VERA CRUZ.
When the road to the interior leaves Vera Cruz, it runs for a mile or two along the low, sandy, sea-beaten shore, and then strikes off, nearly at a right angle, in a gap among the sand-hills towards the west. For many miles it winds slowly and heavily through the deep and shifting soil, until, as the traveller approaches the river Antigua, the country begins to rise and fall by gentle elevations like the first heavy swells of the ocean. Passing this river at Puente Nacional over the noble and renowned bridge of that name, the aspect of the territory becomes suddenly changed. The nearer elevations are steeper and more frequent, the road firmer and more rocky, while, in the western distance, the tall slopes of the Sierras rise rapidly in bold and wooded masses. All the features of nature are still strictly tropical, and wherever a scant and thriftless cultivation has displaced the thick vines, the rich flowers, and the dense foliage of the forest, indolent natives may be seen idling about their cane-built huts, or lazily performing only the most necessary duties of life. Further on, at Plan del Rio the geological features of the coast assume another aspect. Here the road again crosses a small streamlet, and then suddenly strikes boldly into the side of the mountain which is to be ascended. About seven leagues from Jalapa the edge of one of the table lands of the Cordillera sweeps down from the west abruptly into this pass of the river Plan. On both sides of this precipitous elevation the mountains tower majestically. The road winds slowly and roughly along the scant sides which have been notched to receive it. When the summit of the pass is attained one side of the road is found to be overlooked by the Hill of the Telegraph, while on the other side the streamlet runs in an immensely deep and rugged ravine, several hundred feet below the level of the table land. Between the road and the river many ridges of the neighboring hills unite and plunge downwards into the impassable abyss. At the foot of the Hill of the Telegraph, rises another eminence known as that of Atalaya, which is hemmed in by other wooded heights rising from below, and forming, in front of the position a boundary of rocks and forests beyond which the sight cannot penetrate.
When Don Manuel Robles left Vera Cruz, after its fall, he was desired by General Canalizo to examine the site of Cerro Gordo. After a full reconnoissance it was his opinion that it afforded a favorable spot in which the invaders might be at least injured or checked, but that was not the proper point to dispute their passage to the capital by a decisive victory. The most favorable position for resistance he believed to be at Corral Falso.
These views, however, did not accord with the opinions of the commander-in-chief, who when the ground was explored under his own eye, resolved to fortify it for the reception of the Americans. The brigades of General Pinzon and Ranjel; the companies of Jalapa and Coatepec, commanded by Mata; and the veterans of the division of Angostura arrived also about this period, and their last sections reached the ground on the 12th. Meanwhile all was activity in the work of hasty fortification. Robles constructed a parapet at the edge of the three hills, but failing to obtain all requisite materials for such a work, his erection merely served to mark the line of the Mexican operations, and to form a breast-work whence the artillery and infantry might command the ground over which, as the defenders supposed, the Americans would be obliged to advance. Colonel Cano had already cut off the access by the road at the point where it turned on the right slope of the Telegraph, by placing a heavy battery. He also formed a covered way leading to the positions on the right, while General Alcorta constructed a circular work on the summit of the eminence and established within it a battery of four guns. In the centre of this the national flag was hoisted, and off to the left nothing was seen but thick, thorny dells and barrancas, which were regarded by Santa Anna as impassable.
Such was the Mexican line of defences extending on the brink of these precipices for nearly a mile, and, throughout it, the commander-in-chief hastened to distribute his forces. The extreme right was placed under the command of General Pinzon, the next position under the naval captain, Buenaventura Aranjo, the next under Colonel Badillo, the next under General Jarero, the next post, at the road, under General La Vega, and finally the extreme left, at the Telegraph, under Generals Vazquez, Uraga and Colonel Palacios. The forces thus in position, according to the Mexican account, amounted to three thousand three hundred and seventy men with fifty-two pieces of ordnance of various calibre. The remainder of the army, with the exception of the cavalry, which remained at Corral Falso until the 15th, was encamped on the sides of the road at the rancheria of Cerro Gordo, situated in the rear of the position. In this neighborhood was placed the reserve, composed of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th light infantry, comprising 1,700 men; and the 1st and 11th regiments of the line, with 780 men, together with their artillery. It is said that the army was badly provided with food and suffered greatly from the climate and the innumerable insects which infest the region.
As Scott advanced against this position the dangers of his enterprize became manifest, and he caused a series of bold reconnoissances to be made by Lieutenant Beaurgard and Captain Lee, of the engineers. He found that the deep rocky ravine of the river protected the right flank of the Mexican position, while abrupt and seemingly impassable mountains and ridges covered the left. Between these points, for nearly two miles, a succession of fortified summits bristled with every kind of available defence, while the top of Cerro Gordo commanded the road on a gentle slope, like a glacis, for nearly a mile. An attack in front, therefore, would have been fatal to the American army, and Scott resolved, accordingly, to cut a road to the right of his position so as to turn the left flank of the Mexicans. To cover his flank movements, on the 17th of April, he ordered General Twiggs to advance against the fort on the steep ascent, in front, and slightly to the left of the Cerro. Colonel Harney, with the rifles and some detachments of infantry and artillery, carried this position under a heavy fire, and, having secured it, elevated a large gun to the summit of the eminence, and made a demonstration against a strong fort in the rear. Early on the 18th, the columns moved to the general attack. General Pillow's brigade assaulted the right of the Mexican entrenchments, and although compelled to retire, produced a powerful impression on that part of the enemy's line. General Twigg's division stormed the vital part of Cerro Gordo, pierced the centre, gained command of the fortifications and cut them off from support; while Colonel Riley's brigade of infantry rushed on against the main body of the foe, turned the guns of their own fort against them, and compelled the panic stricken crowd to fly in utter confusion. Shields' brigade, meanwhile, assaulted the left, and carrying the rear battery, aided materially in completing the rout of the enemy. The whole American force, in action and reserve, was 8,500. Three thousand prisoners, four or five thousand stand of arms, and forty-three pieces of artillery, fell into Scott's hands. In the two days of conflict our loss amounted to 33 officers and 398 men, of whom 63 were killed. The enemy's loss was computed at 1,000 at least, while among the prisoners no less than two hundred and eighty officers and five generals were included. Santa Anna, and General Ampudia who was in the action, escaped with difficulty; and the commander-in-chief, accompanied by a few friends and a small escort, finally reached Orizaba in safety, after encountering numerous dangers amid the mountains and lonely paths through which he was obliged to pass.
This very decisive victory opened the path for the American army to the highlands of the upper plateau of Mexico, and, accordingly, our forces immediately pushed on to Jalapa and Peroté, both of which places were abandoned by the Mexicans without firing a gun. General Worth took possession of Peroté on the 22d of April, and received from Colonel Velasquez, who had been left in charge of the fortress or castle of San Carlos de Peroté by his retreating countrymen, 54 guns and mortars of iron and bronze, 11,065 cannon balls, 14,300 bombs and hand grenades, and 500 muskets. On capturing the post he learned that the rout at Cerro Gordo had been complete. Three thousand cavalry passed the strong hold of Peroté in deplorable plight, while not more than two thousand disarmed and famishing infantry had returned towards their homes in the central regions of Mexico. From Peroté Worth advanced towards Puebla on the direct road to the capital.
Thus was Mexico again reduced to extreme distress by the loss of two important battles, the destruction of her third army raised for this war, and the capture of her most valuable artillery and munitions. But the national spirit of resistance was not subdued. If the government could no longer restrain the invaders by organized armies, it resolved to imitate the example of the mother country during Napoleon's invasion, and to rouse the people to the formation of guerilla bands under daring and reckless officers. Bold as was this effort of patriotic despair, and cruelly successful as it subsequently proved against individuals or detached parties of the Americans, it could effect nothing material against the great body of the consolidated army. Meanwhile the master spirit of the nation—Santa Anna—had not been idle in the midst of his disheartening reverses. In little more than two weeks, he gathered nearly three thousand men from the fragments of his broken army, and marched to Puebla, where he received notice of Worth's advance from Peroté. Sallying forth immediately with his force, he attacked the American general at Amozoque, but, finding himself unable to check his career, returned with a loss of nearly ninety killed and wounded. On the 22d of May, Puebla yielded submissively to General Worth, and Santa Anna retreated in the direction of the national capital, halting at San Martin Tesmalucan, and again at Ayotla, about twenty miles from Mexico. Here he learned that the city was in double fear of the immediate assault of the victorious Americans and of his supposed intention to defend it within its own walls, a project which the people believed would only result, in the present disastrous condition of affairs, in the slaughter of its citizens and ruin of their property. The commander-in-chief halted therefore at Ayotla, and playing dexterously on the hopes and fears of the people in a long despatch addressed to the minister of war, he at length received the Presidential and popular sanction of his return to Mexico.
In truth, the nation at large had no one but Santa Anna, at that moment of utter despair, in whose prestige and talents—in spite of all his misfortunes and defeats—it could rely for even the hope of escape from destruction, if not of ultimate victory.
Whilst the Mexican nation had been thus sorely vexed by intestinal commotions and foreign invasion an Extraordinary Constituent Congress—Congreso Extraordinario Constituyente—had been summoned and met in the capital, chiefly to revise the Constitution, or the "Bases of Political Organization," of 1843, which had been superseded by the temporary adoption of the Federal Constitution of 1824, according to the edict issued by Salas, under the direction of Santa Anna soon after that personage's return from exile. This Extraordinary Congress readopted the old Federal Constitution of 1824 without altering its terms, principles, or phraseology, and made such slight changes as were deemed needful by an Acta Constitutiva y de Reformas, containing thirty articles, which was sanctioned on the 18th, and proclaimed on the 21st of May by Santa Anna, who had reassumed the Presidency. By this approval of the Federal System the Executive entirely abandoned the Central policy for which he had so long contended, but which, as we have seen in the 11th chapter, he no longer believed, or feigned to believe, suitable for the nation.