Invention: The Master-key to Progress

by Bradley A. Fiske

It may be interesting, however, to realize that mere imagination is possibly the most elementary activity of the mind; mere imagination is evidenced by savages, for instance, and by children, more than by highly educated men. Constructiveness, on the other hand, is little to be found in savages or children, and is a product of education, and a result of the training of the reasoning faculties. Courage and impulsive energy again are elemental faculties, and are observable more in savages than in the civilized. It seems to be the effect of civilization, therefore, to develop the reasoning faculties, at the expense of both imagination and courage. In fact, it is clearly the effect of civilization to develop a cold and calculating materialism. Men are rare therefore, and have been rare in every age, who combine the three qualities of imagination, constructiveness and courage. Napoleon combined all three in harmonious proportions; and he possessed each one in its most perfect form.

His performance at Toulon was so spectacular that it attracted attention at once, and caused his promotion to the command of the artillery in Italy. Here he was able to suggest projects that received approval and brought successes. One plan conceived and developed by him, however, was disapproved. It consisted essentially of dividing the Piedmontese and Austrians, crushing the Piedmontese, and then driving the Austrians out of Italy into Austria and following them thither. Later, this plan was approved, and he himself was put in command in Italy. It was this plan, executed by the Bonaparte of those days, that began the career of the Napoleon of history. So original and brilliant had been the conception, so mathematically correct and practically feasible had been the plan which Bonaparte developed from it, and so furiously energetic were his operations in carrying out the plan, that the sluggish Piedmontese were defeated before they quite realized that war had been begun. A like catastrophe happened to the equally mentally and physically sluggish Austrians; then another catastrophe, and then another, and then still others; and in such rapid and bewildering succession, that in a year and a month after his arrival in Italy he had driven the Austrians out completely, formed the Cisalpine and Ligurian republics in the north of Italy, and signed the armistice of Leoben with the Austrians, within fifty miles of Vienna.

Napoleon's next invention was a project for ruining England by attacking her East Indian possessions by a campaign beginning with an invasion of Egypt. Everything proceeded in substantial accordance with the plan developed, until August 1, 1798. In the evening of that day the whole project was destroyed by Horatio Nelson.

It was destroyed in a battle near the mouth of the river Nile, that was decided in fifteen minutes, though it was not wholly concluded until it had been raging for nearly four hours. In fifteen minutes, the French fleet on which depended Bonaparte's communications with Europe, had been so severely damaged that the failure of Bonaparte's project was decided.

Nelson was a man like Bonaparte in certain qualities; in the qualities that are essential to great leadership, imagination, constructiveness and executiveness. The first clear evidence of these qualities he had displayed startlingly at the battle of Cape St. Vincent on February 14, 1797;—when, swiftly realizing that two separated parts of the hostile Spanish fleet were about to join, he suddenly conceived the idea of preventing the junction by committing an act that—unless it brought success—would probably cost him his commission and perhaps his life. Now, the mere conception of an idea so revolting to professional ethics would not occur to an unimaginative man: and still less would it be retained. But it did occur to Nelson; and Nelson retained it and looked it squarely in the face. To embody his idea in a practicable plan was a simple matter to his active and trained intelligence, while to execute the plan was an act so natural as to be almost automatic. Much to the amazement of the Commander of the fleet and all the officers and men in both the fleets, the little division commanded by Commodore Nelson was seen actually to leave the line of battle! Nelson had taken his life, his fortune and his sacred honor in his hand, and staked all on an endeavor to get between the two separated parts of the Spanish fleet. The British Commander quickly realized what his daring subordinate had in mind, and speedily came to his relief. A brilliant, though not materially decisive, victory was won. The already distinguished Commander-in-Chief was then made Earl St. Vincent, and the hitherto obscure Horatio Nelson brought into the forefront of naval heroes, with the rank of rear-admiral, a gold medal and a knighthood.

Now, Nelson had not appeared at the mouth of the Nile because of any accident, or any chain of fortuitous circumstances; he did not fight the epochal battle there because of any accidental occurrences or conditions, and he did not gain the victory because of any similar causes. Nelson appeared at the mouth of the Nile in accordance with a plan that he had conceived as soon as he heard of Bonaparte's departure from Toulon on a destination carefully kept secret, but which Nelson divined as Egypt. He so divined it, by imagining himself in Bonaparte's place, and imagining for what purpose he, Nelson, would have left Toulon under the conditions prevailing then in France. He engaged the French fleet when he did, and he fought the French fleet in the way he did, in accordance with a plan that he had conceived long before. No men were ever more cautious, more solicitous about the future, more painstaking, more prudent, more insistent against taking undue risks, than those reputedly reckless devil-may-cares, Napoleon Bonaparte and Horatio Nelson.

Napoleon realized at once that his brilliant scheme had been shattered; but he could not now even take his army home, because the British fleet was in the way. Finally, he succeeded in making the trip himself, with only a few of his staff. Events ran rapidly then; and on the sixth of May, 1800, we see Napoleon leaving Paris to undertake a campaign in northern Italy, in accordance with a plan embodied to carry out an idea conceived in his fertile mind, of taking his army through the great St. Bernard pass, dragging his cannon with him through the snow. This plan (like most of his plans) was so brilliantly conceived, so skillfully planned, and so energetically executed, that when Napoleon suddenly appeared with his army in the North of Italy, the Austrian general was bewildered with amazement. The natural result developed quickly, and the Austrians retired beyond the Mincio River.

By this time affairs in Europe were vastly complicated, because of the fact that the maritime enemies of France (which meant virtually all the other maritime countries of Europe) became exasperated at one of their number, Great Britain, in consequence of what they considered her unreasonable insistence on certain doctrines concerning maritime affairs. A League of Armed Neutrality against her was finally formed, that soon assumed menacing proportions. This league was completely broken by the same Horatio Nelson in a naval battle off Copenhagen on April 2, 1801. This battle was the direct result of a plan conceived by Nelson, that was so original and so daring that for a long time he could not secure the consent of his Commander-in-Chief to its execution. The battle resulted in a victory that was brilliant in the highest degree; but it was brilliant only because the original idea was brilliant, and because it was developed into a plan that was constructively correct and skillfully carried out.

Meanwhile, a brief campaign had been going on between the French and the Austrians in Austria. It was carried on with great brilliancy of conception and skill of execution by Moreau, and ended with the battle of Hohenlinden and the disastrous defeat of the Austrians. The treaty of Lunéville followed in February, 1801, and left Great Britain as France's only antagonist.

The victory of Copenhagen having broken the strength of the Confederacy of Neutrals, and Napoleon seeing the folly of attempting further to ruin British commerce then, the Treaty of Amiens between Great Britain and France followed in March, 1802.