But were this power, which men ascribe to them, taken away from the wicked, they would be relieved of the greatest part of their punishment. ¶ But naþeles yif so were þat þilke þat men wenen ben
leueful for shrewes were bynomen hem. so þat þei ne
myȝten nat anoyen or don harme to goode men. ¶ Certys [3528]
a gret party of þe peyne to shrewes shulde ben allegged
and releued. The wicked are more unhappy when they have accomplished their evil designs than when they fail to do so. ¶ For al be it so þat þis ne seme nat
credible þing perauenture to somme folk ȝit mot it
nedes be þat shrewes ben more wrecches and vnsely. [3532]
whan þei may don and performe þat þei coueiten [than
yif they myhte nat complyssen þat they coueyten]. If it is a miserable thing to will evil, it is a greater unhappiness to have the power to execute it, without which power the wicked desires would languish without effect. ¶ For
yif so be þat it be wrecchednesse to wilne to don yuel;
þan is it more wrecchednesse to mowen don yuel. [3536]
wiþ oute whiche moeuyng þe wrecched wille sholde
languisshe wiþ oute effecte. Since, then, each of these three things (i. e. the will, the power, and the accomplishment of evil) hath its misery, therefore a threefold wretchedness afflicts those who both will, can, and do commit sin. ¶ þan syn þat eueryche of
þise þinges haþ hys wrecchednesse. þat is to seyne wil
to done yuel. and moeuynge to done yuel. it mot nedes [3540]
be. þat þei (shrewes) ben constreyned by þre vnselynesses
þat wolen and mowen and performen felonyes
and shrewednesses. B. I grant it—but still I wish the vicious were without this misfortune. ¶ I accorde me quod I. but I
desire gretely þat shrewes losten sone þilke vnselynesses. [3544]
þat is to seyne þat shrewes were despoyled of moeuyng
to don yuel. P. They shall be despoiled of it sooner than you wish perhaps, or than they themselves imagine. ¶ so shullen þei quod she. sonnere
[* fol. 28.] perauenture þen þou woldest *or sonnere þen þei hem
self wenen to lakken mowynge to done yuel. In the narrow limits of this life, nothing, however tardy it appears, can seem to an immortal soul to have a very long duration. ¶ For [3548]
þere nis no þing so late in so short boundes of þis lijf
þat is longe to abide. namelyche to a corage inmortel.
The great hopes, and the subtle machinations of the wicked, are often suddenly frustrated, by which an end is put to their wickedness. Of whiche shrewes þe grete hope and þe heye compassyngus
of shrewednesse is often destroyed by a [3552]
sodeyne ende or þei ben war. and þat þing establiþ to
shrewes þe ende of hir shrewednesse. If vice renders men wretched, the longer they are vicious the longer must they be miserable. ¶ For yif þat
shrewednesse makiþe wrecches. þan mot he nedes be
most wrecched þat lengest is a shrewe. And they would be infinitely wretched if death did not put an end to their crimes. þe whiche [3556]
wicked shrewes wolde ydemen aldirmost vnsely and
caytifs yif þat hir shrewednes ne were yfinissed. at þe
leste weye by þe outerest[e] deeþ. It is clear, as I have already shown, that eternal misery is infinite. for [yif] I haue concluded
soþe of þe vnselynesse of shrewednesse. þan sheweþ [3560]
it clerely þat þilke shrewednesse is wiþ outen ende þe
whiche is certeyne to ben perdurable. B. This consequence appears to be just, but difficult to assent to. ¶ Certys quod I
þis [conclusion] is harde and wonderful to graunte. ¶ But
I knowe wel þat it accordeþ moche to [the] þinges þat I [3564]
haue graunted her byforne. P. You think rightly; but if you cannot assent to my conclusion you ought to show that the premises are false, or that the consequences are unfairly deduced; for if the premises be granted, you cannot reject the inferences from them. ¶ þou hast quod she þe ryȝt
estimacioun of þis. but who so euere wene þat it be an
harde þing to acorde hym to a conclusioun. it is ryȝt
þat he shewe þat somme of þe premisses ben fals. or [3568]
ellys he mot shewe þat þe colasioun of preposiciouns
nis nat spedful to a necessarie conclusion. ¶ and yif it
be nat so. but þat þe premisses ben ygranted þer nis
nat whi he sholde blame þe argument. What I am about to say is not less wonderful, and it follows necessarily from the same premises. for þis þing þat [3572]
I shal telle þe nowe ne shal not seme lasse wondirful.
þilke shrewednesse is wiþ outen ende (l. 3561):
text printed as shown, but may be an error for “wrecchednesse” as in Skeat; see sidenote (“eternal misery”).
THE WRETCHEDNESS OF THE WICKED IS DIMINISHED BY PUNISHMENT.
but of þe þinges þat ben taken al so it is necessarie as
who so seiþ it folweþ of þat whiche þat is purposed
byforn. B. What is that? what is þat quod I. P. That the wicked who have been punished for their crimes, are happier than if justice had allowed them to go unpunished. ¶ certys quod she þat is [3576]
þat þat þise wicked shrewes ben more blysful or ellys
lasse wrecches. þat byen þe tourmentes þat þei han
deserued. þan yif no peyne of Iustice ne chastied[e]
hem. I do not appeal to popular arguments, that punishment corrects vice, that the fear of chastisement leads them to take the right path, and that the sufferings of evil-doers deter others from vice, but I believe that guilty men, unpunished, become much more unhappy in another way. ne þis ne seye I nat now for þat any man myȝt[e] [3580]
þenk[e] þat þe maneres of shrewes ben coriged and
chastised by veniaunce. and þat þei ben brouȝt to þe
ryȝt wey by þe drede of þe tourment. ne for þat þei
ȝeuen to oþer folk ensample to fleyen from vices. ¶ But [3584]
I vndirstonde ȝitte [in] an oþer manere þat shrewes
ben more vnsely whan þei ne ben nat punissed al be it
so þat þere ne ben had no resoun or lawe of correccioun.
ne none ensample of lokynge. B. In what way do you mean? ¶ And what manere [3588]
shal þat ben quod I. ouþer þan haþ ben told here
byforn P. Are not good people happy, and evil folk miserable? ¶ Haue we nat graunted þan quod she þat
good[e] folk ben blysful. and shrewes ben wrecches.
B. Yes. ȝis quod I. P. If good be added to the wretchedness of a man, will not he be happier than another whose misery has no element of good in it? [thanne quod she] ȝif þat any good were [3592]
added to þe wrecchenesse of any wyȝt. nis he nat more
blisful þan he þat ne haþ no medelyng of goode in hys
solitarie wrecchednesse. B. It seems so. so semeþ it quod I. P. And if to the same wretched being another misery be annexed, does not he become more wretched than he whose misery is alleviated by the participation of some good? and what
seyst þou þan quod she of þilke wrecche þat lakkeþ alle [3596]
goodes. so þat no goode nis medeled in hys wrecchednesse.
and ȝitte ouer alle hys wickednesse for whiche
he is a wrecche þat þer be ȝitte anoþer yuel anexid and
knyt to hym. shal not men demen hym more vnsely [3600]
þan þilke wrecche of whiche þe vnselynesse is re[le]ued
by þe participacioun of som goode. B. He does. whi sholde he nat
quod I. P. When evil men are punished they have a degree of good annexed to their wretchedness, to wit, the punishment itself, which as it is the effect of justice is good. ¶ þan certys quod she han shrewes whan þei
ben punissed somwhat of good anexid to hir wrecchednesse. [3604]
þat is to seyne þe same peyne þat þei suffren
whiche þat is good by þe resoun of Iustice. And when these wretches escape punishment something more of ill (i. e. exemption from punishment) is added to their condition. And whan
þilke same shrewes ascapen wiþ outen tourment. þan
han þei somwhat more of yuel ȝit ouer þe wickednesse [3608]
þat þei han don. þat is to seye defaute of peyne.
whiche defaute of peyne þou hast graunted is yuel.
B. I cannot deny it. ¶ For þe desert of felonye I ne may nat denye it quod I.
P. Much more unhappy are the wicked when they enjoy an unmerited impunity than when they suffer a lawful chastisement. ¶ Moche more þan quod she ben shrewes vnsely [3612]
whan þei ben wrongfully delyuered fro peyne. þan
whan þei beþ punissed by ryȝtful vengeaunce. It is just to punish evil-doers, and unjust that they should escape punishment. but þis is
open þing and clere þat it is ryȝt þat shrewes ben
punissed. and it is wickednesse and wrong þat þei [3616]
escapin vnpunissed. [* fol. 28 b.] B. Nobody denies that. ¶ who myȝt[e] denye *þat quod I.
P. Everything, too, which is just is good; and, on the contrary, whatsoever is unjust is evil. but quod she may any man denye. þat al þat is ryȝt nis
good. and also þe contrarie. þat alle þat is wrong nis
wicked. B. These are just inferences from our former premises. certys quod I þise þinges ben clere ynouȝ. and [3620]
þat we han concludid a litel here byforne. But is there any punishment for the soul after death of the body? but I preye
þe þat þou telle me yif þou accordest to leten no tourment
to þe soules aftir þat þe body is dedid by þe deþe.
þis [is] to seyn. vndirstondest þou ouȝt þat soules han [3624]
any tourment after þe deþe of þe body. P. Yes, and great ones too. Some punishments are rigorous and eternal. ¶ Certis quod
she ȝe and þat ryȝt grete. of whiche soules quod she I
trowe þat somme ben tourmentid by asprenesse of
peyne. Others have a corrective and purifying force, and are of finite duration. and somme soules I trowe be excercised by a [3628]
purging mekenesse. But this is not to our purpose. but my conseil nys nat to determyne
of þis peyne. but I haue trauayled and told it
hider to. I want you to see that the power of the wicked is in reality nothing, that the wicked never go unpunished; that their licence to do evil is not of long duration, and that the wicked would be more unhappy if it were longer, and infinitely wretched if it were to continue for ever. ¶ For þou sholdest knowe þat þe mowynge
[.i. myght] of shrewes whiche mowynge þe semeþ to [3632]
ben. vnworþi nis no mowynge. and eke of shrewes of
whiche þou pleynedest þat þei ne were nat punissed.
þat þou woldest seen þat þei ne weren neuer mo wiþ
outen þe torment of hire wickednesse. and of þe licence [3636]
of mowynge to done yuel. þat þou preidest þat it
myȝt[e] sone ben endid. and þat þou woldest fayne
lerne. þat it ne sholde nat longe endure. and þat
shrewes ben more vnsely yif þei were of lenger duryng. [3640]
and most vnsely yif þei weren perdurable. After this I showed that evil men are more unhappy, having escaped punishment, than if justly chastised. and after
þis I haue shewed þe þat more vnsely ben shrewes
whan þei escapen wiþ oute ryȝtful peyne. þan whan þei
ben punissed by ryȝtful uengeaunce. Wherefore when they are supposed to get off scot-free they suffer most grievously. and of þis sentence [3644]
folweþ it þat þan ben shrewes constreyned atte laste wiþ
most greuous tourment. whan men wene þat þei ne ben
nat ypunissed. B. Your reasoning appears convincing and conclusive. But your arguments are opposed to current opinions, and would hardly command assent, or even a hearing. whan I considre þi resouns quod I. I.
ne trowe nat þat men seyn any þing more verrely. and [3648]
yif I tourne aȝeyn to þe studies of men. who is [he] to
whom it sholde seme þat [he] ne sholde nat only leuen
þise þinges. but eke gladly herkene hem. P. It is so. For those accustomed to the darkness of error cannot fix their eyes on the light of perspicuous truth, like birds of night which are blinded by the full light of day. Certys quod
she so it is. but men may nat. for þei han hire eyen so [3652]
wont to derkenesse of erþely þinges. þat þei may nat
liften hem vp to þe lyȝt of clere soþefastnes. ¶ But
þei ben lyke to briddes of whiche þe nyȝt lyȝtneþ hyre
lookyng. and þe day blyndeþ hem. They consider only the gratification of their lusts, they think there is happiness in the liberty of doing evil and in exemption from punishment. for whan men loken [3656]
nat þe ordre of þinges but hire lustes and talentȝ. þei
wene þat oþir þe leue or þe mowynge to done wickednesse
or ellys þe escaping wiþ oute peyne be weleful.
VIRTUE ITS OWN REWARD.
but considere þe iugement of þe perdurable lawe. for Do you attend to the eternal law written in your own heart. Conform your mind to what is good, and you will stand in no need of a judge to confer a reward upon you—for you have it already in the enjoyment of the best of things (i. e. virtue). if [3660]
þou conferme þi corage to þe beste þinges. þou ne hast
no nede to no iuge to ȝiuen þe pris or meede. for þou
hast ioigned þi self to þe most excellent þing. If you indulge in vice, you need no other chastisement—you have degraded yourself into a lower order of beings. and yif
þou haue enclined þi studies to þe wicked þinges. ne [3664]
seek no foreyn wrekere out of þi self. for þou þi self
hast þrest þe in to wicked þinges. ryȝt as þou myȝtest
loken by dyuerse tymes þe foule erþe and þe heuene.
and þat alle oþer þinges stynten fro wiþ oute. so þat [3668]
þou [nere neyther in heuene ne in erthe] ne say[e] no
þing more. þan sholde it semen to þe as by only resoun
of lokynge. þat þou were in þe sterres. and now in þe
erþe. The multitude doth not consider this. but þe poeple ne lokeþ nat on þise þinges. What then? Shall we take them as our models who resemble beasts? what [3672]
þan shal we þan approchen vs to hem þat I haue
shewed þat þei ben lyke to þe bestes. (q. d. non)
THE WICKED NEED PITY.
If a man who had lost his sight, having even forgotten his blindness, should declare that his faculties were all perfect, shall we weakly believe that those who retain their sight are blind? ¶ And what wilt þou seyne of þis ¶ yif þat a man
hadde al forlorn hys syȝt. and had[de] forȝeten þat he [3676]
euer saw and wende þat no þing ne fayled[e] hym of
perfeccioun of mankynde. now we þat myȝten sen þe
same þing wolde we nat wene þat he were blynde (q. d.
sic). The vulgar will not assent to what I am going to say, though supported by conclusive arguments—to wit, that persons are more unhappy that do wrong than those who suffer wrong. ne also ne accordeþ nat þe poeple to þat I shal [3680]
seyne. þe whiche þing is susteyned by a stronge foundement
of resouns. þat is to seyn þat more vnsely ben þei
þat don wrong to oþer folk. þen þei þat þe wrong
suffren. [* fol. 29.] B. I would willingly hear your reasons. ¶ I wolde heren þilke *same resouns quod I [3684]
P. Do you deny that every wicked man deserves punishment? ¶ Deniest þou quod she þat alle shrewes ne ben worþi
to han tourment. B. No, I do not. nay quod I. P. I am satisfied that impious men are in many ways miserable. but quod she I am certeyne
by many resouns þat shrewes ben vnsely. B. They are so. it accordeþ
quod I. P. Then those that deserve punishment are miserable. þan [ne] dowtest þou nat quod she þat [3688]
þilke folk þat ben worþi of tourment þat þei ne ben
wrecches. B. I admit it. It accordeþ wel quod I. P. If you were a judge, upon whom would you inflict punishment? upon the wrong-doer, or upon the injured? yif þou were þan
quod she yset a Iuge or a knower of þinges. wheþer
trowest þou þat men sholde tourment[e] hym þat haþ [3692]
don þe wronge. or hym þat haþ suffred þe wronge.
B. I should not hesitate to punish the offender as a satisfaction to the sufferer. I ne doute nat quod I. þat I nolde don suffissaunt satisfaccioun
to hym þat had[de] suffred þe wrong by þe
sorwe of hym þat had[de] don þe wronge. P. Then you would deem the injuring person more unhappy than he who had been wronged? ¶ þan [3696]
semeþ it quod she þat þe doar of wrong is more wrecche
þan he þat haþ suffred þe wrong. B. That follows naturally. þat folweþ wel quod
[I]. P. From this then, and other reasons of like nature, it seems that vice makes men miserable, and an injury done to any man is the misery of the doer, and not of the sufferer. þan quod she by þise causes and by oþer causes
þat ben enforced by þe same roate þat filþe or synne by [3700]
þe propre nature of it makeþ men wretches. and it
sheweþ wel þat þe wrong þat men don nis nat þe
wrecchenesse of hym þat receyueþ þe wrong. but þe
wrecchednesse of hym þat doþ þe wronge But our advocates think differently—they try to obtain pity for those that have suffered cruelty and oppression; ¶ but certys [3704]
quod she þise oratours or aduocatȝ don al þe contrarie
for þei enforcen hem to commoeue þe iuges to han pite
of hem þat han suffred and resceyued þe þinges þat ben
greuous and aspre. but the juster pity is really due to the oppressors, who ought, therefore, to be led to judgment as the sick are to the physician, not by angry but by merciful and kind accusers, so that, by the physic of chastisement, they may be cured of their vices. and ȝitte men sholden more ryȝtfully [3708]
han pitee on hem þat don þe greuaunces and þe
wronges. þe whiche shrewes it were a more couenable
þing þat þe accusours or aduocatȝ not wroþe but pitous
and debonaire ladden þe shrewes þat han don wrong to [3712]
þe Iugement. ryȝt as men leden seke folk to þe leche.