142. Metrical Geometry, therefore, though distinct from projective Geometry, is not independent of it, but presupposes it, and arises from its combination with the extraneous idea of quantity. Nevertheless the mathematical form of the axioms, in metrical Geometry, is slightly different from their form in projective Geometry. The homogeneity of space is replaced by its equivalent, the axiom of Free Mobility. The axiom of the straight line is replaced by the axiom of distance: Two points determine a unique quantity, distance, which is unaltered in any motion of the two points as a single figure. This axiom, indeed, will be found to involve the axiom of the straight line—such a quantity could not exist unless the two points determined a unique curve—but its mathematical form is changed. Another important change is the collapse of the principle of duality: quantity can be applied to the straight line, because it is divisible into similar parts, but cannot be applied to the indivisible point. We thus obtain a reason, which was wanting in descriptive Geometry, for preferring points, as spatial elements, to straight lines or planes[146]. Finally, an entirely new idea is introduced with quantity, namely, the idea of Motion. Not that we study motion, or that any of our results have reference to motion, but that they cannot, though in projective Geometry they could, be obtained without at least an ideal motion of our figures through space.
Let us now examine in detail the prerequisites of spatial measurement. We shall find three axioms, without which such measurement would be impossible, but with which it is adequate to decide, empirically and approximately, the Euclidean or non-Euclidean nature of our actual space. We shall find, further, that these three axioms can be deduced from the conception of a form of externality, and owe nothing to the evidence of intuition. They are, therefore, like their equivalents the axioms of projective Geometry, à priori, and deducible from the conditions of spatial experience. This experience, accordingly, can never disprove them, since its very existence presupposes them.
I. The Axiom of Free Mobility.
143. Metrical Geometry, to begin with, may be defined as the science which deals with the comparison and relations of spatial magnitudes. The conception of magnitude, therefore, is necessary from the start. Some of Euclid's axioms, accordingly, have been classed as arithmetical, and have been supposed to have nothing particular to do with space. Such are the axioms that equals added to or subtracted from equals give equals, and that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another. These axioms, it is said, are purely arithmetical, and do not, like the others, ascribe an adjective to space. As regards their use in arithmetic, this is of course true. But if an arithmetical axiom is to be applied to spatial magnitudes, it must have some spatial import[147], and thus even this class is not, in Geometry, merely arithmetical. Fortunately, the geometrical element is the same in all the axioms of this class—we can see at once, in fact, that it can amount to no more than a definition of spatial magnitude[148]. Again, since the space with which Geometry deals is infinitely divisible, a definition of spatial magnitude reduces itself to a definition of spatial equality, for, as soon as we have this last, we can compare two spatial magnitudes by dividing each into a number of equal units, and counting the number of such units in each[149]. The ratio of the number of units is, of course, the ratio of the two magnitudes.
144. We require, then, at the very outset, some criterion of spatial equality: without such a criterion metrical Geometry would become wholly impossible. It might appear, at first sight, as though this need not be an axiom, but might be a mere definition. In part this is true, but not wholly. The part which is merely a definition is given in Euclid's eighth axiom: "Magnitudes which exactly coincide are equal." But this gives a sufficient criterion only when the magnitudes to be compared already occupy the same position. When, as will normally be the case, the two spatial magnitudes are external to one another—as, indeed, must be the case, if they are distinct, and not whole and part—the two magnitudes can only be made to coincide by a motion of one or both of them. In order, therefore, that our definition of spatial magnitude may give unambiguous results, coincidence when superposed, if it can ever occur, must occur always, whatever path be pursued in bringing it about. Hence, if mere motion could alter shapes, our criterion of equality would break down. It follows that the application of the conception of magnitude to figures in space involves the following axiom[150]: Spatial magnitudes can be moved from place to place without distortion; or, as it may be put, Shapes do not in any way depend upon absolute position in space.
The above axiom is the axiom of Free Mobility[151]. I propose to prove (1) that the denial of this axiom would involve logical and philosophical absurdities, so that it must be classed as wholly à priori; (2) that metrical Geometry, if it refused this axiom, would be unable, without a logical absurdity, to establish the notion of spatial magnitude at all. The conclusion will be, that the axiom cannot be proved or disproved by experience, but is an à priori condition of metrical Geometry. As I shall thus be maintaining a position which has been much controverted, especially by Helmholtz and Erdmann, I shall have to enter into the arguments at some length.
145. A. Philosophical Argument. The denial of the axiom involves absolute position, and an action of mere space, per se, on things. For the axiom does not assert that real bodies, as a matter of empirical fact, never change their shape in any way during their passage from place to place: on the contrary, we know that such changes do occur, sometimes in a very noticeable degree, and always to some extent. But such changes are attributed, not to the change of place as such, but to physical causes: changes of temperature, pressure, etc. What our axiom has to deal with is not actual material bodies, but geometrical figures[152], and it asserts that a figure which is possible in any one position in space is possible in every other. Its meaning will become clearer by reference to a case where it does not hold, say the space formed by the surface of an egg. Here, a triangle drawn near the equator cannot be moved without distortion to the point, as it would no longer fit the greater curvature of the new position: a triangle drawn near the point cannot be fitted on to the flatter end, and so on. Thus the method of superposition, such as Euclid employs in Book I. Prop. IV., becomes impossible; figures cannot be freely moved about, indeed, given any figure, we can determine a certain series of possible positions for it on the egg, outside which it becomes impossible. What I assert is, then, that there is a philosophic absurdity in supposing space in general to be of this nature. On the egg we have marked points, such as the two ends; the space formed by its surface is not homogeneous, and if things are moved about in it, it must of itself exercise a distorting effect upon them, quite independently of physical causes; if it did not exercise such an effect, the things could not be moved. Thus such a space would not be homogeneous, but would have marked points, by reference to which bodies would have absolute position, quite independently of any other bodies. Space would no longer be passive, but would exercise a definite effect upon things, and we should have to accommodate ourselves to the notion of marked points in empty space; these points being marked, not by the bodies which occupied them, but by their effects on any bodies which might from time to time occupy them. This want of homogeneity and passivity is, however, absurd; space must, since it is a form of externality, allow only of relative, not of absolute, position, and must be completely homogeneous throughout. To suppose it otherwise, is to give it a thinghood which no form of externality can possibly possess. We must, then, on purely philosophical grounds, admit that a geometrical figure which is possible anywhere is possible everywhere, which is the axiom of Free Mobility.
146. B. Geometrical Argument. Let us see next what sort of Geometry we could construct without this axiom. The ultimate standard of comparison of spatial magnitudes must, as we saw in introducing the axiom, be equality when superposed; but need we, from this equality, infer equality when separated? It has been urged by Erdmann that, for the more immediate purposes of Geometry, this would be unnecessary[153]. We might construct a new Geometry, he thinks, in which sizes varied with motion on any definite law. Such a view, as I shall show below, involves a logical error as to the nature of magnitude. But before pointing this out, let us discuss the geometrical consequences of assuming its truth. Suppose the length of an infinitesimal arc in some standard position were ds; then in any other position p its length would be ds.f(p), where the form of the function f(p) must be supposed known. But how are we to determine the position p? For this purpose, we require p's coordinates, i.e., some measurement of distance from the origin. But the distance from the origin could only be measured if we assumed our law f(p) to measure it by. For suppose the origin to be O, and Op to be a straight line whose length is required. If we have a measuring rod with which we travel along the line and measure successive infinitesimal arcs, the measuring rod will change its size as we move, so that an arc which appears by the measure to be ds will really be f(s).ds, where s is the previously traversed distance. If, on the other hand, we move our line Op slowly through the origin, and measure each piece as it passes through, our measure, it is true, will not alter, but now we have no means of discovering the law by which any element has changed its length in coming to the origin. Hence, until we assume our function f(p), we have no means of determining p, for we have just seen that distances from the origin can only be estimated by means of the law f(p). It follows that experience can neither prove nor disprove the constancy of shapes throughout motion, since, if shapes were not constant, we should have to assume a law of their variation before measurement became possible, and therefore measurement could not itself reveal that variation to us[154].
Nevertheless, such an arbitrarily assumed law does, at first sight, give a mathematically possible Geometry. The fundamental proposition, that two magnitudes which can be superposed in any one position can be superposed in any other, still holds. For two infinitesimal arcs, whose lengths in the standard position are ds1 and ds2, would, in any other position p, have lengths f(p).ds1 and f(p).ds2, so that their ratio would be unaltered. From this constancy of ratio, as we know through Riemann and Helmholtz, the above proposition follows. Hence all that Geometry requires, it would seem, as a basis for measurement, is an axiom that the alteration of shapes during motion follows a definite known law, such as that assumed above.
147. There is, however, in such a view, as I remarked above, a logical error as to the nature of magnitude. This error has been already pointed out in dealing with Erdmann[155], and need only be briefly repeated here. A judgment of magnitude is essentially a judgment of comparison: in unmeasured quantity, comparison as to the mere more or less, but in measured magnitude, comparison as to the precise how many times. To speak of differences of magnitude, therefore, in a case where comparison cannot reveal them, is logically absurd. Now in the case contemplated above, two magnitudes, which appear equal in one position, appear equal also when compared in another position. There is no sense, therefore, in supposing the two magnitudes unequal when separated, nor in supposing, consequently, that they have changed their magnitudes in motion. This senselessness of our hypothesis is the logical ground of the mathematical indeterminateness as to the law of variation. Since, then, there is no means of comparing two spatial figures, as regards magnitude, except superposition, the only logically possible axiom, if spatial magnitude is to be self-consistent, is the axiom of Free Mobility in the form first given above.