GOD THE SOURCE OF TRUE FELICITY.
wherefore, that our reasonings may not run on with infinity, we must confess that the Supreme God is full of perfect and consummate good. ¶ And for þi for as moche as [that] my resoun
or my proces ne go nat awey wiþoute an ende. we [2496]
ouȝt[e] to graunten þat þe souereyne god is ryȝt ful of
souereyne perfit goode. And as we have seen that the perfect good is true happiness, it follows that the true felicity resides in the Supreme Divinity. and we han establissed þat þe
souereyne goode is verrey blisfulnesse. þan mot it nedes
ben [þat verray blysfulnesse is] yset in souereyne god. [2500]
B. þis take I wel quod .I. ne þis ne may nat be wiþseid
in no manere. But let us see how we can firmly and irrefragably prove that the Supreme God contains in his own nature a plenitude of perfect and consummate good. ¶ But I preie þe quod she see now how
þou mayst preuen holily and wiþ-outen corrupcioun þis
þat I haue seid. þat þe souereyne god is ryȝt ful of [2504]
souereyne goode. [In whych manere quod I.] wenest
þou ouȝt quod she þat þis prince of alle þinges haue
ytake þilke souereyne good any where þan of hym self.
¶ of whiche souereyne goode men proueþ þat he is ful [2508]
ryȝt as þou myȝtest þinken. þat god þat haþ blisfulnesse
in hym self. and þat ilke blisfulnesse þat is in hym
were diuers in substaunce. If you think that God has received this good from without, then you must believe that the giver of this good is more excellent than God the receiver. ¶ For yif þou wene þat
god haue receyued þilke good oute of hym self. þou [2512]
mayst wene þat he þat ȝaf þilke good to god. be more
goode þan is god. But we have concluded that there is nothing more excellent than God. ¶ But I am byknowen and confesse
and þat ryȝt dignely þat god is ryȝt worþi abouen alle
þinges. But if this supreme good is in Him by nature, and is nevertheless of a different substance, we cannot conceive, since God is the author of all things, what could have united these two substances differing one from another. ¶ And yif so be þat þis good be in hym by [2516]
nature. but þat it is diuers from [hym] by wenyng
resoun. syn we speke of god prince of alle þinges feyne
who so feyne may. who was he þat [hath] conioigned
þise diuers þinges to-gidre. Lastly, a thing which essentially differs from another cannot be the same with that from which it is supposed to differ. and eke at þe last[e] se [2520]
wel þat o þing þat is diuers from any þing. þat þilke
þing nis nat þat same þing. fro whiche it is vndirstonden
to ben diuers. Consequently, what in its nature differs from the chief good cannot be the supreme good. þan folweþ it. þat þilke þing þat
by hys nature is dyuers from souereyne good. þat þat [2524]
þing nys nat souereyne good. But it would be impious and profane thus to conceive of God, since nothing can excel Him in goodness and worth. but certys þat were a
felonous corsednesse to þinken þat of hym. þat no þing
nis more worþe. In fact, nothing can exist whose nature is better than its origin. For alwey of alle þinges. þe nature
of hem ne may nat ben better þan his bygynnyng. [2528]
THERE CANNOT BE TWO CHIEF GOODS.
We may therefore conclude that the Author of all things is really and substantially the supreme Good. ¶ For whiche I may concluden by ryȝt uerray resoun.
þat þilke þat is bygynnyng of alle þinges. þilke same
þing is good in his substaunce. B. Most rightly said! B. þou hast seid ryȝtfully
quod .I. P. But you have owned that true felicity is the sovereign good; then you must also grant that God is that true felicity. P. But we han graunted quod she þat [2532]
souereyne good is blysfulnes. þat is soþe quod .I. þan
quod she mote we nedes graunten and confessen þat
þilke same souereyne goode be god. [* fol. 21 b.] B. Your conclusions follow from your premises. ¶ Certys *quod
.I. I ne may nat denye ne wiþstonde þe resouns purposed. [2536]
and I see wel þat it folweþ by strengþe of þe
premisses. P. Let us see whether we cannot prove this more convincingly by considering it in this view, that there cannot be two sovereign goods which differ in themselves. ¶ Loke nowe quod she yif þis be proued
[yit] more fermely þus. ¶ þat þer ne mowen nat ben
two souereyne goodes þat ben diuerse amo[n]ges hem [2540]
self. For it is plain that of the goods that differ one cannot be what the other is; wherefore neither of them can be perfect where one wants the other. þat on is nat þat þat oþer is. þan [ne] mowen
neiþer of hem ben perfit. so as eyþer of hem lakkiþ to
oþir. That which is not perfect cannot be the supreme good. but þat þat nis nat perfit men may seen apertly
þat it nis nat souereyne. Neither can the chief good be essentially different. þe þinges þan þat ben [2544]
souereynely goode ne mowen by no wey ben diuerse.
But it has been shown that God and happiness are the chief good, wherefore the sovereign felicity and the Supreme Divinity are one and the same. ¶ But I haue wel conclude þat blisfulnesse and god ben
[the] souereyne goode. For whiche it mot nedes be þat
souereyne blisfulnesse is souerey[ne] dyuynite. ¶ No [2548]
þing quod I nis more soþefast þan þis ne more ferme by
resoun. ne a more worþi þing þan god may nat ben
concluded. Following then the examples of geometricians who deduce their consequences from their propositions, I shall deduce to thee something like a corollary as follows:— P. vpon þise þinges þan quod she. ryȝt as
þise geometriens whan þei han shewed her proposiciouns [2552]
ben wont to bryngen in þinges þat þei clepen porismes
or declaraciouns of forseide þinges. ryȝt so wil I ȝeue
þe here as a corolarie or a mede of coroune. Because by the attainment of felicity men become happy, and as felicity is the same as Divinity itself, therefore by the attainment of Divinity men are made happy. For whi.
for as moche as by þe getynge of blisfulnesse men ben [2556]
maked blysful. and blisfulnesse is diuinite. ¶ þan is
it manifest and open þat by þe getyng of diuinite men
ben makid blisful. But as by the participation of justice or of wisdom men become just or wise, ryȝt as by þe getynge of iustice . . .
and by þe getyng of sapience þei ben maked wise. [2560]
THE HAPPY MAN IS A GOD.
so by partaking of Divinity they must necessarily, and by parity of reason, become gods. ¶ Ryȝt so nedes by þe semblable resoun whan þei han getyn
diuinite þei ben maked goddys. Every happy man then is a god. But by nature there is only One; but by participation of Divine essence there may be many gods. þan is euery blisful
man god. ¶ But certis by nature. þer nys but oon god.
but by þe participaciouns of diuinite þere ne letteþ ne [2564]
disturbeþ no þing þat þer ne ben many goddes. ¶ þis
is quod .I. a faire þing and a precious. ¶ Clepe it as
þou wolt. be it corolarie or porisme or mede of coroune
or declarynges ¶ Certys quod she no þing nis fairer. [2568]
þan is þe þing þat by resoun sholde ben added to þise
forseide þinges. what þing quod .I. But as happiness seems to be an assemblage of many things, ought we not to consider whether these several things constitute conjointly the body of happiness, or whether there is not some one of these particular things that may complete the substance or essence of it, and to which all the rest have a relation? ¶ So quod she as
it semeþ þat blisfulnesse conteniþ many þinges. it were
forto witen wheþir [þat] alle þise þinges maken or [2572]
conioignen as a maner body of blysfulnesse by diuersite
of parties or [of] membris. Or ellys yif any of alle
þilke þingus be swyche þat it acomplise by hym self þe
substaunce of blisfulnesse. so þat alle þise oþer þinges [2576]
ben referred and brouȝt to blisfulnesse. þat is to seyne
as to þe chief of hem. B. Illustrate this matter by proper examples. ¶ I wolde quod I þat þou
makedest me clerly to vndirstonde what þou seist. and
þat þou recordest me þe forseide þinges. P. As you grant that happiness is a good, you may say the same of all the other goods; for perfect sufficiency is identical with supreme felicity; so is supreme power, likewise high rank, a shining reputation, and perfect pleasure. ¶ Haue I nat [2580]
iuged quod she. þat blisfulnesse is goode. ȝis forsoþe
quod .I. and þat souereyne goode. ¶ Adde þan quod
she þilke goode þat is maked blisfulnes to alle þe forseide
þinges. ¶ For þilke same blisfulnesse þat is [2584]
demed to ben souereyne suffisaunce. þilke self is
souereyne power. souereyne reuerence. souereyne clernesse
or noblesse and souereyne delit. What say you, then; are all these things, sufficiency, power, and the rest, to be considered as constituent parts of felicity? or are they to be referred to the sovereign good as their source and principal? what seist þou
þan of alle þise þinges. þat is to seyne. suffisance power [2588]
and þise oþer þinges. ben þei þan as membris of blisfulnesse.
or ben þei referred and brouȝt to souereyne good.
¶ Ryȝt as alle þinges þat ben brouȝt to þe chief of hem.
GOOD, THE RULE AND SQUARE OF THINGS DESIRABLE.
B. I see what you are aiming at, and I am desirous to hear your arguments. b. I vndirstonde wel quod .I. what þou purposest to [2592]
seke. but I desijr[e] to herkene þat þou shewe it me.
P. If all these things were members of felicity, they would differ one from another, for it is the property of diverse parts to compose one body. p. Take now þus þe discressioun of þis questioun quod
she. yif al þise þinges quod she weren membris to
felicite. þan weren þei diuerse þat oon fro þat oþer. [2596]
¶ And swiche is þe nature of parties or of membris.
þat dyuerse membris compounen a body. But it has been well shown that all these things are the same and do not differ—therefore they are not parts, for if they were, happiness might be made up of one member—which is absurd and impossible. ¶ Certis
quod I it haþ wel ben shewed her byforne. þat alle þise
þinges ben alle on þing. þan ben þei none membris quod [2600]
she. for ellys it sholde seme þat blisfulnesse were
[* fol. 22.] conioigned *al of one membre alone. but þat is a þing
þat may nat ben doon. B. This I doubt not, but I desire to hear the sequel. þis þing quod .I. nys nat
doutous. but I abide to herkene þe remenaunt of þe [2604]
questioun. P. All the things above-mentioned must be tried by Good, as the rule and square. þis is open and clere quod she. þat alle oþer
þinges ben referred and brouȝt to goode. Sufficiency, power, &c., are all desired, because they are esteemed a good. ¶ For þerfore
is suffisaunce requered. For it is demed to ben
good. and forþi is power requered. for men trowen also [2608]
þat it be goode. and þis same þing mowe we þinken and
coueiten of reuerence and of noblesse and of delit. Good is the cause why all things are desired. þan
is souereyne good þe soume and þe cause of alle þat
auȝt[e] be desired. For that which contains no good, either in reality or appearance, can never be desired. forwhi þilke þing þat wiþ-holdeþ no [2612]
good in it self ne semblaunce of goode it ne may nat
wel in no manere be desired ne requered. On the contrary, things not essentially good are desired because they appear to be real goods. and þe contrarie.
For þouȝ þat þinges by hir nature ne ben nat
goode algates yif men wene þat þei ben goode ȝit ben [2616]
þei desired as þouȝ [þat] þei were verrayly goode. Hence, Good is esteemed as the cause and end of all things that we desire. and
þerfore is it þat men auȝten to wene by ryȝt þat bounte
be souereyne fyn and þe cause of alle þinges þat ben to
requeren. That which is the cause of our desiring any thing is itself what we chiefly want. ¶ But certis þilke þat is cause for whiche [2620]
men requeren any þing. ¶ it semeþ þat þilke same
þing be most desired. If a man desire to ride on account of health—it is not the ride he wants so much as its salutary effects. as þus yif þat a wyȝt wolde ryde
for cause of hele. he ne desireþ nat so mychel þe
moeuyng to ryden as þe effect of his heele. Since all things are sought after for the sake of Good, they cannot be more desirable than the good itself. Now þan [2624]
syn þat alle þinges ben requered for þe grace of good.
þei ne ben [nat] desired of alle folk more þan þe same
good It has been shown that all the aforesaid things are only pursued for the sake of happiness—hence it is clear that good and happiness are essentially the same. ¶ But we han graunted þat blysfulnesse is þat
þing for whiche þat alle þise oþer þinges ben desired. [2628]
þan is it þus þat certis only blisfulnesse is requered and
desired ¶ By whiche þing it sheweþ clerely þat good
and blisfulnesse is al oone and þe same substaunce.
B. I see no cause to differ from you. ¶ I se nat quod I wher fore þat men myȝt[en] discorden [2632]
in þis. P. It has been proved that God and happiness are identical and inseparable. p. and we han shewed þat god and verrey blysfulnesse
is al oon þing B. That is true. ¶ þat is soþe quod .I. Therefore the substance of God is also the same as that of the Supreme Good. þan
mowe we conclude sikerly þat þe substaunce of god is
set in þilke same good and in noon oþer place. [2636]
2453 whiche—which
2454-55-56-58-59 goode—good