This reply, which originated with the Foreign Office, expressed the sender’s thanks for the invitation to attend a meeting of delegates in Berlin and his appreciation of the whole spirit which had prompted the German suggestion, and then went on to say that the new German Navy Bill would necessitate an immediate increase in the British naval estimates, because the latter had been framed on the supposition that the German programme would remain unaltered. If the British Government were compelled to find the means for such an increase, the suggested negotiations would be difficult, if not impossible. On the other hand, the German programme might perhaps be modified by spreading it out over a longer period of time or by some similar measure, so that a considerable increase of British naval construction in order to balance the German efforts could be avoided. In that case the British Government would be ready to proceed with the negotiations without loss of time, as it would be taken for granted that there was a fair prospect of the proposed discussions leading to a favourable result. If this suggestion was acceptable to Germany, the British Government thought the next step should be a private—and not an official—visit of a British Cabinet Minister to Berlin.
Perhaps it is now permissible to give the text of some documents without any further comment, as these latter speak for themselves. The first is a letter of the Chancellor addressed to Ballin, and reads as follows:
“Berlin. Febr. 4th, 1912.
“Dear Mr. Ballin,—
“We are still busy wording the text of our reply, and I shall not be able to see you at 11 o’clock. As soon as the text is settled, I shall submit it to His Majesty for his approval. Under these circumstances I think it is doubtful whether we ought to adhere to the time fixed for our appointment. I rather fancy that I cannot tell you anything definite before 12 or 1 o’clock, and I shall ring you up about that time. You have already made such great sacrifices in the interest of our cause that I hope you will kindly accept this alteration as well.
“In great haste.
“(Signed) Bethmann-Hollweg.”