The Supernatural in the New Testament, Possible, Credible, and Historical / Or, An Examination of the Validity of Some Recent Objections Against Christianity as a Divine Revelation

by C. A. Row

I must now consider whether supernatural occurrences devoid of all moral environment, are capable of proving a divine commission.

It has frequently been the habit, both of the opponents and the defenders of Christianity, to discuss the subject of the evidential value of miracles apart from all reference to their moral environment. As, however, the overwhelming majority of the miracles recorded in the New Testament profess such an environment, the question of the value of supposed miracles which are destitute of it, forms no legitimate portion of the subject before us. What might or might not be proved by them, even if it could be determined satisfactorily, is quite foreign to the present discussion, which is limited to the truth or falsehood of those contained in the New Testament. The most important of these are not mere displays of power, but have an unquestionable moral environment impressed upon them, and they profess to have been wrought for a definite end and purpose. This is less distinctly marked in some of the miracles recorded in the Old Testament, but with them I have no present concern. It will be sufficient to observe that while many of them [pg 078] were unquestionably performed in attestation of a divine mission, as a class they bear another distinctive purpose, viz. that of correcting the polytheistic tendencies of the age. Hence their leading impress is that of power. The necessity of counteracting the tendency which I have referred to, rendered it necessary emphatically to assert the Lordship of one God over universal nature, in opposition to that conception of it so widely diffused throughout the ancient world, which saw a distinct power exerted in every combination of material forces.

The very conception of a miracle as a supernatural occurrence, brought about for the purpose of authenticating a revelation, distinguishes such an action from one which involves only a simple exhibition of power. All acts of moral agents must display a purpose of some kind. No conception of God is of the smallest religious value which does not contemplate him as being a moral agent and a being on whose actions a moral character of some kind must be impressed. Consequently an act entirely devoid of all moral aspect cannot prove that it has resulted from direct divine intervention. The difficulty has originated from dividing into three separate parts an action which is essentially one, and contemplating separately the objective fact in the supernatural action, the circumstances attending its performance, and the purpose for which it was performed. It is the union of all these which constitutes the occurrence in question an evidential miracle.

Let me now offer a few observations on a very important point for our consideration. Can abstract doctrinal statements or moral truths be proved by miracles?

I have already observed that as far as the miracles of the New Testament were wrought for directly evidential purposes, they were performed, not to prove particular doctrines, but as the credentials of a divine mission, or that they formed a part of the superhuman manifestation of our Lord. The apparent exceptions are those which were performed to attract attention to the divine message, to assist in the foundation of the Church, or to bear witness to the truth of the Resurrection. These last were in fact attestations to the reality of the Messianic character of Jesus Christ, which is the highest conceivable form of a divine mission, on which miracle the truth of Christianity is directly pledged by the sacred writers. A mere statement of the facts of the New Testament is a practical solution of the difficulty. It nowhere affirms that a miracle was ever performed to bear witness to the truth of an abstract doctrine.

I will now endeavour to lay down some general principles as to the relation in which doctrinal statements stand to supernatural manifestations. As on such a subject it will be impossible to lay down a general rule which will be applicable to every supernatural event, it will be necessary to consider each case by itself.

First, that of our Lord.

We believe his statements about unknown truths, on the ground that he was perfectly veracious, and had the most perfect knowledge of the subject on which he spoke. The actions which he performed (I mean by these, not his miracles merely, but the entire course of his working) are evidences of his divine character. He himself avers that he possessed the most intimate knowledge of God, and of the great realities of the [pg 080] spiritual world. “We speak,” says he, “that we do know, and testify that we have seen.” “I speak that which I have seen with my Father.” Throughout the Synoptics likewise he is represented as having the most entire knowledge of both spiritual and moral truth, and as teaching direct from his own insight. We believe the assertions, not because he confirmed their truth by the performance of a miracle, but because he afforded evidence that he was a veracious witness, and fully acquainted with the subject on which he spoke. His miraculous actions proved that he was God's messenger, and as such were additional attestations to his veracity.

The acceptance of such affirmations as worthy of the highest credit may be correctly designated as acts of faith; but let us never forget that such acts of faith are also high exercises of reason. Writers in opposition to Christianity are never wearied in running a contrast between reason and faith, and in representing the two as standing in opposition to each other, and belonging to wholly different regions of thought. Nor can it be denied that they have received much encouragement to do this by the indistinct or misleading statements of some Christian writers on the subject. Between them no little confusion has been introduced into the controversy, and a general idea has become prevalent that reason and faith are two distinct, if not opposing faculties, each of which acts within a subject matter of its own. The effect of this confusion has been disastrous.

My contention is that faith is only another name for reason when operating on a particular class of phenomena. To enter on an elaborate proof of this would be out of place here; a few illustrations must therefore suffice. [pg 081] To accept information from persons who have knowledge of subjects which we have not studied, or who have mental powers of insight or perception of which we are destitute, or who have seen phenomena which we have not seen, is an act in conformity with our highest reason. A constant effort has been made by unbelievers to confound faith with credulity: Faith is not credulity, but the acceptance of truth on adequate evidence, and the rejection of mere affirmation, when the evidence is inadequate. On the other hand multitudes of Christians have assiduously laboured to decry reason as the instrument for the investigation of truth. I admit that it is not a perfect instrument, but it is the only one which we have. The light of a candle may not be all that we can wish, but if we have no other we shall not improve our condition by extinguishing it.