The Supernatural in the New Testament, Possible, Credible, and Historical / Or, An Examination of the Validity of Some Recent Objections Against Christianity as a Divine Revelation

by C. A. Row

But there are the difficulties about the Absolute and the First Cause. It has been urged that the Absolute is that which is out of relation to every thing else—perfectly independent in itself. It is argued, therefore, if God be this Absolute, he cannot be the first Cause, because a cause can only be a cause by its being in relation to that of which it is the cause. For similar reasons, if he be the first Cause, He cannot be the Absolute. But as He is both, He must therefore be unknowable and unthinkable.

It is impossible in a treatise like this to enter into such profound metaphysical questions. For my present purpose, I can safely refer to Mr. Mill's discussion on this subject. As far as the views in question bear adversely on Christian evidence, he has sufficiently refuted them. It is not fair for unbelievers to put forth these positions as subversive of Christianity, without answering the reasonings of so eminent an unbeliever as Mr. Mill in proof of their inconclusiveness, or even alluding to the fact that he has pronounced them untenable.

There is no point which reasoners of this class have [pg 118] laboured more diligently to prove than that it is impossible for human reason to think of God as a person. The assumption of the personality of God is the foundation of the Christian argument, without which, even if the occurrence of miracles could be proved as objective facts, they would have no evidential value. It follows, therefore, that if our only mode of attaining the knowledge of the personality of God be from revelation, we are arguing in a vicious circle.

Briefly stated, the argument of unbelief is as follows: God is the infinite Being. Personality is a conception which necessarily involves the finite. Therefore it cannot be predicated of an infinite Being. It follows therefore that to speak of God as infinite, and at the same time as a person, involves a contradiction.

It is an unquestionable fact that the only beings whom we are directly acquainted with as persons are finite beings, i.e. men. No less certain is it that the only beings whom we know to be possessed of wisdom and intelligence are finite beings, i.e. men, and those various classes of animals by which the latter quality is manifested. The argument is equally valid for proving that wisdom and intelligence can only belong to finite beings; and consequently that the existence of wisdom and intelligence in the first Cause of all things is inconceivable, and the assumption that He is wise and intelligent is a contradiction. The same argument is no less valid against ascribing any moral perfection to Him, or in fact any other, for all our knowledge of such things is both in itself finite, and derived from finite beings.

But it even goes further than this. If, as the positive philosophy lays down, our real knowledge of things is confined to direct subjects of cognition; as the only beings which we know to be possessed of wisdom and [pg 119] intelligence are men and animals, it is quite contrary to sound reasoning to infer that these qualities can be possessed by any other class of finite beings. To do so is to transfer human conceptions to beings who are not human. Equally valid would be the reasoning of an animal, if he could reason on the subject, as for instance a horse or a dog, that the existence of wisdom and intelligence beyond his own limited sphere was an unwarrantable assumption. Pantheists have also propounded theories on the assumption of the existence in nature of an unconscious wisdom and intelligence. This assumption is open to the most formidable objections; but even on their own principles it is utterly invalid; for if on the grounds which they allege it is impossible to ascribe personality to God, the same reasonings are equally valid against ascribing wisdom and intelligence to unconscious nature.

I conclude, therefore, that it by no means follows because our direct knowledge of personality is confined to human beings, and is derived from them, that personality itself cannot be conceived of as a property belonging to any other than human beings. It is absurd to maintain that the qualities of things must be confined to those things from which we learn their existence.

But it will be objected that the very essential notion of personality is limitation; consequently that although it may be conceived of as belonging to limited beings, it transcends the power of thought to conceive of it as the attribute of a being who is unlimited or infinite; that is to say, that although it lies within the power of thought to conceive of the Being who had adequate power to build the universe as a Person, because the power may be a limited power, yet when I ascribe to Him beyond this the possession of all possible power, [pg 120] the conception of personality becomes unthinkable. This is the real meaning of the affirmation, unless our reasonings are to be confined within the region of abstractions. But we have no assurance that such reasonings are valid, unless we can bring them to the test of some concrete form of thought.

Next: It by no means follows because our conception of personality is derived from finite beings, that it is necessarily limited to them; and that it cannot be thought of in connection with a being, some of whose attributes are infinite and others perfect; in other words, that the idea of finiteness is necessarily involved in that of personality. What are the conceptions that make up the idea of our own personality? I reply, the power to affirm “I” of one's own being—the possession of will—the power of self-consciousness, and these in union with rationality. These conceptions we undoubtedly derive from the contemplation of our own finite being, but there is nothing in them which is necessarily limited to the finite. If the conception of an infinite being is possible (and the fact that it is so constantly introduced into this controversy proves that it is possible), then there is no reason why these conceptions, which certainly contain in them nothing quantitative, should not be applicable to such a being. The real fact is, these conceptions are not inherently finite, because they have nothing in them of a quantitative character,—they are only derived from a being whose manifestation in space we conceive of under the form of limitation, and whose attributes are neither infinite nor perfect.

I must call attention to the remark already made that the correct representation of God in thought is not that of a pure abstraction, the infinite Being, but of a being who possesses attributes, some of which are [pg 121] infinite and others perfect. To affirm that such a being is a person, is not to attempt to think that which is unthinkable. When we affirm that God possesses the power adequate to build the universe, and all possible power beside, we do not ascribe to Him that of which it is impossible to predicate the possession of will or self-consciousness. When we affirm that such a being exists now, that he has existed in all past known times, and that no limits in point of time are conceivable of him, there is nothing contradictory in ascribing to such a Being personality. It is quite thinkable that an ultimate particle may never have had a beginning and never will have an end; no less so is it that such a particle may be possessed of personality, for it is finite. Surely therefore there is nothing in the ascription to God of existence without beginning and without end, which destroys the idea of His personality.