In all this I have been considering the question of the relation between the structure of language and the structure of the world. It is clear that anything that can be said in an inflected language can be said in an uninflected language; therefore, everything that can be said in language can be said by means of a temporal series of uninflected words. This places a limitation upon what can be expressed in words. It may well be that there are facts which do not lend themselves to this very simple schema; if so, they cannot be expressed in language. Our confidence in language is due to the fact that it consists of events in the physical world, and, therefore, shares the structure of the physical world, and therefore can express that structure. But if there be a world which is not physical, or not in space-time, it may have a structure which we can never hope to express or to know. These considerations might lead us to something like the Kantian a priori, not as derived from the structure of the mind, but as derived from the structure of language, which is the structure of the physical world. Perhaps that is why we know so much physics and so little of anything else. However, I have lapsed into mystical speculation, and will leave these possibilities, since, by the nature of the case, I cannot say anything true about them.
[CHAPTER XXV]
THE VALIDITY OF INFERENCE
It is customary in science to regard certain facts as “data”, from which laws and also other facts are “inferred”. We saw in [Chapter VII] that the practice of inference is much wider than the theories of any logician would justify, and that it is nothing other than the law of association or of “learned reactions”. In the present chapter, I wish to consider what the logicians have evolved from this primitive form of inference, and what grounds we have, as rational beings, for continuing to infer. But let us first get as clear a notion as we can of what should be meant by a “datum”.
The conception of a “datum” cannot be made absolute. Theoretically, it should mean something that we know without inference. But before this has any definite meaning, we must define both “knowledge” and “inference”. Both these terms have been considered in earlier chapters. For our present purpose it will simplify matters to take account only of such knowledge as is expressed in words. We considered in Chapter XXIV the conditions required in order that a form of words may be “true”; for present purposes, therefore, we may say that “knowledge” means “the assertion of a true form of words”. This definition is not quite adequate, since a man may be right by chance; but we may ignore this complication. We may then define a “datum” as follows: A “datum” is a form of words which a man utters as the result of a stimulus, with no intermediary of any learned reaction beyond what is involved in knowing how to speak. We must, however, permit such learned reactions as consist in adjustments of the sense-organs or in mere increase of sensitivity. These merely improve the receptivity to data, and do not involve anything that can be called inference.
If the above definition is accepted, all our data for knowledge of the external world must be of the nature of percepts. The belief in external objects is a learned reaction acquired in the first months of life, and it is the duty of the philosopher to treat it as an inference whose validity must be tested. A very little consideration shows that, logically, the inference cannot be demonstrative, but must be at best probable. It is not logically impossible that my life may be one long dream, in which I merely imagine all the objects that I believe to be external to me. If we are to reject this view, we must do so on the basis of an inductive or analogical argument, which cannot give complete certainty. We perceive other people behaving in a manner analogous to that in which we behave, and we assume that they have had similar stimuli. We may hear a whole crowd say “oh” at the moment when we see a rocket burst, and it is natural to suppose that the crowd saw it too. Nor are such arguments confined to living organisms. We can talk to a dictaphone and have it afterwards repeat what we said; this is most easily explained by the hypothesis that at the surface of the dictaphone events happened, while I was speaking, which were closely analogous to those that were happening just outside my ears. It remains possible that there is no dictaphone and I have no ears and there is no crowd watching the rocket; my percepts may be all that is happening in such cases. But, if so, it is difficult to arrive at any causal laws, and arguments from analogy are more misleading than we are inclined to think them. As a matter of fact, the whole structure of science, as well as the world of common sense, demands the use of induction and analogy if it is to be believed. These forms of inference, therefore, rather than deduction, are those that must be examined if we are to accept the world of science or any world outside of our own dreams.
Let us take a simple example of an induction which we have all performed in practice. If we are hungry, we eat certain things we see and not others—it may be said that we infer edibility inductively from a certain visual and olfactory appearance. The history of this process is that children a few months old put everything into their mouths unless they are stopped; sometimes the result is pleasant, sometimes unpleasant; they repeat the former rather than the latter. That is to say: given that an object having a certain visual and olfactory appearance has been found pleasant to eat, an object having a very similar appearance will be eaten; but when a certain appearance has been found connected with unpleasant consequences when eaten, a similar appearance does not lead to eating next time. The question is: what logical justification is there for our behaviour? Given all our past experience, are we more likely to be nourished by bread than by a stone? It is easy to see why we think so, but can we, as philosophers justify this way of thinking?
It is, of course, obvious that unless one thing can be a sign of another both science and daily life would be impossible. More particularly, reading involves this principle. One accepts printed words as signs, but this is only justifiable by means of induction. I do not mean that induction is necessary to establish the existence of other people, though that also, as we have seen, is true. I mean something simpler. Suppose you want your hair cut, and as you walk along the street you see a notice “hair-cutting, first floor”. It is only by means of induction that you can establish that this notice makes it in some degree probable that there is a hair-cutter’s establishment on the first floor. I do not mean that you employ the principle of induction; I mean that you act in accordance with it, and that you would have to appeal to it if you were accompanied by a long-haired sceptical philosopher who refused to go upstairs till he was persuaded there was some point in doing so.
The principle of induction, prima facie, is as follows: Let there be two kinds of events, A and B (e.g. lightning and thunder), and let many instances be known in which an event of the kind A has been quickly followed by one of the kind B, and no instances of the contrary. Then either a sufficient number of instances of this sequence, or instances of suitable kinds will make it increasingly probable that A is always followed by B, and in time the probability can be made to approach certainty without limit provided the right kind and number of instances can be found. This is the principle we have to examine. Scientific theories of induction generally try to substitute well-chosen instances for numerous instances, and represent number of instances as belonging to crude popular induction. But in fact popular induction depends upon the emotional interest of the instances, not upon their number. A child who has burnt its hand once in a candle-flame establishes an induction, but words take longer, because at first they are not emotionally interesting. The principle used in primitive practice is: Whatever, on a given occasion, immediately precedes something very painful or pleasant, is a sign of that interesting event. Number plays a secondary part as compared with emotional interest. That is one reason why rational thought is so difficult.
The logical problem of induction is to show that the proposition “A is always accompanied (or followed) by B” can be rendered probable by knowledge of instances in which this happens, provided the instances are suitably chosen or very numerous. Far the best examination of induction is contained in Mr. J. M. Keynes’s Treatise on Probability. There is a valuable doctor’s thesis by the late Jean Nicod, Le Problème logique de l’induction, which is very ably reviewed by R. B. Braithwaite in Mind, October 1925. A man who reads these three will know most of what is known about induction. The subject is technical and difficult, involving a good deal of mathematics, but I will attempt to give the gist of the results.
We will begin with the condition in which the problem had been left by J. S. Mill. He had four canons of induction, by means of which, given suitable examples, it could be demonstrated that A and B were causally connected, if the law of causation could be assumed. That is to say, given the law of causation, the scientific use of induction could be reduced to deduction. Roughly the method is this: We know that B must have a cause; the cause cannot be C or D or E, etc., because we find by experiment or observation that these may be present without producing B. On the other hand, we never succeed in finding A without its being accompanied (or followed) by B. If A and B are both capable of quantity, we may find further that the more there is of A the more there is of B. By such methods we eliminate all possible causes except A; therefore, since B must have a cause, that cause must be A. All this is not really induction at all; true induction only comes in in proving the law of causation. This law Mill regards as proved by mere enumeration of instances: we know vast numbers of events which have causes, and no events which can be shown to be uncaused; therefore, it is highly probable that all events have causes. Leaving out of account the fact that the law of causality cannot have quite the form that Mill supposed, we are left with the problem: Does mere number of instances afford a basis for induction? If not, is there any other basis? This is the problem to which Mr. Keynes addresses himself.