The subject of an unrestricted submarine war, already touched upon by Ballin in his above-mentioned letter to the Kaiser written in January, 1916, was discussed with much animation in the course of the year, and a powerful propaganda in its favour was started by certain quarters. Ballin’s attitude towards this question, and particularly towards its bearing on the possible entry of the United States into the war, is described with great clearness in a letter addressed to a friend of his attached to the Army Headquarters. In this message he wrote:
“ ... You ask me to tell you something about the political and military situation as I see it, and I shall gladly comply with your wish.
“The American danger seems to be averted for the moment at least. A severance of diplomatic relations with the United States would have been nothing short of fatal to Germany at the present stage. Just because the war may be looked upon as won in a military sense, we were obliged to avoid such a catastrophe at all costs. As far as military exertions are concerned, it is quite correct to say that Germany has won the war, because in order to turn the present position into a military defeat our enemies, in the first instance, would have to gain military victories in Russia, France, and Belgium. These would have to be followed up by our retreat from the occupied countries and by their invasion of ours, and they would have to defeat us at home. Every sensible critic must see that neither their human material nor their organizing powers are sufficient for such achievements. The fact is that we have reached the final stage of a progressive war of exhaustion, which nothing but the intervention of the United States could have prolonged.
“The accession of Italy to the ranks of our opponents has shown what it means if an additional Power enters the war against us. From a military point of view the entry of Italy did not materially aggravate our position; but the whole aspect of the war, as viewed by our enemies, underwent a complete change, and Grey, who shortly before had announced that ‘there is nothing between us and Germany except Belgium,’ stated a few weeks subsequent to the Italian volte-face that he could not find a suitable basis for peace negotiations anywhere.
“The entry of the United States would have been of immeasurably greater effect on the imagination and the obstinacy of our enemies.
“The very intelligent gentlemen who even now preach the unrestricted submarine war, especially the leading members of the Conservative and National Liberal parties, are misinformed about what the submarines can do. They not only regard it as possible, but even as practically certain, that the starvation of Great Britain could be achieved if the unrestricted submarine war were introduced. I need not tell Your Excellency that such an assumption fails to estimate things at their true value. Great Britain will always be able to maintain her connexion with the French Channel ports. Quite apart from that, she will always succeed in importing the 14,000 tons of cereals which she needs every day to feed her population even if the number of our submarines is trebled, because it must not be forgotten that the submarines cannot operate during the night.
“Hence the whole problem is now, as ever, governed by the axiom to which I have over and over again drawn the attention of the heads of the Berlin economic associations, viz. that we can no more force the British into subjection through our submarines than they can hope to wear us out by their starvation blockade. Both the submarine war and the blockade are extremely disastrous measures, inflicting heavy losses on either side; but neither of them can determine the fate of the war nor bring about a fundamental improvement in the position of either of the belligerent groups of Powers. That, apart from all other considerations, the unrestricted submarine war would have exposed us to the open hostility of the neutral countries, and might even have caused them to join the ranks of our enemies, is an additional contingency which the submarine enthusiasts have found it most convenient to dismiss by a wave of the hand.
“If after the war Germany remains isolated from the rest of the world, she cannot feed her population, and the doctrine of Central European brotherhood promulgated by some of our amiable poets has given rise to a movement which is apt to be of the greatest detriment to the interests of our country when the war is over.
“If we had wished to invest large parts of our German national wealth in countries like Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, nothing could have prevented us from realizing such a plan at any time previous to the war, provided we had thought it economically sound.
“Such a return to a continental policy, I maintain, would be a disaster to Germany. Our needs and our aspirations have increased to such an extent that we can no longer hope to satisfy them by economic isolation or within the framework of a Central European economic league of states.