I fully concede that natural phenomena and even the phenomena of the mind of man, only testify directly to the existence of a power adequate to their production, and that we cannot directly infer from them the presence of omnipotence. But this is to quarrel about words. For the power manifested in nature and in man is so great that the human mind can make no distinction between it and omnipotence; or in other words, it justly infers from its manifestations that the power which could originate this universe and all things in it must be capable of effecting anything which is possible. [pg 107] To this mind, whether in or out of nature, our reason ascribes the attributes of intelligence and will. Such a power it is incapable of conceiving as inherent in material forces; it therefore assumes that this power exists outside nature, and is capable of controlling it.
It follows therefore that the reasoning is fallacious, which asserts that the conception of a supreme Being which represents Him as a spirit independent of the physical universe, and able from a standing-point external to nature to interrupt its order, is a conception which we must seek from revelation, and cannot be arrived at by any exertion of our rational powers on the facts of nature and of man. Its apparent plausibility has arisen solely from ignoring the presence of man, either in nature or outside it, and neglecting to take the facts of human nature, man's reason, conscience and will, into consideration. To affirm that, independently of man's moral and intellectual being, physical nature, its forces and laws, can prove nothing, is a simple platitude. We have not to go to revelation for the principles on which we reason, but to man, and the phenomena of his rational, self-conscious, and voluntary agency. It follows, therefore, that the affirmation that in conducting the Christian argument we reason from God to miracles and from miracles to God, is utterly disproved. Yet the writer before me has ventured to affirm that, when we commence with the being of a personal God as the groundwork of our reasonings, we begin and end with a bare assumption.
The philosophical writings of Dr. Mansel are also pressed into the service for the purpose of discrediting the evidences of Christianity, and, I own, with considerably greater reason. Mr. Herbert Spencer has also invoked them in confirmation of his theory that God is unknown and unknowable. He refers to them [pg 108] in the following words: “Here I cannot do better than avail myself of the demonstration which Mr. Mansel, carrying out in detail the doctrine of Sir W. Hamilton, has given us in his ‘Limits of Religious Thought.’ And I gladly do this, not only because his mode of presentation cannot be improved, but because writing as he does in defence of current theology, his reasonings will be more acceptable to the majority of readers.”
Before referring to Dr. Mansel as an unquestionable authority on this subject, it would only have been candid in both writers to have informed their readers that not only have his principles been repudiated by a considerable number of Christian writers as unsound, but they have been carefully examined by that eminent atheistic philosopher, Mr. Mill, who gives it as his deliberate opinion that they are founded on fallacious principles. It is absurd to urge principles, though they have been maintained by an eminent Christian writer, which an eminent unbeliever has pronounced unsound, as a clear and conclusive argument against Christianity.
The work of Dr. Mansel may be described as an attempt to prove the truth of Christianity on the principles of the most sceptical philosophy. It may be briefly stated thus: Reason is incapable of forming any idea of God as He is, whether as the Infinite, the Absolute, or the first Cause. All the conceptions which we can frame on the subject are mutually self-destructive. On similar principles our conceptions of His moral attributes are wholly inadequate to inform us of His real perfections. It by no means follows that our human conception of benevolence or justice is a measure of the divine benevolence, or of divine justice; and so of His other attributes. It is affirmed that because they [pg 109] are the attributes of an infinite Being, they lie beyond the possibility of being realized in human thought. Consequently, holiness in God may admit of very different manifestations from holiness in man. Upon these principles, which affirm the inadequacy of the human intellect, even to conceive of anything as it exists in God, it follows that our only possible conceptions of God are relative; or, to use the word chosen by the author in relation to Christianity, regulative; i.e. fitted to regulate our conduct, but not to illuminate our understanding.
Upon the assumption that reason, when it attempts to analyse our ideas of the Infinite, the Absolute, or the first Cause, lands us in hopeless contradictions, Dr. Mansel arrives at the conclusion that it is incapable of forming any conception of God as he actually exists. It follows as a necessary consequence from this, that even by revelation we are only capable of attaining relative ideas of Him, and that these relative ideas do not represent His real nature, but are only regulative of conduct, i.e. we are to act upon them as if they were true. E.g. God is revealed as holy. Our only conception of holiness is our human conception of it. But we cannot know that this is an adequate measure of the divine holiness. God is declared to be benevolent. We have no conception of benevolence but that which is derived from the human mind. So likewise with respect to justice. But benevolence and justice as they exist in God may differ from these qualities as they exist in man. The same thing follows as a necessary conclusion from Dr. Mansel's premises with respect to all the other attributes of God. Nothing will better illustrate the position to which this argument reduces us than to apply it to the truthfulness or veracity of God. All that we know about truthfulness [pg 110] is as it exists in finite beings, that is, in men. But God is an infinite being. It follows therefore that truthfulness in man is no adequate representation of truthfulness as it exists in God, that is to say, that the divine veracity may differ from our human conception of it. This is certainly a very startling position.
If, therefore, these principles are correct, acquiescence on the part of man in the divine character is impossible. It is impossible to love a being who does not present to us the aspect of loveliness; or to reverence one who does not present to us an aspect capable of exciting this emotion; or to feel trust in a being of whose justice we have no certainty that it resembles our conception of justice; or to rely on the promises of one whose veracity may differ from our own. Such feelings cannot be made to order. They can only be generated by the contemplation of a being who is holy, benevolent, just, and true, in the ordinary acceptation of these words. They cannot be excited by any merely regulative ideas. We love, reverence, and trust, not ideas or conceptions, but persons, possessing moral attributes. But on the principle of merely regulative ideas of God, the assertion that “God is love,” loses all its value, if God is not what I mean by love, but, because he is infinite, he may be something else, I know not what; and thus the great precept of the moral law, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, mind, soul, and strength,” becomes meaningless. Such devotion of our entire nature cannot be created by the mere command to render it. It can only be rendered to a being whose claims over us we both feel and know to be an absolute reality, and to whom on the conviction of their reality we can offer ourselves up a voluntary sacrifice. But if we cannot know Him as He is, how is the fire of devotion to Him [pg 111] to be kindled in our hearts? How shall we trust in Him? How shall we acquiesce in His character? How shall we worship Him, how shall we adore Him, if it is true that the justice, benevolence, or holiness of the divine character may not resemble our conception of them? Nay, more: the theory in question lays the axe to the root of the Christian revelation itself. There is no affirmation of the New Testament more decisive than that Jesus Christ in His divine and human personality is the image of the invisible God, as far as His moral perfections are concerned. Are the perfections of the character of Jesus Christ only regulative, or are they real representations of these attributes as they exist in God? Are the divine attributes of holiness, benevolence, or justice, adequately represented by the manifestations of them, as made by Jesus Christ? If we accept the testimony of St. John's Gospel, our Lord himself has expressly affirmed, “He that hath seen me hath seen the Father” (John xiv. 9). But this is impossible if our conceptions of God's moral attributes are only regulative, and if the human idea of holiness is no adequate representation of the divine.
However erroneous a system may be, yet if it has been elaborated by a powerful mind, it has generally some foundation in reason, and I am far from affirming that, with considerable qualifications, some important elements of truth may not be found in that of Dr. Mansel. It is well that we should be made to feel that there are limits of thought beyond which the human mind cannot penetrate, and that there are profundities of metaphysics which an imperfect measuring-line cannot reach. But placing the matter as he has, the Christian apologist may well feel indebted to Mr. Mill for his crushing demolition of the dangerous portions of Dr. Mansel's system. When unbelievers quote the [pg 112] authority of Dr. Mansel, why do they not also tell their readers that there was at least one unbeliever of very high logical power, who wrote against the validity of his system.
It is one thing to affirm that we cannot penetrate to the depths of the Deity, and that after we have raised our thoughts to the highest, there is something higher still; and quite another to affirm that our highest thoughts of him have no validity; or, to use the terms of a fashionable philosophy, that God is unknown and unknowable, that no true conception of Him can be formed in thought; in one word, that he is absolutely unthinkable. The difficulties of this subject have arisen mainly from discussing it in terms of pure abstractions, instead of embodying them in a concrete form. It is impossible in this place to enter on the profound depths involved in these questions; but a few observations will be necessary for the purpose of clearing away the difficulties in which our opponents seek to involve the subject of miracles. I shall confine myself to our conceptions of the Infinite.
It is affirmed that no conception of the infinite can be framed in thought; that it is therefore unthinkable, and transcends the limits of human knowledge; that it is a negation; and that therefore our reason is unable to affirm anything respecting it; that the idea of personality is incompatible with that of infinity; and that therefore when we speak of God as a person who possesses infinite perfections, we enter on a region where human thought is invalid, and respecting which all affirmation involves a contradiction.