They were thy chosen music, Liberty.”
There are few principles of action which are more immediately beneficial to society, and which have received more assiduous cultivation, than love of country. The Swiss regards his country with the tenderness of filial affection, and, like the undiscerning lover, fondly gazes without discrimination upon its beauties and its deformities.[13] Enamored of their rocks, ice, and snow, they look on milder climates and more fruitful plains without one envious emotion. Deeper down even than the deep-seated differences of race, language, and creed lies the feeling that comes from the common possession of a political freedom that is greater than that possessed by surrounding peoples: this is the enduring bond of the Confederation. Switzerland has demonstrated that democracies are not necessarily short-lived. The short-lived glory of Athens and its subjection under the rough foot of the astute Macedonian was not the result of too much freedom, but because the Greek states had too little unity. In Switzerland republican institutions can claim to have been fairly tried and thoroughly succeeded. Dating from the perpetual Alliance of 1291, the Confederation now counts six centuries; living through many forms of government, feudal, clerical, imperial, radical, the League of Cantons never ceased to be a union of republics, and is the only federal government which has come down from mediæval times to our own day. We see that the Swiss have lasted well, “for utility is their bond and not respects.” While in some European countries very anomalous forms of government have assumed the republican name, it is gratifying to observe that there is at least one European state in which republicanism is a fact and a living force properly understood and properly practised, uniting with as large a measure of individual liberty all the advantages of careful and judicious legislation, economy in the administration, and justice in the execution of the laws to as high a degree as can be found in any country. Every man is free; every child educated; the sovereign power resides in hands that defend it in danger and adorn it in peace; a common faith that love of country, “all for each and each for all,” is better than a love of self pervades the entire population. Amid powerful monarchies there is a state without king or nobles, with a well-developed system of democratic institutions, admirably suited to the genius of the people and administered with the economy, the wisdom, and the consistency of a well-regulated family. There the problem of a free commonwealth was first solved, and popular government first made possible. There are presented some of the most striking examples of democracy in its simplest form, and of carefully-contrived and durable republican institutions, to be found in the annals of political history. There is a government based on the simple but sound philosophy expounded in the homely observations of the honest old boatman of Geneva, Jean Desclaux, “If one man rule, he will rule for his own benefit and that of his parasites; if a minority rule, we have many masters instead of one, all of whom must be fed and served; and if the majority rule, and rule wrongfully, why the minimum of harm is done.”
CHAPTER II.
THE CONSTITUTION.
“On the main-land only two little spots at the two extremities of the old Teutonic world came out of the mediæval crucible with their self-government substantially intact. At the mouth of the Rhine, the little Dutch communities were prepared to lead the attack in the terrible battle for freedom with which the drama of modern history was ushered in. In the impregnable mountain fastnesses of upper Germany, the Swiss Cantons had bid defiance alike to Austrian tyrant and to Burgundian invader, and had preserved in its purest form the rustic democracy of their Aryan forefathers. By a curious coincidence, both these free peoples in their efforts towards national unity were led to frame federal unions, and one of these political achievements is from the stand-point of universal history of very great significance.”[14] Writers, as a rule, properly consider a federal government, owing to its nice balances in regard to a division of power between the union and the members, and in regard to the conflicting interests of the parts, as a peculiarly delicate and almost unadjustable framework.
“The federative system,” says Guizot, “is one which evidently requires the greatest maturity of reason, of morality, of civilization in the society to which it is applied.” The two poles of a federal government are independent action of the members in certain things, and a central power or government which in certain things is equally independent. The aim is to gain the advantages of the concentrated power of great states, while retaining the advantages of local interest found in small states. On the one hand, each of the members of the union must be wholly independent in those matters which concern each member only. On the other hand, all must be subject to a common power in those matters which concern the whole body of members collectively. Switzerland represents the happy outcome of the first attempt at such a federal union made by men of Teutonic descent. Complete independence in local affairs combined with adequate representation in the Federal Council has effected such an intense cohesion of interests throughout the nation as no centralized government, however cunningly devised, would ever have secured. The constitutional history of the confederation is a study in federalism. First a mere defensive alliance or league;[15] then a Staatenbund, or permanent alliance of several small states, to which the term confederacy nearly corresponds; then a Bundesstaat, or an organized state with central legislative, executive, and judicial departments, which answers substantially to the term federation as usually employed, and as realized in the Constitution of 1848, and perfected in that of 1874. The distinction which German publicists have introduced into political science between a Staatenbund and a Bundesstaat, constituting the two chief forms of union between states, is a very valuable one,—the former word denoting a league or confederation of states; the latter, a state formed by means of a league or confederation. In order to know to which of the two classes a given state belongs, we need to inquire only whether the political body in question has the essential qualities of a state or not. Confederation and federation; both are composite political bodies, and in so far different from mere alliances which form no new state. Staatenbund, or confederation, is rather a conglomeration of states than a real state; it retains the character of a contractual combination of states. Bundesstaat, or federation, implies the advance from the incomplete and transitional form to the formation of a collective state or union; it is a more highly developed Staatenbund, the difference is only one of degree in purpose, form, and powers to carry out the national will. A confederation, by joining several states in a political association, presents at least externally the appearance of one state of an international personality; but yet is not organized into one central state distinct from the particular states. The management of the collective state is left either to some particular state as President (Vorort), or to an assembly of delegates and representatives of all the several states. The former was the case with the Greek leagues under the hegemony of Sparta and Athens; the latter with the American Union under the ancient articles of 1778, and the German confederation of 1815. In a federation there are not merely completely organized particular states, each remaining sovereign and independent within the range of such powers as it does not hand over to the federal authority; but there is an independently organized common or central state, that within the range of the powers handed over to it forms a single commonwealth under a government with its own executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The Achæan league was already in some measure such a federal state. This form of state first appears in modern times in the Constitution of the United States adopted in 1787, and subsequently imitated by Switzerland. The Swiss Confederation previous to 1848 joined the members of the league only on such terms and for such purposes as were agreed on, and their common affairs were administered by a federal Diet. Still each Canton remained perfectly independent in all its internal concerns; even keeping the right of separate dealings with foreign governments. There was nothing which could be strictly called a federal government, whose one will makes the constitution, and demands obedience from the minority, even of particular Cantons. The foundation of the Swiss Constitution is the old Swiss league, which lasted from 1291 to 1798. But there had been simply alliances between different Cantons, and no real federal constitution existed. The establishment of the Helvetic Republic, one and indivisible, was the first attempt at a constitution. The representative democracy of the United States found a soil ready prepared for it in Switzerland, to which it was transplanted by French intervention. The constitution unitaire was imposed on Switzerland most tyrannically, but it was not in itself a bad one. Under what may be called the French readjustment of Switzerland, constitutions rose and fell and succeeded each other in rapid rotation from 1798 to 1803. First appears a project of the Constitution of March, 1798; by this a single centralized state was substituted for the thirteen old Cantons. It served with modifications as the groundwork of another sketched in April of the same year. This latter was prevented by the outbreak of war between France and Austria in 1799 from taking root. Another Constitution of May, 1801, approved by Bonaparte, then First Consul, was acceptable to few in its political and territorial arrangements. The Cantons became mere divisions, like counties or departments. One of its earliest provisions abolishes the ancient democracies of the Forest Cantons. The traditions of independence in these older Cantons, and the elements of internal opposition, were too strong to admit of submission. The inhabitants of these sequestered regions, communicating little with the rest of the world, ardently attached to their liberties, inheriting all the dauntless intrepidity of their forefathers, clearly perceived that, in the wreck of all their ancient institutions, the independence of their country could not long be maintained. They saw that the insidious promises of the French envoys had terminated only in ruinous exaction and tyrannical rule. Animated by these feelings, “We have lived,” said they, “for several centuries under a republic based on liberty and equality; possessing no other goods in the world but our religion and our independence; no other riches but our herds; our first duty is to defend them.” This attempt to form the whole of Switzerland into a united representative system could not be permanent, and was soon dissolved. Other constitutions followed in October, 1801, February, 1802, and July, 1802. Then February 2, 1803, came, under the so-called Act of Mediation, a moderately centralized federal government granted by Napoleon. Old family and civic privileges were annulled; all Swiss were made equal in the eye of the law, and vassalage was altogether abolished, and free right of settlement in any part of Switzerland assured to all. All alliances of one Canton with another, or with a foreign state, were interdicted. This was stipulated in consequence of an improper alliance in 1442 by Zurich with the House of Austria. It was ordained that each Canton should send one deputy to the general Diet; that they should have definite instructions and powers of attorney, and should not vote against their instructions. The functions of the Diet were declared to be: 1. To proclaim war or peace, and conclude foreign alliances, which required the consent of three-fourths of the Diet. 2. To fix regulations for foreign commerce, capitulations in foreign service, and the recruiting of soldiers. 3. To levy the contingent, appoint commanders of the armed forces, and the foreign ambassadors. 4. To adopt measures of external utility and settle disputes between one Canton and another. The act concluded in these terms: “The present act, the result of long conference with enlightened persons, appears to us the best that could be devised for the constitution and happiness of the Swiss. As soon as it is carried into execution the French troops shall withdraw. We recognize Helvetia as organized by this act as an independent power, and guarantee the Federal constitution, and that of each Canton in particular, against the enemies of the tranquillity of the state.” This act for the remainder of Napoleon’s reign settled the condition of the Helvetic Confederacy; and although it was peaceful and prosperous, the Act of Mediation was felt to be the work of a foreigner and master, and it fell with the extinction of his power. Here French readjustments came to an end, and after the Congress of Vienna, March, 1815, guaranteed the neutrality of Switzerland, there followed in November of the same year the Federal Pact. This was a looser confederation, and in many respects a return to the state of things previous to the French Revolution, and restored to the Cantons a large portion of their former sovereignty. There continued to be a Tagsatzung, or Diet for general affairs, consisting of “ambassadors from the sovereign estates,” meaning the Cantons, each Canton still having only one voice, and three-fourths of the votes being necessary for war or peace and treaties with foreign powers; but in other matters of business an absolute majority decides. It fixes the rate of troops and taxes for federal purposes; gives every Canton the right to demand defence against internal and external force; provides for the settlement of disputes between the Cantons; puts an end to all dependent territory and exclusive possession of rights by a class of citizens; and continues the old plan of having a Vorort. Military capitulations and conventions concerning affairs of police or public economy may be made by single Cantons, provided they oppose no federal principles, nor existing league, nor cantonal rights. Ambassadors from the league may be sent to foreign powers when their appointment is thought necessary. In extraordinary cases the Vorort may be invested with especial powers, and a committee can be appointed, composed of the officer of the Vorort, who is intrusted with the management of the federal affairs in conjunction with other representatives of the Confederation. This representative committee is chosen by six circles of Cantons each in turn. The Diet gives the requisite instructions to these federal representatives, and fixes the duration of their duties, which cease, of course, when there is a new Diet. When this assembly is not in session, the Vorort has the charge of federal affairs within the limits existing before 1798. Cloisters and chapters are allowed to continue, but are subject to taxation like private property; and the Helvetic national debt is acknowledged. The Federal Pact became unpopular not merely from its own intrinsic defects and ambiguities, but also from the time and circumstances of its origin. It was a reactionary instrument, bringing back the yoke of the patrician families and the extreme Ultramontane party. The central authority of the Confederation was wreak. It had no powers, either legislative, executive, or administrative, binding upon the several Cantons; no provision for the repression of wars between rival Cantons, nor for the proper restraint of separate alliances with foreign powers which endangered the peace, if not the independence, of the federal state; no federal army, no public treasury, no national mint, no common judiciary, nor any other common marks of sovereignty. The Diet assembled for little more than deliberation, all matters of importance being referred to the determination of the Cantons. National affairs were discussed in general Diets, as in fact they had been from the beginning, but they were Diets which lacked the very essentials of republican government, majority rule, and power of execution. They depended more upon moral authority than legal powers, persuading where they could not command obedience. The difficulties of a union so obviously imperfect and narrow were greatly increased by the Reformation, which alienated the Catholic and Protestant Cantons, causing political and religious struggles that culminated in civil war. There is then a constitutional rest until the next great revolutionary storm, which swept over so many countries of Europe in 1848, when a new constitution, modelled in many respects after that of the United States, was adopted, and superseded the Federal Pact. It changed the federal union of states into a federal republic; a transition from a Staatenbund to a Bundesstaat. The stage of confederation was passed over and the higher state of federation reached; an organized nation, and at the same time the peoples of the particular Cantons also possessing organic unity; a Swiss nation, and yet a Bernese and Genevese people. The Constitution of 1848 was the first which was entirely the work of the Swiss without any foreign influence. For the revolution of 1848, which paralyzed Austria, Rome, and Germany, enabled the Swiss to reassume in full the reins of self-government. Two legislative chambers were for the first time created, and invested with the power of enacting laws and issuing orders which are binding directly on individual citizens. This most important and far-reaching principle, that the Federal head should operate directly on individuals and not on states, involved momentous consequences, forcing the construction of a “Composite State.” The joint action of the two chambers, constituting the Bundesversammlung, or Federal Assembly, became a substantive part of the government of every Canton; and, within the limits of its attributions, made laws which are obeyed by every citizen, and executing them through its own officers, and enforcing them by its own tribunal; powers essential for an effective federal government. The old Diets never ventured on any undertaking of public utility, amelioration, or reform, during more than three hundred years. The Confederation was loose and incomplete even for its essential objects, mutual defence and foreign relations. The principal objects of this new constitution were:
1. The strengthening of the national government, reconciling the supremacy of the Confederation with the autonomy of the Cantons.
2. The overthrow of oligarchies.
3. The protection of the state from the dominion of Rome.
The first two were attained by the direct provisions of the Constitution; the third was afterwards promoted by the expulsion of the Jesuits and their affiliated societies from Swiss territory. A great benefit was conferred upon the Confederation by the unification of such matters as coinage, weight, measures, and posts; and the surrender by the Cantons to the Confederation of the exclusive right to levy duties at the frontiers of the country. For twenty-four years Switzerland enjoyed under this Constitution uninterrupted peace and prosperity; the European wars between 1855 and 1871 did not disturb her neutrality, though military operations offered great temptation to march across her territory. In 1872 a project of amendment was submitted conferring upon the general government many additional powers. By a small popular and a large cantonal majority it was defeated. The agitation for amendment continued, and in 1874 a more moderate revision of the Constitution of 1848 was again presented. This remodelling in 1874 did little more than work out in a complete and logical form the principles laid down in 1848; the most marked difference being a further enlargement of the Federal authority; forming a well compacted union, a Federal state, each portion of which has its sphere of sovereignty. This revised Constitution received the sanction of the Federal Assembly, January 31, 1874, was submitted to the popular vote on Sunday, April 19, following, resulting in a vote of 340,199 in favor of, and 198,013 against, acceptance. The vote by Cantons was fourteen and a half Cantons for, and seven and a half Cantons against, acceptance (the votes of the half-Cantons being counted each as a half vote). The Cantons voting against the adoption of the Constitution were Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden (the original three), Luzern, Zug, Freiburg, Valais, and Appenzell (Inner). A decree of the Federal Assembly, May 28, 1874, after setting forth that the revised Federal Constitution had received both a majority of all the votes cast and the approval of a majority of all the Cantons, says, “That it is, therefore, hereby solemnly declared in effect, bearing date of May 29, 1874.” The Federal Council, on May 30, 1874, ordered the above decree, together with the Constitution, to be enrolled in the official collection of statutes of the Confederation, and the decree to be transmitted to the governments of the Cantons, to be published by them through posting up in public places. The Federal system thus established has many features which are strikingly like, as well as many which are almost as strikingly unlike, those in the system of the United States. The preamble, and Articles I. and II. of the Constitution, point out the aim and lay down the fundamental idea of the Confederation.
IN THE NAME OF ALMIGHTY GOD.