The volume of the work done by the Z.E.G. may be inferred from the fact that the goods handled by the organization during the four years from 1915 to 1918 represented a value of 6,500 million marks, in which connexion it must not be forgotten that at that time the purchasing power of the mark was still nearly the same as before the war. When the Roumanian harvest was brought in the daily imports sometimes reached a total of 800 truck-loads. However, the greatest credit, in my opinion, is due to the Z.E.G. for putting a stop to the above-mentioned confusion in the methods of buying abroad and for establishing normal conditions. To-day it is scarcely possible to realize how difficult it was and how much time it required to overcome the opposition often met with at home.
Not much need be said here about the activities of the Hamburg-Amerika Linie during the war. The longer the struggle lasted, and the larger the number of countries involved in the war against Germany became, the heavier became the company’s losses of tonnage and of other property. All the shore establishments, branch offices, pier accommodation, etc., situated in enemy countries, were confiscated, and the anxiety about the post-war reconstruction grew from month to month. Ballin never lost sight of this problem, and it is chiefly due to his efforts that the Government and the Reichstag passed a Bill (1917) providing the means for the rebuilding of the country’s mercantile marine. Along with this he tried to keep the company financially independent by cutting down expenses, by finding work for the inland offices of the company, by selling tonnage, and by other means. The families and dependents of those employees who had been called to the colours were assisted as far as the funds at the company’s disposal permitted. Of all these measures the company has already given the necessary information to the public, and I can confine myself to these brief statements. There is only one circumstance which requires special mention.
It is universally acknowledged that no German industry has suffered so greatly through the action of the German Government as the shipping business. When the discussions as to the rebuilding of the merchant fleet were being carried on, the Government frankly admitted this fact. I am not thinking, in this connexion, of those measures which were imposed upon the Government by the Versailles Treaty, such as the surrender of the German mercantile marine, but what I have in mind is the steps taken whilst the war was in actual progress. These have one thing in common with those imposed by the enemy: their originators have, more or less, arrived at the belated conviction that they have sacrificed much valuable property to no purpose. In Great Britain it is admitted quite openly that the confiscation of the German merchant fleet has very largely contributed to the ensuing collapse of the world’s shipping markets, and to the confusion which now prevails on every trade route. The war measures of the German Government—or, rather, of the German naval authorities—have sacrificed enormous values merely for the sake of a phantom, thus necessitating the compensation due to the shipowners—a compensation far from sufficient to make good even a moderate fraction of the loss. The vessels that can be built for the sums thrown out for this purpose will not be worth the twentieth part of the old ones, if quality is taken into account as well as quantity. This will become apparent when the compensation money has been spent, and when it will be possible to compare the fleet of German passenger boats then existing with what the country possessed previous to the war.
The phantom just referred to was the foolish belief that it would be possible to eliminate all ocean tonnage from the high seas—a belief which was in itself used to justify the submarine war, and which was responsible for the assumption that the withdrawal of German tonnage from the high seas would affect the food and raw material supply of the enemy countries. This mistaken idea was also the reason for prohibiting the sale of the German vessels in neutral ports, and for ordering the destruction of their engines when it became impossible to prevent their confiscation. The latter measure, and in particular the manner in which it was carried out, prove the utter inability of the competent authorities to grasp the very elements of the great problem they were tackling, and in view of such lack of knowledge it is easy to understand the bitterness of tone which characterizes Ballin’s criticism of these measures as contained in his memorandum to the Minister of the Interior (1917). He wrote:
“When Your Excellency decided to permit the sale of our vessels in the United States it was too late to do so, because the U.S. Government had already seized them. Previous to that, when we saw that war would be inevitable, and when we had received an exceedingly favourable purchasing offer from an American group, we had asked permission to sell part of our tonnage laid up in that country.
“Your Excellency, acting on behalf of the Chancellor, declined to grant this permission. I am quite aware that neither the Chancellor nor Your Excellency as his representative were responsible for this refusal, but that it was due to a decision of the Admiralty Staff. However, the competent authority to which the protection and the furtherance of the country’s shipping interests are entrusted is the Ministry of the Interior. With the Admiralty Staff itself, as I need not remind Your Excellency, we have no dealings whatever, and we are not even entitled to approach that body directly in such matters.
“Our company which was the biggest undertaking of its kind in the world, and which previous to the war possessed a fleet aggregating about 1,500,000 tons, has lost practically all its ships except a very few. The losses are not so much due to capture on the part of the enemy as to the measures taken by our own Government. If our Government had acted with the same foresight as did the Austro-Hungarian Government with respect to its ships in United States and Chinese waters, the German vessels then in Italy, Portugal, Greece, the United States, Brazil, and elsewhere, might have been either retained by us or disposed of at their full value.
“The Austrian ships, with their dismantled engines were, at the instance of the Austrian Government, sold in such good time that the shipping companies concerned are not only in a position to-day to refrain from asking their Government to pass a Shipowners’ Compensation Bill, as we are bound to do, but they have even enriched the Austrian national wealth by such handsome additions that their capital strength has reached a sum never dreamt of before, and that they are now able to rebuild their fleet by drawing upon their own funds, and to make such further additions to their tonnage that in future we shall not only be compelled to compete with the shipping companies of neutral and enemy countries—which have accumulated phenomenal profits—but with the Austrian mercantile marine as well.
“From the point of view of our country’s economic interests it is greatly to be regretted that the policy of the Government has not changed in this respect even now. We have received reliable news from private sources to the effect that the engines of the German vessels now in Argentine waters have been destroyed without Your Excellency having so far informed us of this action, and without Your Excellency having asked us to take steps to utilize the vessels, if possible, for the benefit of the country’s economic interests and for that of the completely decimated German merchant fleet.
“Moreover, a wire sent by His Excellency Herr v. Jonquières to the competent Hamburg and Bremen authorities states that the ships in Uruguayan waters are also in great jeopardy. The Government of that country, according to this report, would prefer to purchase them rather than confiscate them. After what has been done before, we fear that the Admiralty Staff will either not permit the sale at all, or only grant its permission when it is too late.