On this point Archbishop Trench has laid down the following position broadly: “If Jesus knew that the Jewish belief in demoniacal possession was baseless and that Satan did not exercise such power over the bodies or spirits of men there would be in such language that absence of agreement between thoughts and words in which the essence of a lie consists.”
If this position is correct it involves a principle far more extensive than the case immediately before us. It is nothing less than that our Lord neither in his formal teaching nor in his conversation should have used language which was other than scientifically correct. It might be argued, that if He had done so He would have lent his sanction to the error which it involved. Even if the principle thus laid down could be confined to religious truth (which it cannot), it would then have been necessary that whenever the current ideas, or the mode of conception of the day contained an assumption involving an incorrect theory or endangering a religious error, our Lord ought to have corrected it in the course of his teaching. If we admit [pg 258] that demoniacal possession was a real agency there can be no doubt that the Jews would confound many cases of ordinary mania with it. This being so, if the principle is correct, our Lord ought to have pointed out the distinction. Again, even if it is assumed that demoniacal agency was sometimes manifested in the phenomena of witchcraft, there can be no doubt that much of it was due to human imposture. On the principle laid down by the Archbishop our Lord ought to have corrected every error that was prevalent on that subject. On the same principle it would have been impossible for him to have used an ad hominem argument or in fact any form of expression founded on an erroneous conception. It is therefore evident that the principle, if accepted at all, can only be accepted under very considerable qualifications, or we shall convert our Lord from the revealer of truth and teacher of Christianity into one whose duty it was to combat every erroneous opinion of the day. On such a theory it is difficult to see how our Lord was not bound to correct every erroneous opinion then current respecting the first and second chapters of Genesis, and to point out their true relation to the modern discoveries of geology, for He expressly referred to the second chapter in his teaching. He also referred to the flood, respecting which many erroneous opinions were undoubtedly current. If the principle is good it might be urged that He sanctioned those errors by his silence.
The same principle must also have been applicable to many other erroneous opinions which the Jews entertained respecting the interpretation of the Old Testament. In fact it would be difficult to assign any limits to our Lord's duty of correcting popular errors which had any kind of bearing on religious truth.
But to return to the demoniacs. Is there any thing [pg 259] inconsistent with our Lord's truthfulness, if we suppose that they were lunatics and nothing more, in his using the current language of the day respecting them? Let it be observed that two considerations are really involved; first, our Lord is represented as conversing directly with the demoniac. Secondly, He also occasionally speaks of demoniacal possession in his ordinary teaching in the current language of the day. Now if it be admitted to be consistent with his truthfulness to address such language to the maniac, is it equally so to employ such language in his discourses to others?
I observe first, that if possession was mania, the real ground of the popular error was an erroneous opinion as to the cause of a natural disorder. The popular belief in fact ascribed it to supernatural instead of natural causes. So far, but no farther, it touched religious questions. To correct the error involved not merely the teaching of religious truth, but in this particular case the enunciation of sounder principles of mental philosophy. I think that I may fearlessly affirm that the teaching of scientific truth, either mental or material, did not come within the scope of our Lord's divine mission. Political truth is a part of moral truth, and moral truth is closely allied to religious truth. Now although Christianity is a power which will ultimately reform the political world, our Lord expressly affirmed that it was no part of his mission to enunciate political truth.
In the same manner it may have formed no direct portion of his mission to teach correct views respecting the origin of mania, or to counteract the opinions which ascribed it to supernatural causes.
If this principle is correct, there is nothing inconsistent with his truthfulness if when our Lord conversed with a supposed demoniac, He addressed him in language [pg 260] which took for granted the truth of his delusions. Even if it is supposed that truthfulness required that He should have exposed a popular delusion, surely it was no occasion for doing so, when He was addressing a madman. Who would affirm that a physician is wanting in truthfulness if he addresses his patient in terms of his own delusions, or imagines that it is his duty to enter into a discussion with a madman as to the causes of his malady?
On these principles it is quite consistent with our Lord's truthfulness to suppose that the dialogue with the demoniac of Gadara actually occurred, while He himself knew that possession was nothing but mania. Let us suppose that the man was a raving madman. He had been treated cruelly. He rushed towards Jesus and was awed by the greatness of his character. The dialogue takes place, as it is described by the Evangelist. I see no want of truthfulness on our Lord's part, nor can I conceive any necessity for explaining to the man that he was not possessed by a multitude of demons; or if the madman requested that the demons by whom he imagined himself possessed might be allowed to go into the swine, that our Lord should explain to him that it was impossible that they should do so because the idea of the demoniac was a delusion. The case would be one of confused or double personality, and accordingly the narrator has described the demons and the man as alternately speaking, and our Lord as addressing them. In such a case the form of the narrative would be modified by the subjective impressions of the narrator.
But the words which our Lord is described as addressing to the demoniac lad also require consideration. St. Mark describes them as follows. Jesus rebuked the foul spirit, saying unto him, “Thou deaf [pg 261] and dumb spirit, I charge thee come out of him, and enter no more into him; and the spirit cried, and rent him sore and came out of him.” Let us suppose that the disease was mania, and that our Lord knew it to be so, but that the father, as well as the maniac and the others who were present believed that it was caused by the action of an evil spirit. What was there inconsistent with veracity in addressing the maniac in terms of his own delusions? If it is urged that the belief in possession was a superstition, and that to use such language tended to confirm the belief, I reply that if we assume that our Lord was bound not to use the language which was common among his hearers in speaking of such diseases, or that He ought to have given explanations of their true causes, then we assume that his character as a revealer of Christianity rendered it necessary that in the course of his public ministry He should correct all the errors which He encountered, and never use language which had originated in them.
The words which are ascribed to our Lord by the Evangelist when He stilled the tempest will throw light on this subject. St. Mark gives them as follows: “He rebuked the winds and said to the sea, Peace, be still.” The word here rendered “Be still” is in the Greek far more emphatic, Be gagged (πεφίμωσο). In the case of the demoniac our Lord is represented as rebuking the evil spirit. Here He rebukes the waves. Now it is only possible to rebuke rational agents. Such an expression would therefore be only accurate if addressed to a being who was capable of hearing it, and who was uttering load cries. It may be objected that the expression favours the notion that the speaker supposed the roaring of the waves to be the voice of an evil spirit, who was exciting the tempest, or, in other words, that He gave countenance to the heathen [pg 262] belief, that it was the voice of Æolus, the spirit of the storm. Whatever amount of superstition may be attributed to the Jews at the time of the Advent, it will scarcely be urged that the followers of Jesus attributed the roaring of the gale to the voice of a demon. Still it may be urged on the principles above referred to that the words uttered by our Lord tended to confirm superstitions notions as to the nature and origin of storms. I argue, on the other hand, that these expressions prove indisputably that the language used by Him was not always intended to be a literal description of fact, any more than the numerous similar addresses to the inanimate creation which we find in the Psalms.