2658 seine—seyn
MEN DO NOT SEEK TRUE FELICITY.
[ASSENCIOR INQUAM CUNCTA. Boice.]
I assent[e] B. I assent, and am convinced by the force of your arguments. me quod .I. For alle þise þinges ben [2660]
strongly bounden wiþ ryȝt ferme resouns. P. But how greatly would you value it, did you fully know what this good is? how
mychel wilt þou preisen it quod she. yif þat þou
knowe what þilke goode is. B. I should value it infinitely if at the same time I might attain to the knowledge of God, who is the sovereign good. I wol preise it quod I by
price wiþ outen ende. ¶ yif it shal bytyde me to [2664]
knowe also to-gidre god þat is good. P. I shall elucidate this matter by incontrovertible reasons if thou wilt grant me those things which I have before laid down as conclusions. ¶ certys quod she
þat shal I do þe by verray resoun. yif þat þo þinges þat
[* fol. 22 b.] I haue conclude[d] a litel her by *forne dwellen oonly
in hir first[e] grauntyng. B. I grant them all. Boice. þei dwellen graunted [2668]
to þe quod .I. þis is to seyne as who seiþ .I. graunt þi
forseide conclusiouns. P. Have I not shown that the things which the majority of mankind so eagerly pursue are not true and perfect goods, for they differ from one another; and because where one of them is absent the others cannot confer absolute happiness (or good)? ¶ Haue I nat shewed þe quod
she þat þe þinges þat ben requered of many folke. ne
ben nat verray goodes ne perfit. for þei ben diuerse þat [2672]
oon fro þat oþer. and so as eche of hem is lakkyng to
oþer. þei ne han no power to bryngen a good þat is ful
and absolute. Have I not shown, too, that the true and chief good is made up of an assemblage of all the goods in such a way, that if sufficiency is an attribute of this good, ¶ But þan atte arst ben þei verray good
whan þei ben gadred to-gidre al in to a forme and in [2676]
to oon wirchyng. so þat þilke þing þat is suffisaunce.
it must at the same time possess power, reverence, &c. þilk same be power and reuerence. and noblesse and
mirþe. If they be not one and the same, why should they be classed among desirable things? ¶ And forsoþe but alle þise þinges ben alle o
same þing þei ne han nat wher by þat þei mowen ben [2680]
put in þe noumbre of þinges. þat auȝten ben requered
or desired. b. ¶ It is shewed quod .I. ne her of may
þer no man douten. While these things differ from one another they are not goods; but as soon as they become one then they are made goods.—Do not they owe their being good to their unity? p. þe þinges þan quod she þat ne
ben none goodes whan þei ben diuerse. and whan þei [2684]
bygynnen to ben al o þing. þan ben þei goodes. ne
comiþ it hem nat þan by þe getynge of unite þat þei ben
maked goodes. B. So it appears. b. so it semeþ quod .I. P. Do you confess that everything that is good becomes such by the participation of the sovereign good or no? but alle þing þat
is good quod she grauntest þou þat it be good by participacioun [2688]
of good or no. B. It is so. ¶ I graunt[e] it quod .I.
UNITY NECESSARY TO EXISTENCE.
P. Then you must own that unity and good are the same (for the substance of those things must be the same, whose effects do not naturally differ). ¶ þan mayst þou graunt[en] it quod she by sembleable
resoun þat oon and good ben o same þing. ¶ For of
þinges [of] whiche þat þe effect nis nat naturely diuerse [2692]
nedys þe substaunce mot ben o same þinge. B. I cannot gainsay it. I ne may
nat denye it quod I. P. Do you not perceive that everything which exists is permanent so long as it preserves its unity—but as soon as it loses this, it is dissolved and annihilated? ¶ Hast þou nat knowen wel quod
she. þat al þing þat is haþ so longe his dwellyng and
his substaunce. as longe is it oone. ¶ but whan it [2696]
forletiþ to ben oone it mot nedis dien and corrumpe togidre.
B. How so? ¶ In whiche manere quod .I. P. In the animal creation as long as the soul and the body are united and conjoined in one, this being is called an animal or beast, but when the union is dissolved by the separation of these, the animal perishes and is no longer a beast. ¶ Ryȝt as in
beestes quod she. whan þe soule and þe body ben
conioigned in oon and dwellen to-gidre it is cleped a [2700]
beest. and whan hire vnite is destroied by disseueraunce
þat oon fram þat oþir. þan sheweþ it wel þat it is a
dede þing. and þat it is no lenger no beste. The same may be said of man and all other things; they subsist while unity is preserved, but as soon as that is destroyed the things themselves lose their existence. and þe
body of a wyȝt while it dwelleþ in oon forme by coniunccioun [2704]
of membris it is wel seyn þat it is a figure of
mankynde. and yif þe partyes of þe body ben [so]
diuide[d] and disseuered þat oon fro þat oþir þat þei
destroien vnite. þe body forletiþ to ben þat it was byforne. [2708]
¶ And who so wolde renne in þe same manere
by alle þinges he sholde seen þat wiþ outen doute euery
þinge is in his substaunce as longe as it is oon. and
whan it forletiþ to ben oon it dieþ and perissiþ. B. I believe we should find this true in every case. boice. [2712]
whan I considre quod I many þinges I see noon oþer.
NATURE SUSTAINS VEGETATION.
P. Is there anything which acts naturally that forgoes this desire of existence and wishes for death and corruption? ¶ Is þer any þing þanne quod she þat in as moche as
it lyueþ naturely. þat forletiþ þe appetit or talent of
hys beynge. and desireþ to come to deeþ and to corrupcioun. [2716]
B. I do not find any creature endowed with volition, which, of itself and without constraint, renounces or despises life and self-preservation or willingly hastens to destruction. ¶ yif I considere quod I þe beestes þat han
any manere nature of willynge or of nillynge I ne
fynde no þing. but yif it be constreyned fro wiþ out
forþe. þat forletiþ or dispiseþ to lyue and to duren [2720]
or þat wole his þankes hasten hym to dien. ¶ For
euery beest trauayleþ hym to defende and kepe þe
sauuacioun of lijf. and escheweþ deeþ and destruccioun.
But with regard to herbs and trees, I am doubtful whether I ought to have the same opinion of them, for they have no sensitive soul, nor any natural volition like animals. b. but certys I doute me of herbes and of trees. þat is [2724]
to seyn þat I am in a doute of swiche þinges as herbes
or trees þat ne han no felyng soule. ne no naturel
wirchynges seruyng to appetite as beestes han wheþer
þei han appetite to dwellen and to duren. P. There is no cause for doubt in respect to these. ¶ Certis [2728]
quod she ne þer of þar þe nat doute. Herbs and trees first choose a convenient place to grow in, where, agreeably to their respective natures, they are sure to thrive, and are in no danger of perishing; for some grow on plains, some on mountains, &c.; ¶ Now look
vpon þise herbes and þise trees. þei waxen firste in
swiche place as ben couenable to hem. in whiche place
þei ne mowen nat sone dien ne dryen as longe as hire [2732]
nature may defenden hem. ¶ For some of hem waxen
in feldes and some in mountaignes. and oþir waxen in
mareis. [A leaf lost here, and supplied from C.]
[and oothre cleuyn on Roches / and soume waxen plentyuos [2736]
in sondes / and if you try to transplant them, they forthwith wither and die. and yif þat any wyht enforce hym to
beryn hem in to oother places / they wexen drye // To everything that vegetates, nature gives what is needful for its subsistence, and takes care that they should not perish before their time. For
nature yeueth to euery thing þat / þat is conuenient to
hym and trauaylith þat they ne dye nat as longe as they [2740]
han power to dwellyn and to lyuen // Need I tell you that plants are nourished by their roots (which are so many mouths hid in the earth), and diffuse strength throughout the whole plant, as through their marrow? what woltow seyn
of this / þat they drawen alle hyr norysshynges by hyr
rootes / ryht as they haddyn hyr Mowthes I.-plounged
with in the erthes / and shedyn by hyr maryes (i. medullas) [2744]
hyr wode and hyr bark / And further, it is admirably contrived that the pith, the most tender part of plants, is hid in the middle of the trunk, surrounded with hard and solid wood, and with an outer coat of bark to ward off the storms and weather. and what woltow seyn
of this þat thilke thing / þat is ryht softe as the marye (i.
sapp) is / þat is alwey hidd in the feete al with inne and
þat it is defendid fro with owte by the stidefastnesse of [2748]
wode // and þat the vttereste bark is put ayenis the destempraunce
of the heuene / as a defendowr myhty to suffren
harm / Admire, too, the diligence of nature in propagating plants by a multiplicity of seeds, which are as a foundation for a building, not to remain for a time, but as it were for ever. and thus certes maystow wel sen / how gret is
the diligence of nature / For alle thinges renouelen and [2752]
pupllisen hem with seed .I.-multiplyed / nether nis no man
þat ne wot wel þat they ne ben ryht as a foundement and
edyfice for to duren / nat only for a tyme / but ryht as forto
duren perdurablely by generacyoun // Things inanimate incline to what is most suitable to their beings, and to preserve continuance. and the thinges ek [2756]
þat men wenen ne hauen none sowles / ne desire they nat ech
of hem by semlable resoun to kepyn þat that is hirs / þat
is to seyn þat is acordynge to hyr nature in conseruacioun
of hyr beynge and endurynge // For why should the flame mount upwards by lightness, and the earth tend towards its centre by gravity (weight), unless these motions were agreeable to their respective natures? For wher for elles berith [2760]
lythnesse the flaumbes vp / and the weyhte presseth the
erthe a-doun // but For as moche as thilke places and
thilke moeuynges ben couenable to euerich of hem //