In favour of the theory which I have briefly outlined, I do not claim that it is certainly true. Apart from the likelihood of mistakes, much of it is avowedly hypothetical. What I do claim for the theory is that it may be true, and that this is more than can be said for any other theory except the closely analogous theory of Leibniz. The difficulties besetting realism, the confusions obstructing any philosophical account of physics, the dilemma resulting from discrediting sense-data, which yet remain the sole source of our knowledge of the outer world—all these are avoided by the theory which I advocate. This does not prove the theory to be true, since probably many other theories might be invented which would have the same merits. But it does prove that the theory has a better chance of being true than any of its present competitors, and it suggests that what can be known with certainty is likely to be discoverable by taking our theory as a starting-point, and gradually freeing it from all such assumptions as seem irrelevant, unnecessary, or unfounded. On these grounds, I recommend it to attention as a hypothesis and a basis for further work, though not as itself a finished or adequate solution of the problem with which it deals.
FOOTNOTES:
[23] An address delivered to the Philosophical Society of Manchester in February, 1915. Reprinted from The Monist, July, 1915.
[24] Cf. especially Samuel Alexander, "The Basis of Realism," British Academy, Vol. VI.
[25] "Are Secondary Qualities Independent of Perception?" Proc. Arist. Soc., 1909-10, pp. 191-218.
[26] First dialogue between Hylas and Philonous, Works (Fraser's edition 1901). I. p. 384.
[27] This point has been well urged by the American realists.
[28] Cf. T.P. Nunn, "Are Secondary Qualities Independent of Perception?" Proc. Arist. Soc., 1909-1910.