Again: The author affirms “that the solitary instance of an efficient cause, if it be distinguished from the other forces of nature by the possession of an initiatory impulse, is from the moment when that power is exerted subject to physical laws like all other forces; and there is no instance producible, or even logically conceivable, of any power whose effects are opposed to the ultimate [pg 147] ruling of the laws of nature. The occurrence of anything opposed to these laws is incredible.” p. 48.
What is meant, I ask, by “the intimate ruling of the laws of nature”? Even if we substitute forces for laws, the meaning is sufficiently obscure. Probably the expression is intended to mean the combined result effected by the energy of all the forces in nature. If these include all mental as well as all material forces, then the assertion is a simple truism, that nothing can be contrary to itself. But if they exclude mental force, then the results which they produce are clearly opposed to the ultimate ruling of the forces of unintelligent nature. Numerous instances are not only logically conceivable, but actually producible. The occurrence, therefore, of anything opposed to the ultimate rulings of these unintelligent physical forces is not incredible. It is perfectly true that man can only produce results through the agency of these physical forces; but he can modify their results, and so use them as to make them the means of effectuating his purposes. It is quite true that nothing can occur opposed to the forces of nature; that is to say, that, while the force of gravitation is in energy, and no other force is present capable of overcoming its power, the ascension of a human body into heaven is impossible. But who has ever affirmed that it was possible? Those who affirm that an ascension has taken place, also assert that another force was in active energy, which was capable of counteracting the force of gravitation. This assertion, therefore, is totally irrelevant to the point at issue.
The consideration of the next question before us may very properly be introduced, by quoting the following passage of the same author:
“Our highest attainable conception of infinite power [pg 148] and wisdom is based on the universality and invariability of law, and inexorably excludes as unworthy and anthropomorphistic any idea of its fitful suspension.”
This at once raises the very important question, whether there is anything in the performance of a miracle inconsistent with the divine character and perfections. It has been often alleged by those who deny the possibility of miracles, that God energizes in the universe in conformity with invariable laws, which express the uniform mode of the divine working. From these, as the result of his wisdom, He will never deviate. To alter or vary from this mode of acting implies that the machinery of the universe, through which He acts, is imperfect. The supposition that He has worked a miracle therefore involves the assumption that He has ceased from one mode of action and adopted another; or, in other words, that the forces of the universe fail to effectuate his purposes; or that the whole machine has got out of order and requires rectification. Any action of this kind in the case of a Being possessed of all power, is a reflection both on his wisdom and his immutability. Still further: it is affirmed by some that the love of order is an attribute so inherent in Deity, that it is inconceivable that any alteration in the existing order of the universe should take place under his government.
One objection raised in the above quotation I may dismiss summarily, viz. the idea that God interposes with any fitful interventions in the universe. The idea of fitful intervention is quite foreign to the conception of a miracle, which is described in the New Testament as one of the means by which he realizes his deliberate purposes. I shall elsewhere disprove the allegation that Revelation is an intervention of the Creator to rectify a miscarriage in his creative work.
It will also be desirable in this place to answer the charge of anthropomorphism so frequently urged against the defenders of Christianity. When they speak of God as a person, they are charged with manufacturing a gigantic man. When they ascribe to Him a moral character, or describe Him as acting in nature, they are then accused of making a God out of a number of conceptions which are purely human. This fault, if it be one, must be shared alike by philosophers, men of science, and theologians. The plain fact is, that man has no conceptions but human ones. To abandon these is to cease to think altogether. When philosophers and men of science speak of nature, they are obliged to apply to it conceptions which are strictly true only of man. We are obliged to do precisely the same with respect to God. So far all thought, the most elevated and the most ordinary, is anthropomorphic. The term can be fairly used as a reproach only when certain material conceptions or degraded passions are directly affirmed to exist in the divine mind.
The author, in the following passage, places the objection before us in a still more striking light: “Being therefore limited to reason for our feeble conceptions of the divine Being of which we are capable, and reason being totally opposed to an order of nature so imperfect as to require or permit repeated interference, and rejecting the supposition of arbitrary suspension of law, such a conception of the Deity as is proposed by theologians must be pronounced irrational, and derogatory to the wisdom and perfection which we recognize in the invariable order of nature. It is impossible for us to conceive the supreme Being acting otherwise than we actually see in nature; and if we recognize in the universe the operation of his infinite wisdom and power, it is in the immutable order and regularity of all phenomena, [pg 150] and the eternal prevalence of law that we see their highest manifestation.”
It is asserted by this writer and a great number of others, that the most perfect conception of the universe is that of a machine, which when once set into action shall go on eternally grinding out its results without the smallest occasion for the intervention of its Maker. According to this view, all the He has to do for the future after the machine is once set into operation, is to retire from the scene of His creative work, and to contemplate the results of its wonderful operations. Any intervention on His part would imply a defect in the construction of the machine. It follows therefore that the most perfect conception of God (if there be one) is that of a perfect mechanist and chemist, who has originally formed matter with its properties and forces acting in conformity with invariable law, and that this has been done by Him with such perfection, that they have gone on ever since evolving whatever has existed, without the need of His intervention or supervision; or to put it in other words, after the original act of creation, His presence in the universe may be dispensed with as unnecessary. The universe is therefore a self-acting machine which goes on in an eternal series of self-evolutions.
Such a conception may be the most worthy one that we can form of a perfect mechanist or chemist, though it may be doubtful how far the idea of having his services dispensed with for the future would be wholly satisfactory to him. It is far from clear, however, that it is the most perfect conception we can form of God. The creations of the mechanist and of the chemist are destitute alike of feeling, reason and volition, a moral nature, conscience, and spiritual affections. They may therefore when completed be left to themselves; and [pg 151] the more perfect the irrational machine may be, the more perfectly it will grind out its results. But many of the constructions of God possess attributes, which exhibit other qualities in their maker than those of a perfect mechanist or chemist. It follows, therefore, that this is not the most perfect nor the most worthy conception which we can form of God.