The Emancipation of Massachusetts

by Brooks Adams

The whole of the subtle policy, whereof this legislation forms a part, well repays attentive study. The relation of the church to the state was not unlike that of Samuel toward Saul, for no public man could withstand its attack, as was demonstrated by the fate of Vane. Much of the story has been told already in describing the process whereby the clergy acquired a substantial ascendency over the executive and legislature, through their command of the constituencies which it was the labor of their lives to fill with loyal retainers. Nothing therefore remains to be done but to trace the means they employed to invest their order with judicial attributes.

From the outset lawyers were excluded from practice, so the magistrates were nothing but common politicians who were nominated by the priests; thus the bench was not only filled with trusty partisans without professional training or instincts, but also, as they were elected annually, they were practically removable at pleasure should they by any chance rebel. Upon these points there is abundant evidence: “The government was first by way of charter, which was chiefly managed by the preachers, who by their power with the people made all the magistrates & kept them so intirely under obedience, that they durst not act without them. Soe that whensoever anything strange or unusuall was brought before them, they would not determine the matter without consulting the preachers, for should any bee soe sturdy as to presume to act of himself without takeing advice & directions, he might bee sure of it, his magistracy ended with the year. He could bee noe magistrate for them, that was not approved and recommended from the pulpit, & he could expect little recommendation who was not the preacher’s most humble servant. Soe they who treated, caressed & presented the preachers most, were the rulers & magistrates among the people.” [Footnote: An Account of the Colonies, etc., Lambeth MSS. Perry’s Historical Collections, iii. 48.]

From the decisions of such a judiciary the only appeal lay to a popular assembly, which could always be manipulated. Obviously, ecclesiastical supervision over the ordinary course of litigation was amply provided for. The adjudication of the more important controversies was reserved; for it was expressly enacted that doubtful questions and the higher crimes should be judged according to the Word of God. This master-stroke resembled Hilkiah’s when he imposed his book on Josiah; for on no point of discipline were the ministers so emphatic as on the sacred and absolute nature of their prerogative to interpret the Scriptures; nor did they fail to impress upon the people that it was a sin akin to sacrilege for the laity to dispute their exposition of the Bible.

The deduction to be drawn from these premises is plain. The assembled elders, acting in their advisory capacity, constituted a supreme tribunal of last resort, wholly superior to carnal precedent, and capable of evolving whatsoever decrees they deemed expedient from the depths of their consciousness. [Footnote: See Gorton’s case, Winthrop, ii. 146.] The result exemplifies the precision with which a cause operating upon the human mind is followed by its consequence; and the action of this resistless force is painfully apparent in every state prosecution under the Puritan Commonwealth, from Wheelwright’s to Margaret Brewster’s. The absorption of sacerdotal, political, and juridical functions by a single class produces an arbitrary despotism; and before judges greedy of earthly dominion, flushed by the sense of power, unrestrained by rules of law or evidence, and unopposed by a resolute and courageous bar, trials must become little more than conventional forms, precursors of predetermined punishments.

After a period of about half a century these social conditions underwent radical change, but traditions remained that deeply affected the subsequent development of the people, and produced a marked bent of thought in the lawyers who afterward wrote the Constitution.

At the accession of William III. great progress had been made in the science of colonial government; charters had been granted to Connecticut and Rhode Island in 1662 and 1663, which, except in the survival of the ancient and meaningless jargon of incorporation, had a decidedly modern form. By these regular local representative governments were established with full power of legislation, save in so far as limited by clauses requiring conformity with the law of England; and they served their purpose well, for both were kept in force many years after the Revolution, Rhode Island’s not having been superseded until 1843.

The stubborn selfishness of the theocracy led to the adoption of a less liberal policy toward Massachusetts. The nomination of the executive officers was retained by the crown, and the governor was given very substantial means of maintaining his authority; he could reject the councillors elected by the Assembly; he appointed the judges and sheriffs with the advice of this body, whose composition he could thus in a measure control; he had a veto, and was commander-in-chief. Appeals to the king in council were also provided for in personal actions where the matter in difference exceeded three hundred pounds.

On the other hand, the legislature made all appropriations, including those for the salaries of the governor and judges, and was only limited in its capacity to enact statutes by the clause invariably inserted in these patents.

This, therefore, is the precise moment when the modern theory of constitutional limitations first appears defined; distinct from the ancient corporate precedents. By a combination of circumstances also, a sufficient sanction for the written law happened to be provided, thus making the conception complete, for the tribunal of last resort was an English court sustained by ample physical force; nevertheless the great principle of coordinate departments of government was not yet understood, and substantial relief against legislative usurpation had to be sought in a foreign jurisdiction. To lawyers of our own time it is self-evident that the restrictions of an organic code must be futile unless they are upheld by a judiciary not only secure in tenure and pay, but removed as far as may be from partisan passions. This truth, however, remained to be discovered amid the abuses of the eighteenth century, for the position of the provincial bench was unsatisfactory in the last degree. The justices held their commissions at the king’s pleasure, but their salaries were at the mercy of the deputies; they were therefore subject to the caprice of antagonistic masters. Nor was this the worst, for the charter did not isolate the judicial office. Under the theocracy the policy of the clergy had been to suppress the study of law in order to concentrate their own power; hence no training was thought necessary for the magistrate, no politician was considered incompetent to fill the judgment-seat because of ignorance of his duty, and the office-hunter, having got his place by influence, was deemed at liberty to use it as a point of vantage, from whence to prosecute his chosen career. For example, the first chief justice was Stoughton, who was appointed by Phips, probably at the instigation of Increase Mather. As he was bred for the church, he could have had no knowledge to recommend him, and his peculiar qualifications were doubtless family connections and a narrow and bigoted mind; he was also lieutenant-governor, a member of the council, and part of the time commander-in-chief.

Thomas Danforth was the senior associate, who is described by Sewall as “a very good husbandman, and a very good Christian, and a good councillor;” but his reputation as a jurist rested upon a spotless record, he having been the most uncompromising of the high church managers.