| He left Puebla with | 10,738 rank and file. |
| At Contreras and Churubusco, there were | 8,497 engaged. |
| At El Molino del Rey and La Casa Mata, | 3,251 " |
| On 12th and 13th September, at Chapultepec,&c. | 7,180 " |
| Final attack on city, after deducting killed, wounded, garrison of Mixcoac and Chapultepec, | 6,000 |
Losses.
| At Contreras and Churubusco, | 137 killed. | 877 wounded. | 38 missing. |
| At El Molino, &c., | 116 " | 665 " | 18 " |
| September 12th, 13th, and 14th, | 130 " | 703 " | 29 " |
| Grand total of losses, 2,703. |
"On the other hand," says Scott in his despatch of 18th September, 1847, "this small force has beaten on the same occasions, in view of the capital, the whole Mexican army, composed, at the beginning, of thirty odd thousand men, posted always in chosen positions, behind entrenchments or more formidable defences of nature and art;—killed or wounded of that number more than 7,000 officers and men,—taken 3,730 prisoners, one-seventh officers, including 13 generals, of whom 3 had been Presidents of this Republic;—captured more than 20 colors and standards, 75 pieces of ordnance, besides 57 wall pieces, 20,000 small arms, and an immense quantity of shot, shells and powder." See Ex. Doc. No. 1 Senate, 30th Congress, 1st Session, p. 384.
Footnotes
[ [74] See Lieut. Smith's Memoir, ut antea, p. 8.
[ [75] This was a great but a rash victory. The American infantry relying chiefly on the bayonet and expecting to effect its object by surprise and even at an earlier hour of the morning, advanced with portions of the three thousand two hundred and fifty-one men to attack at least eleven or twelve thousand Mexicans upon a field selected by themselves, protected by stone walls and ditches, commanded by the fortress of Chapultepec and the ground swept by artillery, while four thousand cavalry threatened an overwhelming charge! We have no criticism to make as to inequality of numbers, but although we believe that our officers did not anticipate so strong a resistance, we are satisfied that it would have been better to rely at first upon the fatal work of mortars and siege pieces, of which we had abundance, and, then, to have permitted the bayonet to complete the task the battering train had begun. If the difficulty of moving rapidly to the scene of action in the night, prevented a night attack and surprise, it would probably have been better to change the plan of battle even at a late hour. In the end, Duncan's great guns, effectually destroyed a post which had been the slaughter house of many a noble American soldier. The Mexican cavalry behaved shamefully. In Colonel Ramsey's notes on the translation of the Mexican Apuntes para la historia de la Guerra, &c., p. 347, he says: "it is now known in Mexico that Santa Anna was in possession of General Scott's order to attack the Molino del Rey in a few hours after it was written, and during the whole of the 7th, troops were taking up their positions on that ground. It is believed further that Santa Anna knew the precise force that was to attack. When, therefore, Scott supposed that Worth would surprise the Mills and Casa Mata, he was met by what? Shall the veil be raised a little further? There was a traitor among the list of high ranking officers in the Mexican army, and for gold he told the Mexican force. Scott had been betrayed by one not an American, not an officer or soldier, but Santa Anna was betrayed by one of his own officers and a Mexican. Santa Anna believed the information he received and acted on it. General Scott did not believe what he learned at night, and—the victory was won!"
[ [76] The importance of the previous capture of El Molino del Rey was proved in this assault upon Chapultepec, for Pillow's division started from this very Mill, from within the enemy's work, and found itself on an equality with the foe up to the very moment of scaling the walls at the crest of the mount, whereas the other assaulting column under Quitman taking the only remaining road to the castle, a causeway leading from Tacubaya, was successfully held at bay by the outworks defending this road at the base of the hill, until after the castle was taken, and the opposing force was taken in rear by troops passing through and around Chapultepec. Had El Molino still been held by the Mexicans, the siege pieces would not have been allowed to play uninterruptedly, nor would the assaulting parties been able to take position or attack with impunity. See Lieut. Smith's Memoir, ut antea p. 8.