Such is a picture of the sufferings of our army of occupation, drawn by an eye-witness, and scarcely colored by the warmth of his feelings. If the advice of military men, and the opinion of persons whose experience as campaigners entitled them to respect, had been heeded, this war would have been speedily ended. Ever since the rumor of annexation in 1843, but, especially, since the inaugural address of President Polk in 1845, in which he pronounced so emphatic an opinion as to our right to the whole of Oregon, our political firmament had been clouded. Prudent men thought it probable that there would be war with Mexico or hostilities with England, and that the two sources of irritation, by distracting our powers, would materially increase each other's virulence.
At this time, General Gaines, a chieftain who has become venerable in the service of his country, and whose skill and bravery on many a field have manifested his character in actions that no citizen can ever forget, commanded on our south-western frontier. The delicate character of our foreign relations, to which allusion has just been made, attracted his anxious attention in 1845; and his responsibility as Chief on a long, exposed frontier, compelled him to give timely warning to the department. It seemed to this officer, if we engaged hastily in war with Mexico or England, at such a crisis, and with no preparations either for an army or its instruction, that the conflict would be disastrous or procrastinated, especially as the latter power had so far surpassed us in applying steam to naval purposes. Long years of peace had rendered us indifferent to war; and unvarying success in other conflicts had made us confident. Accordingly, he recommended the concentration of a large force of volunteers on the borders of the probable theatre of war, where they should be trained in military science, together with the regulars commanded by General Taylor, until the spring of 1846. If war could not be averted before that period, we might then be able to march against the enemy with a powerful and disciplined army. He contended that the true policy of our country, in such an assault, was to pursue with relentless energy the military bandits who swayed the destinies of Mexico, whilst, on all sides, we protected the persons and property of non-combatants; so that in pushing onward to the capital we would leave throughout the country traversed an indelible impression of our justice. Thus the confidence of the best portions of Mexico would be secured, the prestige of her army promptly destroyed, and peace obtained before she was able to rally. On the other hand, General Gaines believed that if we began war without large and instructed forces, we might count on a protracted struggle, as in the Seminole campaigns from 1836 to 1842. The precipices upon the doubtful verge of whose summits we tottered during the war, prove the wisdom of these suggestions. The faithful page of history admonishes that nations as well as individuals who recklessly disregard the essential maxims that prescribe their prudent duties, must sooner or later pay the penalty of neglect. But politicians, uneducated even in the pleasant discipline of militia trainings, do not view matters in the same light as military men whose knowledge of detail, and of the responsibilities of real service, make them unwilling to engage in war, or even to threaten hostilities, without the amplest preparation to perform all they promise. Without such true and earnest discipline warlike array is but a military cheat.
It is vain to predict what might have been the result had the advice of the gallant and prudent Gaines been adopted; yet it cannot be doubted that a well equipped body of twenty-five or thirty thousand men would have marched to the city of Mexico and dictated peace at the cost of one fourth the blood and treasure that were subsequently expended. A lingering policy of hesitation together with the acknowledged inefficiency of Mexico, may palliate the errors of our cabinet; but wise politicians will not henceforth fail to be impressed with the necessity of military preparation which this conflict has taught us.
A war which was originally supposed to be one exclusively of defence, was suddenly changed to an aggressive conflict, and is, perhaps, an additional excuse for our unpreparedness. Most of the events in this narrative derive peculiar interest from the fact that it is the first and only offensive war into which we have been forced. With every known principle of defence we had been long acquainted; for, in the school of Washington, we acquired a sound, practical knowledge, which subsequent experience, under the most perfect system of self-government, enabled us to improve. But it is to be hoped that many years will elapse before our volunteers will be again called from their peaceful duties to take part in an aggressive war, and especially against a government whose theory of rule is the same as our own.
Note.—General Gaines, who commanded the western division, was censured by the War department for having made a requisition on the governor of Louisiana for State troops to be sent to the army in Texas under Taylor's command, at the moment of apprehended danger described in this chapter. General Taylor, for more than a year previous to September, 1845, commanded one of the brigades of Gaines's division, and the latter never knew by authority that the former had been disconnected from him, except upon temporary service, until advised by the secretary of war on the 13th of September. He never received a copy of the authority given to Taylor to go to Texas until after the date of his requisition for Louisiana volunteers, on the 15th of August, 1845; consequently he then considered himself responsible for the strength and support of one of his own brigades, and bound to succor it speedily when he believed it to be in imminent danger.—See Senate doc. No. 378, for his correspondence, and especially p. 48.
FOOTNOTES:
[70] Almonté's report. Kennedy's Texas, chap. 1.
[71] Senate doc. 341, 28th cong. 1st sess. p. 56.
[72] Kennedy's Texas, chap. 1.
[73] Senate doc. No. 341, 28th cong. 1st sess. p. 76.