For as a workman, who has formed in his head the plan of a work which he is desirous to finish, executes it afterwards, and produces after a time all the different parts of the model which he has conceived; for ryȝt as a werkman þat
aperceiueþ in hys þouȝt þe forme of þe þing þat he wil
make moeueþ þe effect of þe werke. and lediþ þat he
had[de] loked byforne in hys þouȝt symply and presently [3888]
by temporel þouȝt. so God in the plan of his Providence disposes everything to be brought about in a certain order and in a proper time; ¶ Certys ryȝt so god disponiþ
in hys purueaunce singlerly and stably þe þinges
þat ben to done. but he amynistreþ in many maneres
and in dyuerse tymes by destyne. þilke same þinges [3892]
þat he haþ disponed þan wheþir þat destine be excercised.
PROVIDENCE CONTROLS FATE.
and afterwards, by the ministry of Fate, he accomplishes what he has planned, conformably to that order and that time. eyþer by somme dyuyne spirites seruaunteȝ to
þe deuyne purueaunce. or ellys by somme soule (anima
mundi). or ellys by al nature seruynge to god. or ellys [3896]
by þe celestial moeuyng of sterres. or ellys by þe vertue
of aungels. or ellys by þe dyuerse subtilite of deueles.
or ellys by any of hem. or ellys by hem alle þe destynal
ordynaunce is ywouen or accomplissed. certys it is open [3900]
þing þat þe purueaunce is an vnmoeueable and symple
forme of þinges to done. and þe moeueable bonde and
þe temporel ordynaunce of þinges whiche þat þe deuyne
simplicite of purueaunce haþ ordeyned to done. þat is [3904]
destine. So then, however Fate be exercised, it is evident that things subject to Destiny are under the control of Providence, which disposes Destiny. For whiche it is þat alle þinges þat ben put
vndir destine ben certys subgitȝ to purueaunce. to
whiche purueaunce destine it self is subgit and vndir.
But some things under Providence are exempt from the control of Fate; being stably fixed near to the Divinity himself, and beyond the movement of Destiny. ¶ But somme þinges ben put vndir purueaunce þat [3908]
sourmounten þe ordinaunce of destine. and þo ben
þilke þat stably ben yficched ney to þe first godhed þei
sourmounten þe ordre of destinal moeuablite. For even, as among several circles revolving round one common centre, that which is innermost approaches nearest to the simplicity of the middle points, and is, as it were, a centre, round which the outward ones revolve; ¶ For
ryȝt as cercles þat tournen aboute a same Centre or [3912]
about a poynt. þilke cercle þat is inrest or moost wiþ-ynne
ioineþ to þe symplesse of þe myddel and is as it
were a Centre or a poynt to þat oþer cercles þat tournen
abouten hym. whilst the outermost, revolving in a wider circumference, the further it is from the centre describes a larger space—but yet, if this circle or anything else be joined to the middle point, it is constrained to be immovable. ¶ and þilke þat is outerest compased by [3916]
larger envyronnynge is vnfolden by larger spaces in so
mochel as it is forþest fro þe mydel symplicite of þe
poynt. and yif þer be any þing þat knytteþ and felawshippeþ
hym selfe to þilke mydel poynt it is constreyned [3920]
in to symplicite. þat is to seyn in to [vn]moeueablete.
and it ceseth to ben shad and to fletin dyuersly. By parity of reason, the further anything is removed from the first intelligence, so much the more is it under the control of Destiny; ¶ Ryȝt
so by semblable resoun. þilke þinge þat departiþ firþest
fro þe first þouȝt of god. it is vnfolden and summittid [3924]
to grettere bondes of destine. and the nearer anything approaches to this Intelligence, the centre of all things, the more stable it becomes, and the less dependent upon Destiny. and in so moche is þe
þing more free and lovs fro destyne as it axeþ and
holdeþ hym ner to þilke Centre of þinges. þat is to
seyne god.
DESTINY RULES NATURE.
And if we suppose that the thing in question is joined to the stability of the supreme mind, it then becomes immovable, and is beyond the necessity and power of destiny. ¶ and if þe þinge cleueþ to þe stedfastnesse [3928]
of þe þouȝt of god. and be wiþ oute moeuyng certys it
sourmounteþ þe necessite of destyne. As reasoning is to the understanding, as that which is produced to that which exists of itself, as time to eternity, as the circle to the centre, so is the movable order of Fate to the stable simplicity of Providence. þan ryȝt swiche
comparisoun as [it] is of skilynge to vndirstondyng and
of þing þat is engendred to þing þat is. and of tyme to [3932]
eternite. and of þe cercle to þe Centre. ryȝt so is þe
ordre of moeueable destine to þe stable symplicite of
purueaunce. Destiny rules nature. ¶ þilke ordinaunce moeueþ þe heuene
and þe sterres and attempreþ þe elymentȝ to gider [3936]
amonges hem self. and transformeþ hem by enterchaungable
mutacioun. ¶ and þilke same ordre neweþ
aȝein alle þinges growyng and fallyng a-doune by sembleables
progressiouns of seedes and of sexes. þat is [3940]
to sein. male and female. It controls the actions of men by an indissoluble chain of causes, and is, like their origin, immutable. and þis ilke ordre constreyneþ
þe fortunes and þe dedes of men by a bonde of causes
nat able to ben vnbounden (indissolubili). þe whiche
destinal causes whanne þei passen oute fro þe bygynnynges [3944]
of þe vnmoeueable purueaunce it mot nedes
be þat þei ne be nat mutable. Thus, then, are all things well conducted, since that invariable order of cause has its origin in the simplicity of the Divine mind, and þus ben þe þinges ful
wel ygouerned. [* fol. 31.] yif þat þe symplicite dwellynge *in þe
deuyne þouȝt sheweþ furþe þe ordre of causes. and by its inherent immutability exercises a restraint upon mutable things, and preserves them from irregularity. vnable to [3948]
be I-bowed. and þis ordre constreyneþ by hys propre
stablete þe moeueable þinges. or ellys þei sholde fleten
folily To those who understand not this order, things appear confused—nevertheless, the proper condition of all things directs and inclines it to their true good. for whiche it is þat alle þinges semen to be confus
and trouble to vs men. for we ne mowe nat considere [3952]
þilke ordinaunce. ¶ Naþeles þe propre manere of
euery þing dressynge hem to goode disponit hem alle.
For there is nothing done for the sake of evil, not even by the wicked, who, in seeking for felicity, are led astray by crooked error. for þere nis no þinge don for cause of yuel. ne þilke
þing þat is don by wicked[e] folk nis nat don for yuel [3956]
þe whiche shrewes as I haue shewed [ful] plentiuously
seken goode. but wicked errour mystourniþ hem.
NOTHING DONE FOR EVIL’S SAKE.
But the order proceeding from the centre of supreme goodness does not mislead any. ¶ Ne þe ordre comynge fro þe poynt of souereyne goode ne
declineþ nat fro hys bygynnynge. But you may say, what greater confusion can there be than that both prosperous and adverse things should at times happen to good men, and that evil men should at one time enjoy their desires and at another be tormented by hateful things. but þou mayst sein [3960]
what vnreste may ben a wors confusioun þan þat goode
men han somme tyme aduersite. and somtyme prosperite.
¶ and shrewes also han now þinges þat þei
desiren. and now þinges þat þei haten ¶ wheþer men [3964]
lyuen now in swiche hoolnesse of þouȝt. as who seiþ.
Are men wise enough to discover, whether those whom they believe to be virtuous or wicked, are so in reality? ben men now so wise. þat swiche folk as þei demen to
ben goode folk or shrewes þat it mot nedes ben þat folk
ben swiche as þei wenen. Opinions differ as to this matter. Some who are deemed worthy of reward by one person, are deemed unworthy by another. but in þis manere þe domes [3968]
of men discorden. þat þilke men þat somme folk demen
worþi of mede. oþer folk demen hem worþi of tourment.
But, suppose it were possible for one to distinguish with certainty between the good and the bad? but lat vs graunt[e] I pose þat som man may wel demen
or knowen þe goode folk and þe badde. Then he must have as accurate a knowledge of the mind as one has of the body. May he þan [3972]
knowen and seen þilke inrest attemperaunce of corages.
as it haþ ben wont to be said of bodyes. as who saiþ
may a man speken and determine of attemperaunce in
corages. as men were wont to demen or speken of complexiouns [3976]
and attemperaunces of bodies (q’ non).
ne it [ne] is nat an vnlyke miracle to hem þat ne knowen
it nat. It is miraculous to him who knows it not, why sweet things are agreeable to some bodies, and bitter to others; why some sick persons are relieved by lenitives and others by sharper remedies. ¶ As who seiþ. but is lyke a merueil or a
miracle to hem þat ne knowen it nat. whi þat swete [3980]
þinges [ben] couenable to some bodies þat ben hool and
to some bodies bittre þinges ben couenable. and also
whi þat some seke folk ben holpen with lyȝt medicines
[and some folk ben holpen with sharppe medicynes] It is no marvel to the leech, who knows the causes of disease, and their cures. but [3984]
naþeles þe leche þat knoweþ þe manere and þe attemperaunce
of heele and of maladie ne merueileþ of it no
þing. What constitutes the health of the mind, but goodness? And what are its maladies, but vice? but what oþer þing semeþ hele of corages but
bounte and prowesse. and what oþer þing semeþ maladie [3988]
of corages but vices. Who is the preserver of good, or the driver away of evil, but God, the physician of souls, who knows what is necessary for men, and bestows it upon them? who is ellys kepere of good or
dryuere awey of yuel but god gouernour and leecher of
þouȝtes. þe whiche god whan he haþ by-holden from þe
heye toure of hys purueaunce he knoweþ what is [3992]
couenable to euery wyȝt. and leneþ hem þat he wot
[þat] is couenable to hem. From this source springs that great marvel—the order of destiny—wrought by the wisdom of God, and marveled at by ignorant men. Loo here of comeþ and
here of is don þis noble miracle of þe ordre destinal.
GOD THE SOUL’S PHYSICIAN.