For several obvious reasons the convention of the original signatories of the Berlin Treaty for the promulgation of European peace was at that time impossible. Great Britain would not consent to such a convention unless all agreed that the original treaty should not be changed, but that the present issues alone should be discussed; Russia would not consent to such a convention unless the clause which barred the Dardanelles to the passage of Russian war vessels was struck in advance from the original treaty; Austria refused to be a part of such a convention unless her annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was acknowledged in advance by the other Powers.
At a conference held in the interests of permanent peace, France, Russia and Great Britain submitted tentative plans, which were promptly adopted, for the re-distribution of authority in the Balkan provinces, the most important decision being that Bosnia and Herzegovina go permanently to Austria. The original stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin did not even have a hearing. France, of course, blamed Germany for instigating the troubles in order to humiliate Great Britain and force the “Young Turks’ Party,” which compelled the Sultan to acknowledge a new constitution and later dethroned him, to re-adopt the old régime, under which Germany is alleged to have benefited greatly by trade with Turkey. Germany, in turn, felt slighted at not having been invited to join Great Britain, France and Russia in the drawing up of their proposals. For a time the guy-ropes of the European peace-tent were stretched mighty taut. Had just one of them parted there would have been the liveliest scramble among the Powers for Balkan territory that Europe had seen in many a day.
Although Bulgaria complied with the demand of Turkey that the Roumelia tribute be capitalized, Turkey was loth—and is yet, for that matter—to acknowledge the independence of Bulgaria or the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria; Antivari, Montenegro’s only seaport, enjoyed for a time a splendid view of an Austrian war fleet; Montenegro claimed, but failed to collect, indemnity from Austria for the detention by officials on Austrian territory of a special Montenegrin envoy to Servia; and the strained relations between Austria and Servia took on a ridiculous aspect by Austria’s refusal to allow war materials to be imported into Servia through her domain ... about the only way Servia would be able to obtain such materials.
Bulgaria said she had been preparing for a possible war with Turkey for ten years, and it is a known fact that, although barely one-fifth the size, in population, of the Ottoman Empire, she could have placed in the field fully as many men, some three hundred and seventy-five thousand, vastly better drilled and better versed in the tactics of war. The expenses of keeping the reserve forces with the colours during the recent disturbances and the “compensations” which she had to pay because of her prince’s assumption to the title of “Tzar” were met by increased taxes upon her peasantry, and upon the apathy or enthusiasm of this peasantry would have depended the defeat or victory of Bulgarian arms in a war with Turkey. In advent of hostilities, however, it is safe to say that the pugnacious Bulgarians, with Austria nagging them on, would have bade fair to sweep the Turk from the map of Europe.
Had the unsatisfied Servians, on the other hand, been foolish enough to force themselves into war with Austria, the continuance of Servia as a nation would have been doubtful indeed. It would be difficult to imagine an alliance between the Servians, including the Montenegrins, and the Turks, their life-long enemies, but under the conditions at that time such a thing was not out of the question.
CHAPTER X
A BULGARIAN MARKET
Bulgaria’s Busy Day—The Orient Express.