Ballin’s letter went on to say that the German Navy Bill had gradually been reduced to a minimum, and that it was not possible to cut it down any further. We could not, and we would not, give rise to the suspicion that great alterations had been made merely to meet British objections. Finally, Ballin requested his friend to go to London in order to make inquiries on the spot, and also declared his readiness to go there himself.
My report on my conversations with Sir Ernest Cassel, which took place at Marseilles on March 9th and 10th, is as follows:
“Our friend arrived about four hours late, but he received me all the same at 10 P.M. on that evening. I told him all about my journey and related to him verbally the contents of Ballin’s letter. When I described the incident of how Grey had raised new objections at his interview with Metternich, and when I explained how, after that, the matter had come to a dead stop, so that nothing further was heard of it in Germany, our friend interrupted me by saying that since then the British Government had presented a memorandum containing the objections raised against the German Navy Bill. The latter, he suggested, was the only stumbling-block, as could be inferred from a letter which he had received en route from Haldane.
“When I remarked that Ballin, in a postscript to his letter, had expressed an apprehension lest some foreign influence had interfered with the course of events, our friend positively denied this. France, he said, was on good terms with Great Britain, and had no reason for intriguing against an Anglo-German agreement destined, as it was, to promote the cause of peace.
“When I then proceeded with my account, drawing his special attention to the reduction of the estimates contained in the Navy Bill, Sir Ernest interposed that he was not sufficiently au courant as to the details. He himself, in his statement prepared for the British Government, had only referred to the battleships, and he thought he had perhaps given too cursory an account of the other factors of the case. He also threw out some fairly plain hints that Haldane had gone too far in Berlin, and that he had made statements on a subject with which he was not sufficiently conversant. Later on, he continued, the Navy Bill had been subjected to a careful examination by the British Admiralty, and before his departure from Cannes he, Sir Ernest, had received a letter from Mr. Churchill, the tone of which was very angry. Churchill complained that Germany had presented such a long list of the wishes with which she wanted Great Britain to comply, that the least one could hope for was an accommodating spirit in the question of the Navy. Everything now depended on Churchill; if he could be satisfied, all the rest would be plain sailing. He and Lloyd George were the greatest friends of the agreement. Sir Ernest also made it fairly clear that Great Britain would be content with a postponement of the building dates, or in other words with a ‘retardation of the building programme.’ The negotiations would be bound to fail, unless Ballin could secure such a postponement. It was necessary to strike whilst the iron was hot, and this particular iron had already become rather cool. He quite accepted Grey’s statement that the Haldane mission had not been in vain, as the feeling had doubtless become more friendly since then. Some few individual indiscretions, such as Churchill’s reference to the German Navy as an article of luxury, should not be taken too seriously. If the German Bill were passed into law in its present shape, the British Government would be obliged to introduce one asking for three times as much, but it could not possibly do this and declare at the same time that it had reached an understanding with Germany. Such a proceeding would be absurd. The argument that it is inconsistent with common sense to conclude an agreement and yet to continue one’s armaments, is evidently still maintained in Great Britain, and is one which, of course, it is impossible to refute.
“In the course of our conversation Sir Ernest produced the letter which he had received from Haldane en route. This letter stated that the discussions with Metternich were then chiefly on the subject of the Navy Bill, and that the Admiralty had prepared a memorandum for the German Government dealing with these questions. The letter was dated February 25th, and its tone was not pessimistic; Churchill, however, as stated above, had previously written him a ‘very angry’ letter. In this connexion it must not be forgotten that the man on whom everything depends is not the amiable negotiator Haldane, but Churchill.”
In order to make further inquiries about the state of things and to assist in promoting the good cause, Ballin, immediately after my return, proceeded to Paris and then to London. He reported to the Chancellor upon the impressions he had received in Paris. The following is an extract from his report:
“Owing to the brief time at my disposal when I was in Paris, I could only learn the views of the members of the ‘haute finance.’ It is well known that in France the attitude taken up by financial circles is always regarded as authoritative. They look upon the present situation as decidedly pacific; they are pleased that the Morocco affair is settled, and they feel quite sure that the political sky is unclouded by complications. They would gladly welcome an agreement between Germany and Great Britain. My friends assure me that the Government also does not view the idea of such an understanding with displeasure; on the contrary, it looks upon it as an advantage. It is, however, thought unlikely that an agreement will be reached, because it is believed that popular feeling in Germany is too much opposed to it. If, notwithstanding these pacific views held by influential and competent sections, the casual visitor to the French capital is impressed by a certain bellicose attitude of the nation as a whole, it is largely due to the propaganda carried on by the Matin with the purpose of obtaining voluntary subscriptions for the furtherance of aviation. The French are enthusiastic over this idea, and as it has a strong military bearing, the man in the street likes to connect the French aviation successes with a victorious war.”
From London Ballin sent me some telegrams which I was instructed to pass on to the Chancellor. In these messages he stated that his conversations with the German Ambassador and with Haldane had convinced him that people in London believed that the increase in the number of the crews, if the proposed German Navy Bill became law, would be greater than the figures given by Berlin would make it appear. It would therefore be most desirable to arrange for a meeting of experts to clear up this discrepancy. Ballin’s impression was that the British Cabinet, and also the King, were still favourably disposed to the whole plan, and that the Cabinet was unanimous in this view. A conversation with Churchill, which lasted several hours, confirmed these impressions. In London the increase in the number of the crews had previously been estimated at half of what it would really be, and alarm was felt about the large number of torpedo boats and submarines demanded; but since the German Government had explained that the figures arrived at in London—i.e. those stated in the memorandum which had been addressed to the German Government some time before—were not correct, Churchill had agreed that both sides should nominate experts who would check the figures and put them right. Churchill was anxious to see that the matter was brought to a successful issue, and he was still hoping that a neutrality agreement would induce the German Government to make concessions in regard to the Navy Bill.
When Ballin had satisfied himself as to this state of things, he immediately returned to Berlin, as he did not consider it appropriate that any private person should do anything further for the time being, and as he thought that the conduct of the discussions concerning the neutrality agreement were best left to the Ambassador.