| Col. 1 | Col. 2 | Col. 3 | ||
| Value of offensive power at beginning | A | 970 | 569 | 841 |
| B | 800 | 200 | 500 | |
| Damage done in 1st period by | A | 97 | 57 | 84 |
| B | 80 | 20 | 50 | |
| Value of offensive power at end 1st period | A | 890 | 549 | 791 |
| B | 703 | 143 | 416 | |
| Damage done in 2d period by | A | 89 | 55 | 79 |
| B | 70 | 14 | 42 | |
| Value of offensive power at end 2d period | A | 820 | 535 | 749 |
| B | 614 | 88 | 337 | |
| Damage done in 3d period by | A | 82 | 54 | 75 |
| B | 61 | 0 | 34 | |
| Value of offensive power at end 3d period | A | 759 | 526 | 715 |
| B | 532 | 32 | 262 | |
| Damage done in 4th period by | A | 76 | 53 | 72 |
| B | 53 | 3 | 26 | |
| Value of offensive power at end 4th period | A | 706 | 523 | 689 |
| B | 456 | 0 | 190 | |
| Damage done in 5th period by | A | 71 | 69 | |
| B | 46 | 10 | ||
| Value of offensive power at end 5th period | A | 660 | 670 | |
| B | 385 | 121 | ||
| Damage done in 6th period by | A | 66 | 67 | |
| B | 39 | 12 | ||
| Value of offensive power at end 6th period | A | 621 | 658 | |
| B | 319 | 54 | ||
| Damage done in 7th period by | A | 62 | 66 | |
| B | 32 | 5 | ||
| Value of offensive power at end 7th period | A | 589 | 653 | |
| B | 257 | 0 | ||
| Damage done in 8th period by | A | 59 | ||
| B | 26 | |||
| Value of offensive power at end 8th period | A | 563 | ||
| B | 198 | |||
| Damage done in 9th period by | A | 56 | ||
| B | 20 | |||
| Value of offensive power at end 9th period | A | 543 | ||
| B | 142 | |||
| Damage done in 10th period by | A | 54 | ||
| B | 14 | |||
| Value of offensive power at end 10th period | A | 529 | ||
| B | 88 | |||
| Damage done in 11th period by | A | 53 | ||
| B | 9 | |||
| Value of offensive power at end 11th period | A | 520 | ||
| B | 35 | |||
| Damage done in 12th period by | A | 52 | ||
| B | 4 | |||
| Value of offensive power at end 12th period | A | 516 | ||
| B | 0 |
The main advantage of superior speed in naval operations is the ability it gives to secure tactical positions of advantage, and to make desirable strategic dispositions; ability, for instance, to T or flank an enemy force, and to prevent the enemy from T-ing or flanking; also to catch separated parts of an enemy fleet before they can unite, while retaining the ability to divide one's own force without undue risk. For these purposes, speed is an element of the highest value; but the high price that it costs in gun power or armor protection—or both—and the fact that speed cannot always be counted on by reason of possible engine breakdowns and foul bottoms, result in giving to war-ships a lower speed than otherwise they would have.
Owing to the fact that, for any given horse-power put into a ship, the speed attainable increases with her length; and owing to the further fact that the weight that any ship can carry increases more rapidly than the displacement (weight of the ship complete), the best combination of gun power, armor protection, and speed is attainable in the largest ship. In other words, the larger the ship, the more power it can carry in proportion to its size, and the more quickly that power can be placed where it can do the most good.
Strategic Operations.—These may be divided into two classes, offensive and defensive. The two classes are distinct; and yet there is no sharp dividing-line between them any more than there is between two contiguous colors in the spectrum. Defensive operations of the kind described by a popular interpretation of the word "defense" would be operations limited to warding off or escaping the enemy's attack, and would be just as efficacious as the passive warding off of the blows of fists. Such a defense can never succeed, for the reason that the recipient is reduced progressively in power of resistance as the attacks follow each other, while the attacker remains in unimpaired vigor, except for the gently depressing influence of fatigue. Reference to Table I will render this point clear, if we make the progressive reductions of the power of one contestant, and no reductions of the power of the other contestant.
Defensive operations, therefore, include "hitting back"; that is, a certain measure of offensive operations, intended to weaken the ability of the enemy to do damage. In fact, no operations are more aggressively offensive, or more productive of damage to the enemy's personnel and material, than operations that are carried on in order to defend something. No animal is so aggressively belligerent as a female "defending" her young.
Offensive and defensive operations are nevertheless quite different, especially in two particulars, one being the use of the initiative or attack, and the other the distance to the home. In offensive operations, the attack is made; in defensive operations, the attack is resisted; and even if the resistance takes an aggressive character, and drives the original attacker back to the place he started from, yet the side which has made the original attack has carried on offensive operations, and the other side defensive. Offensive operations are, as a rule, carried on farther from home than defensive operations. If A is carrying on offensive operations against B, A is usually farther away from his home than B is from his home. We see from this that the offensive has the advantage of the initiative, of making an attack for which the enemy may be unprepared, and has the disadvantage of being far from its home bases; whereas the defensive has the disadvantage of not knowing when or where or whence an attack is to come, and the advantage of the support of various kinds given by home bases. In other words, the offensive has the advantage except in so far as it is impaired by unfavorable conditions.
For this reason, every military nation at the outset of war desires to be able to assume the offensive; and only refrains from the offensive from motives of prudence or because, in a particular case, the distance between the adversaries is so great, that the lack of bases would be of greater weight than the advantage of the initiative—or because the situations of the contending parties would be such that the side accepting the defensive rôle and staying near home, might be able to carry on aggressive attacks better than could the other. An illustration of a mistake in taking the offensive, and the wisdom of the other side in accepting the defensive, may be seen in Napoleon's expedition against Russia; for the Russians were able to repel his attack completely, and then to assume a terrible offensive against his retreating, disorganized, and starving army. Another illustration was the expedition made by a weak Spanish fleet under Cervera to the Caribbean in 1898. Another illustration was that of the Russians in the war of 1904; the practical disadvantages under which the Russian fleet operated at Tsushima were too great to be balanced by the advantage of the attack; especially as the situation was such that the Japanese were able to foretell with enough accuracy for practical purposes the place where the attack would be delivered, and the time.
Operations on the sea, like operations on the land, consist in opposing force to force, in making thrusts and making parries. If two men or two ships contend in a duel, or if two parallel columns—say of ten ships each—are drawn up abreast each other, the result will depend mainly on the hitting and enduring powers of the combatants; the conditions of the "stand-up fight" are realized, and there is little opportunity for strategy to exert itself.
But if any country—say the United States—finds herself involved in war with—say a powerful naval Power or Powers of Europe, and the realization of the fact comes with the suddenness that characterized the coming of war in August, 1914, and we hear the same day that a fleet of battleships, battle cruisers, destroyers, submarines, aircraft, and auxiliaries has left the enemy's country, followed by a fleet of transports carrying troops—there will be immediate need for strategy of the most skilful kind; and this need will continue until either the United States or her enemy has been made to acknowledge herself beaten, and to sue for peace.
As such a war will be mainly naval, and as naval wars are characterized by great concentration of force, by each side getting practically all its naval force into the contest, by each side staking its all on the issue of perhaps a single battle (as the Russians and Japanese did at Tsushima) one fleet or the other will be practically annihilated, and its country will be exposed naked to the enemy.