If, however, the country, proud of its conquests, desired to retain them, its exhaustion made it eager for the conclusion of hostilities, and the necessity of at least confining the field of war to narrower limits was recognised even by those deputies whose policy was most aggressive and ambitious. As in France, so also in Spain, in Prussia, throughout Italy, the Austrian dominions, and the Empire, a general desire for peace existed. In none of these countries had there been from the first any national enthusiasm for the war, while the large expectations with which governments began hostilities had been blown to the winds. There was no longer any thought of restoring the Bourbon monarchy in France, nor probability of making conquests at her expense; and, in fact, those continental Princes alone cared to continue the struggle who looked forward to effecting, at the cost of third and weaker States, the enlargement of their own dominions.
Policy of Thugut.
As yet Austria had, during the course of the war, made no territorial acquisition. In the second division of Poland, Russia and Prussia alone shared. The chancellor, Thugut, the director of Austrian foreign policy, and the one statesman of mark whom Austria possessed, was a continuator of the schemes formerly entertained by Joseph II. for the extension and consolidation of the Austrian dominions. He possessed the entire confidence of his master, Francis II., but the position which he held was isolated, and his authority limited. Had he attempted to draw upon the resources of the various kingdoms and duchies subject to the Emperor, as the Convention had drawn upon the resources of France, he would have incited disturbance and revolt on every side. The administration, more especially of the war department, was inefficient and lax, and the public service suffered in consequence of the negligence or wilfulness of officials high in place. Thugut was the son of a poor boatbuilder, and the court nobility never forgot his origin, and thwarted him on every opportunity. Thugut, however, proud, despotic, and ambitious, would not be diverted from his course by misfortune in war, by the factious opposition of a court nobility, or by the ill-will and discontent of subject populations. On the retention of Belgium he laid no great stress. Belgium lay far from the seat of government, and though wealthy, its wealth was not at the arbitrary disposition of the Emperor. If, however, he were to resign Belgium, Thugut required an ample equivalent for the loss elsewhere, and before bringing to a close the French war, designed further to acquire an indemnity equal to that which Prussia had obtained by the second partition of Poland. There were three courses by which Thugut saw possible opportunities of making acquisitions. He might make Austrian influence supreme in Germany by the annexation of Bavaria, or he might extend the Austrian dominions in Italy, or, again, he might acquire new possessions in the East, at the expense of Poland and of the Porte. For the time he had no thought of entering into negotiation with the Republic, because he expected best to gain his ends by making common cause with England and Russia, which two Powers were both urgent for the continuation of the war.
Alliances between Austria and Russia.
The third partition of Poland was at this time at the point of accomplishment. The insurrection which broke out in the Spring of 1794 had been suppressed by Russian troops, under the command of Suwaroff, the famous conqueror of the Crimea. The Poles had received two crushing defeats. The national hero, Kosciusko, had been wounded and made prisoner. Warsaw, the capital, had surrendered (November 8) after the storm of its suburb Praga, when, for a long time, no quarter was given, and, as it was said, 10,000 persons, including many non-combatants, were either drowned in the Vistula or perished by the sword. Poland, having thus been obliterated from the list of independent kingdoms, Catherine II. again turned her attention to the destruction of the empire of the Porte. She sought to secure the good-will of Austria, and by insuring the continuance of war in the West, to avert the possibility of interference on the part either of England or of France. The evident reluctance with which the Prussian Government continued to take part in the French war was sufficient cause for Catherine to favour Austria in dividing the remains of Poland. But, on the other hand, she could not exclude Frederick William II. from all share in the partition without incurring risk of driving him to take up arms against herself. A treaty was concluded between Russia and Austria, determining the partition that was to be made between the three Powers, which the Emperor and the Czarina undertook to carry into effect, whether the King of Prussia were content or not with the share allotted to him (January 3, 1795). At the same time they entered into an alliance directed against Turkey, and agreed that in case of war Moldavia, Wallachia, and Bessarabia should be converted into a Russian dependency, and that Servia and Bosnia should pass to Austria. The plan of exchanging Belgium for Bavaria was revived, and Catherine further engaged to support the Emperor in making acquisition of Venetian or other territory.
England’s foreign policy.
Between France and England the strong sense of national hostility which existed when the war first broke out had increased in intensity. There was no name so hated in France as the name of Pitt. The English statesman, who by his gold sustained the arms of the Coalition, had also, according to popular report, by his bribes and emissaries been the author of the Terror, and was held responsible for all the internal ills under which France suffered. In England, the feeling of hatred was fully reciprocated. The ideas of the Revolution were regarded with abhorrence, the Convention with loathing, and the triumph of the French armies did but excite the stronger determination to go on fighting until both Holland and Belgium were wrested from the grasp of the atheistic and regicide Republic. If England had ignominiously been beaten on the Continent, she had been victorious at sea. Corsica had been occupied, and George III. proclaimed (February, 1794). A naval battle had been fought, commonly called the battle of June 1, when the French fleet, sailing out of Brest, had been defeated by Lord Howe, and driven back shattered to the coast (1794). Tobago, St. Martinique, Guadaloupe, and other French West Indian islands were already in English possession, and St. Domingo, the most important of French colonies, threatened with conquest. If now the Dutch fleet was pressed into the service of France, on the other hand the rich Dutch colonies, possessions coveted by England, such as Ceylon and the Cape, were open to seizure. The Cabinet was indeed intensely eager that the Continental war should continue, and was making every exertion to fan the zeal of Austria, and to draw Russia on to render active assistance. Instead of subsidising Prussia, England now subsidised Austria. In return for a loan of 4,600,000l. the Emperor undertook to put 200,000 men in the field (May 4, 1795). A treaty was, at the same time, entered into between England and Russia, in which Catherine agreed to send 12,000 men to fight against France. Subsequently, in the autumn, a Triple Alliance was concluded between the three Powers, and separate negotiations renounced (September 28).
Treaty of Basel.
While thus Austria, Russia, and England were drawing closer together, Prussia was fast backing out of the war. Both military and official circles were thoroughly weary of it. The country had no interests peculiar to itself to defend, and the Government no acquisitions in view, beyond what had already been obtained in Poland. It was, however, but with reluctance that the King, who had lost none of his repugnance to the Revolution, consented to the opening of the negotiations held with Barthélemy, the French Ambassador at Basel. The main difficulty in coming to terms was the disposition of Prussian possessions on the left bank of the Rhine, of which the cession would imply readiness on the King’s part to resign to France all the territory of the Empire on that side. The Committee of Public Safety demanded absolutely whatever belonged to Prussia on the left bank. But Frederick William was unwilling formally to abandon the cause of the Empire, and the Committee was too desirous of concluding peace to refuse a compromise which, in reality, yielded to France the point required. In the public articles of the treaty it was merely stated that French troops should remain in occupation of Prussian territory on the left bank until the making of peace between France and the Empire; but in a secret article the King declared his readiness to abandon his territory on the left bank in return for an equivalent on the right, if France kept the Rhine as her boundary when she made peace with the Empire. A second matter of difficulty was the question whether the Empire was to obtain the benefits of peace. The King could not leave the Northern States to be overrun by French armies without lowering the position of Prussia within the Empire. He accordingly proposed that France should agree to a truce with the Empire, and afterwards accept Prussian mediation. The Committee refused these demands, but consented to a line of demarcation being drawn across Germany, and to regard as neutrals the States lying to the north of it. It was also agreed that the Committee should accept the services of the King in treating with the separate States of the Empire. On these terms peace was concluded at Basel (April 5), and ratified with applause by the Convention. The Empire was henceforth torn in half. The Northern States under the wing of Prussia enjoyed neutrality, while the Southern remained subjected to the miseries of war.
Treaty with Spain.